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Abstract
Emerging influenza viruses continue to challenge public health. The problem is public
health science professionals have been battling emerging human influenza diseases with
tactile and reactionary methods because there is a lack of knowledge and data at the
human-animal interface. This research was a baseline study of the proportion of influenza
A virus (IAV) in urban and rural communities in California. The population was artificial
recirculating water ponds in the geographic locations of rural and urban Californian
communities. Surface water samples [N = 182] were collected from artificial recirculating
ponds in California. Positivity for IAV was verified by real time RT-PCR, MDCK cells
for virus infectivity, nucleotide sequencing of the RNA genome, and phylogenic analysis
of IAV H5N1 strains. The proportion of IAV in rural and urban ponds favored the greater
burden of IAV in urban ponds over rural ponds. The presence of waterfowl and IAV M
gene sequence positivity were found not to be significantly related. The geochemical
properties—pH, salinity, and water temperature at time of collection—were not
predictors of IAV infectivity. This baseline research study validated these water ponds as
resource sites for IAV surveillance and monitoring. The social change implications of
this study can be recognized at the national and international levels, to the population
level, and to the individual level by providing geospatial analysis and spatial-temporal
data for IAV surveillance, initiating biosecurity measures to protect poultry industries in
the United States and Brazil, and contributing to the current IAV strain library.
Contributions to the IAV strain library may be used to develop vaccines against human
pandemics.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Background
The “Spanish” influenza H1N1 pandemic of 1918–1919, which caused
approximately 50 million deaths worldwide, has remained an ominous warning to
professionals in the field of public health (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006). Since then,
new subtypes of human influenza A viruses have been detected at various times: in 1957,
the H2N2 subtype (Asian influenza) replaced the H1N1 subtype; in 1968, the H3N2
subtype (Hong Kong virus) appeared; and in 1977, the H1N1 virus reappeared (Webster,
Bean, Gorman, Chambers, & Kawaoka, 1992). Influenza disease emergence data are
collected year-round, but economic strain on global public health to prevent and treat
human influenza outbreaks has been enormous. Therefore, it is imperative to identify
potential sources of the virus to help minimize outbreak occurrence.
There are gaps in knowledge about the association between molecular structure,
epidemiologic and clinical characteristics, and the impact of ecological and other
contextual aspects of influenza viruses. Gaps in understanding the role of the physical
and biogeochemical environment as an integral part of the influenza A viral transmission
also exist (Lang, Kelly, & Runstadler, 2008). More importantly, gaps in knowledge about
the burden of influenza A virus in rural and urban community settings remain present.
Researchers have expected influenza risk assessment tools (IRAT) to prompt additional
studies to address these key gaps in the knowledge (Trock, Burke, & Cox, 2012).
The problem in this study was that public health scientists have been battling
emerging human influenza diseases with tactile and reactionary methods because there
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was a lack of knowledge and data at the human-animal interface. This baseline study of
the proportion of influenza A virus in urban and rural community settings may provide
knowledge and biological data of significant interest at the human-animal interface. This
biological data may be of significant interest for the development of IRAT.
Summary of Chapter
This chapter is a moderately detailed presentation of my dissertation study. For
the benefit of the reader, the introduction of this manuscript is divided into eighteen
major topic sections: research literature, gaps in the knowledge, necessity of this study,
problem statement, relevance of the problem, gaps in the current literature, the purpose of
the study, research questions, research hypotheses, theoretical framework, relationship of
theory to study approach and research questions, conceptual framework, nature of the
study, definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance.
The major topic sections; research literature, gaps in the knowledge, necessity of this
study, problem statement, relevance of the problem, and gaps in the current literature are
detailed with further explanation in Chapter 2. The major topic sections; purpose of the
study, research questions, research hypotheses, relationship of theory to study approach
and research questions, conceptual framework, nature of the study, definitions,
assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance are detailed with
further explanation in Chapter 3. The chapter continues with a brief summary of the
research literature related to the scope of influenza A virus.
Research Literature
Seasonal influenza virus outbreaks cause 250,000 to 500,000 deaths annually
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(Keeler, 2011). The review of the literature identified many studies seeking to reduce the
morbidity and mortality resulting from influenza virus outbreaks. One area of significant
interest is the human-animal interface. The World Health Organization (2011) described
the human-animal interface as a complex but critical juncture at which new paradigms
are emerging. The aquatic virus reservoir is a human-animal interface. Franklin et al.
(2011) suggested aquatic virus reservoirs give rise to indirect transmission, which would
alter the transmission dynamics, beyond just direct interactions between infectious and
susceptible individuals. Although several studies established the relevance of the
problem, there are gaps in knowledge about the association between molecular structure,
epidemiologic and clinical characteristics, and the impact of ecological and other
contextual aspects of influenza viruses.
Ecological
Austin and Hinshaw (1984) investigated feral duck species as a source of
transmission of influenza A virus and paramyxoviruses. From the investigation, Austin
and Hinshaw isolated three antigenetically distinct strains of influenza A virus and two
strains of paramyxoviruses. Additionally, Austin and Hinshaw suggested surveillance of
healthy ducks, and the aquatic environment they frequent may be of significant interest to
monitoring and controlling influenza A viruses. Austin and Hinshaw and others have
identified influenza viral subtypes in various waterfowl breeds worldwide (Ferro et al.,
2010; Mehrabanpour, Rahimian, Shirazinezhad, Moein, & Shayanfar, 2012). These
worldwide zoonotic studies supported the hypothesis that migratory waterfowl play a role
in the natural influenza virus reservoir(s) and dispersal. Similar ecological studies have
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been conducted in the United States. Ferro et al. (2010) conducted one such study.
Ferro et al. (2010) focused on the presence of influenza A viruses among the
migratory ducks and the winter breeding grounds along the Texas coast. The researchers
investigated the prevalence of avian influenza virus among hunter-harvested waterfowl
stratified by sex, age, species. Ferro et al. identified the Blue Winged Teal (Anas discors),
Green Winged Teal (Anas carolinensis), and Northern shoveler (Anas clypeata) as the
three predominate host species for avian influenza viruses. Authors of other recent studies
have investigated waterborne transmission of influenza as a zoonotic disease in the
natural environment (Lang et al., 2008; VanDalen, Franklin, Mooers, Sullivan, & Shriner,
2010; Webster et al., 1992).
VanDalen et al. (2010) were able to show viral sheding in fecal material to be of
higher viral concentrations than oropharyngeal or cloacal swabs. Researchers have
recognized that waterfowl fecal material and droppings are common in aquatic habitats
frequented by migratory and domestic birds. The literature supported a fecal-oral
transmission between waterfowl of influenza A viruses (Franklin, VanDalen, & Huyvaert,
2011). Thus, it is possible influenza viruses can be transfered between organisms via
contaminated open water-sources as wetlands, lakes, and ponds. Other researchers have
investigated if influenza A viruses can be detected in these contaminated aquatic habitats.
Lang et al. (2008) collected and studied sediment samples from three ponds in
Alaska. The Creamer’s Field Migratory Waterfowl Refuge, Alaska, is a location used by a
wide variety of migratory waterfowl. The researchers collected sediment samples using a
time-series approach and analyzed for influenza A virus RNA by reverse transcription-
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polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) methodologies (Lang et al., 2008). Lang et al.
demonstrated influenza viruses were readily detected in the winter when ponds were
frozen, indicating the sediment could be a year-to-year reservoir of viruses to infect birds
using the ponds. Zhang et al. (2006) conducted a similar a study sampling ice and water.
Zhang et al. (2006) collected and studied samples of ice or water from three
northeastern Siberian lakes in the Koluma River region for the presence of influenza A
virus. Analysis for avian influenza virus in the Zhang et al. study was conducted using
RT-PCR methodologies. Zhang et al. found the highest frequencies of detection of
influenza A virus RNAs in the lakes with the highest concentrations of migratory
waterfowl, and influenza A virus RNA preserved in higher concentrations in lake ice than
in lake water. Other researchers have collected and studied influenza A viruses from
surface water to investigate the perpetuation between waterfowl and water-contamination
(Hinshaw, Webster, & Turner, 1980; Ito et al., 1995), while others have researched the
infectivity and transmission of influenza A viruses in the aquatic environment (Brown,
Goekjian, Poulson, Valeika, & Stallknecht, 2009; Halvorson, Kelleher, & Senne, 1985).
In a longitudinal study, Hinshaw et al. (1980) collected and analyzed samples
from waterfowl, unconcentrated lake water, and feces from lake shores near Vermillion,
Alberta, Canada. The purpose of this investigation was to isolate influenza viruses and to
determine whether influenza viruses continually circulated or whether the same or
different strains were present from year to year (Hinshaw et al., 1980). The findings of
the Hinshaw et al. study indicated the feral ducks in the study area of Canada were a
perpetual reservoir influenza A viruses and paramyxoviruses. Additionally, Hinshaw et al.
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asserted this longitudinal study of feral ducks would provide data on the size of the gene
pool of influenza A viruses in nature and the number of viruses antigenically related to
human strains present in avian species. A purpose of this dissertation was to provide data
on the size of the gene pool of influenza A viruses in artificial aquatic habitats in
California and the number of viruses antigenically related to human strains present in
avian species that use these habitats.
In the early study by Halvorson et al. (1985), the researchers investigated the
theory of water-borne transmission of avian influenza A viruses among wild waterfowl
and domestic fowl. The findings of the Halvorson et al. study provided support for the
theory of water-borne transmission of avian influenza A viruses among wild waterfowl
and domestic fowl even though the researchers only identified certain duck-derived
isolates were capable of infecting domestic turkeys. Later Ito et al. (1995) and Brown et
al. (2009) further investigated the theory of water-borne transmission of avian influenza A
viruses.
In the longitudinal study by Ito et al. (1995), influenza virus isolates were
collected from the fecal samples of dabbling ducks and also from lake water frequented
by migratory waterfowl. The results of this investigation showed the viruses remained
viable in the lake water after most ducks left for migration south (Ito et al., 1995).
Complementing the research by Ito et al. was the work by Brown et al. (2009). The
laboratory investigation by Brown et al. indicated the pH, temperature, and salinity at
levels normally encountered in nature could impact the ability of avian influenza A
viruses to remain infective in water. The evidence that avian influenza A viruses can
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remain infective in water is support for the theory of water-borne transmission of avian
influenza A viruses among wild waterfowl and domestic fowl.
Molecular Structure
The work by Poulson (2011) and Taubenberger and Kash (2010) provided the
most current detailed understanding of the molecular structure of influenza A virus. The
molecular structure of influenza A virus consists of eight single-stranded RNA gene
sequences. These eight single-stranded RNA gene sequences are PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP,
NA, M, and NS (Taubenberger & Kash, 2010). The methodologies to investigate and
understand the molecular structure of influenza A virus include the following: virus
detection by RT-PCR (Poddar, Espina, & Schnurr, 2002), virus isolation and
characterization by allantoic cavities of embryonic eggs (Fouchier et al., 2005),
infectivity studies using Madin Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cell lines (Brown et al.,
2009), nucleotide sequencing of the RNA genome (Yamamoto et al., 2011), and
phylogenic analysis using the basic local alignment search tool (BLAST) available from
GenBank (Fouchier et al., 2005). Zhang, Xu, Chen, Chen, and Chen (2011) applied
several molecular methodologies during their investigation of influenza A virus at the
Dongting Lake wetlands.
Zhang et al. (2011) asserted the Dongting Lake wetland as an important habitat
and over-wintering area for East Asian migratory birds. From the 95 water samples
collected in the Zhang et al. study, an H10N8 influenza A virus was isolated, whole
genome genetic sequenced, and pathogenicity investigated in mice and specific pathogen
free (SPF) White Leghorn Chickens (Zhang et al., 2011). Findings of the study by Zhang
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et al. were supportive for an environmental water sampling approach for influenza risk
assessment. The review of the literature identified many studies and publications
supporting the material and methods of this dissertation study.
A few of the studies and publications supporting the material and methods of this
dissertation study included the following: Evers, Slemons, and Taubenberger (2007);
Zhang et al. (2011); and Tønnessen et al. (2013). Evers et al. (2007) investigated the
commercial preservative RNAlater (Qiagen) against the current method of cryo-freezing,
and ethanol preservatives for influenza A virus samples. The purpose of Evers et al.
investigation was to determine if using the commercial preservative RNAlater would
result in improved RT-PCR amplification over the current sample preservation methods
of cryo-freezing or ethanol fixation. Zhang et al. (2011) collected 200-ml water samples
from areas near the habitat of migratory birds and stored the samples at -80°C until
assayed. Tønnessen et al. (2013) collected samples along migratory flyways for influenza
viruses, genome sequencing, and similarity analysis.
Contextual Aspects
The review of the literature identified many studies and publications seeking to
reduce the morbidity and mortality resulting from influenza virus outbreaks. The
researchers and scientists of these studies sought to investgate gaps in knowledge about
the association between molecular structure, epidemiologic and clinical characteristics,
and the impact of ecological and other contextual aspects of influenza viruses. The
literature search strategy of this dissertation identified studies that establish the relevance
of the problem and support the investigation of the burden of influenza A virus in rural
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and urban ponds.
As previously noted, there are subjects within the topic of the influenza that were
known and accepted in the literature. First, in the literature migratory waterfowl and
shorebirds have been recognized as natural reservoirs for influenza viruses. Second,
antigenic drift has been accepted as a causative process from which influenza viruses can
evade humoral immunity. Third, researchers have accepted antigenic shift as a causative
process which may lead to pandemic influenza viral strains. Fourth, the mixing vessel
theory has been widely accepted as the process of creating novel influenza strains that are
capable of host switching. Fifth, the molecular structure and the RNA genome of the
influenza viron have been well documented. Sixth, the influenza virus genome database
(GenBank) is available as a resource library to the international community and also a
repository where new contributions can be made. However, there are subjects within the
topic of the influenza that have not been well understood in the literature.
The process of antigenic shift and antigenic drift was not well understood in the
literature. This process of creating novel influenza strains and subtype(s) of existing
strains may result in viruses with molecular characteristics that allow for animal-tohuman transmission (primary) or human-to-human transmission (secondary). The
molecular characteristics that give an influenza virus the properties for animal-to-human
transmission, or more seriously, human-to-human transmission were not well understood.
In addition to having the properties of primary or secondary transmission, mutated
influenza viruses may express varying virulence in different species.
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Necessity of this Study
Modern influenza surveillance began with the World Health Organization Global
Influenza Programme in 1947. Since then, many nations and international collaborations
have evolved due to advancements in research and science. The influenza surveillance
control programme of 1947 became the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network
consisting of 113 national influenza centers located in 84 countries (World Health
Organization, 2005). In May 2011, the Global Influenza Surveillance Network was
changed to Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System. Throughout this
evolution, the overarching purpose of influenza surveillance has remained the same:
reduce the global burden of influenza viruses on the human population.
The annual global burden of influenza viruses on the human population has been
estimated to cause 250,000 to 500,000 deaths annually (Keeler, 2011). The review of the
literature identified many studies and publications seeking to reduce the morbidity and
mortality resulting from influenza virus outbreaks. One area of significant interest is the
human-animal interface of influenza A virus. The World Health Organization (2011)
recognized the human-animal interface as a complex but critical juncture to which new
paradigms are emerging. The aquatic virus reservoir is a human-animal interface.
Franklin et al. (2011) suggested aquatic virus reservoirs give rise to indirect transmission.
Indirect transmission may alter the transmission dynamics of influenza A virus beyond
just direct interactions between infectious and susceptible individuals (Franklin et al.,
2011). Investigation of aquatic virus reservoirs may reduce the annual global burden of
influenza viruses on the human population.
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Problem Statement
There are gaps in knowledge about the association between molecular structure,
epidemiologic and clinical characteristics, and the impact of ecological and other
contextual aspects of influenza viruses. Gaps in understanding the role of the physical
and biogeochemical environment as an integral part of the influenza A viral transmission
also exist (Lang et al., 2008). More importantly, gaps in knowledge about the burden of
influenza A virus in rural and urban community settings remain present. The problem
was that public health science professionals have been battling emerging human
influenza diseases with tactile and reactionary methods because there was a lack of
knowledge and data at the human-animal interface. The purpose of this baseline study of
the proportion of influenza A virus in urban and rural community settings was to provide
knowledge and biological data of significant interest at the human-animal interface.
Emerging influenza viruses have continued to challenge public health officials.
Influenza viral infections appear with such regular annual frequency that it has been
common to refer to the phenomenon as flu season or seasonal flu. However, pandemic
influenza events have not been regular or predictable. Taubenberger and Morens (2006)
identified and provided a brief synopsis of 13 pandemic events between 1510 and 1978.
Wali and Music (2011) provided a summary of public health outcomes of nine U.S.
influenza epidemics that occurred between the period 1972 to 1973 through 1991 to
1992. Keeler (2011) provided a brief history of influenza pandemics from the time of
discovery of the influenza virus through the last decade. Further, Keeler notably
identified the sharp increase in public awareness of influenza and the potential human
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health threat of the virus. Several pandemic influenza events have occurred since the
early part of the 20th century. The pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 was one of the greatest
human health threats.
The pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 was one of the deadliest disease outbreaks in
history (Keeler, 2011; Morens & Fauci, 2007). This event was followed by the influenza
pandemic of 1957-1958. The influenza pandemic of 1957-1958 first occurred in the
Yunan Province of China in February of 1957 (Potter, 2001). In mid-July 1968, a
widespread outbreak of acute respiratory disease occurred in Southeast China. This
outbreak was reported in The Times of London (Cockburn, Delon, & Ferreria, 1969).
Human-to-human transmission rates of this acute respiratory disease were high. By the
end of July 1968, an estimated one-half a million persons had become infected (Keeler,
2011).
During the months of January and February 1976, novel swine influenza A virus
outbreak occurred in Fort Dix, New Jersey. More than 230 soldiers were affected during
this outbreak. Of the 230 soldiers affected, 13 soldiers (12 basic trainees and one cadre
office worker) developed severe respiratory illness with one death (Gaydos, Tops,
Hodder, & Russell, 2006). By the end of May and the beginning of June 1977, another
outbreak of influenza was identified in Liaoning Province and Tientsin Municipality in
China (Kung, Jen, Yuan, Tien, & Chu, 1978). Also known as the 1977 Russian flu, this
outbreak is often considered the fourth pandemic of the 20th century (Keeler, 2011).
In 1996, the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 (HPAI H5N1)
emerged in southern China. This influenza A virus caused a moderate number of deaths in
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geese in the Guangdong region of China (Webster, Peiris, Chen, & Guan, 2006). In
February 2002, a descendant of the 1997 avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infected two
persons, of whom one died (Webster et al., 2006). In late April 2005, an avian influenza A
(H5N1) outbreak occurred at Qinghai Lake, China (Chen et al., 2005). This event was
followed by a swine influenza emergence in Mexico.
In mid-March of 2009, Mexican health surveillance began identifying cases of
influenza-like illness during a time when seasonal outbreaks were usually declining
(World Health Organization, 2009a). Mexican health officials suspected these phenomena
to be an outbreak of a newly emerged influenza virus (World Health Organization,
2009b). Two months following, the newly emerged influenza virus appeared in the
United States. By mid-April 2009, two children in Southern California developed febrile
respiratory illness caused by infection from genetically similar swine virus, a novel
influenza A (H1N1; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). The novel
influenza A (H1N1) virus rapidly achieved global spread. By the end of May 2009, nearly
13,000 novel influenza A (H1N1) virus infection cases had been reported in over 40
countries (World Health Organization, 2009b). The 2009 H1N1 reference vaccine virus
selected by the WHO was the A/California/7/2009 (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2010). On August 10, 2010 the WHO Director-General Dr. Margaret Chan
announced the H1N1 influenza event had moved into the postpandemic period (World
Health Organization, 2010).
At the time of this writing, the current WHO phase of pandemic alert for avian
influenza A (H5N1) was ALERT (World Health Organization, 2013). The potential for
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further spread of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus and the high case fatality rate warrants
further surveillance. International scientific collaboration would suggest pandemic
influenza viruses may arise months prior to their emergence in humans, hence providing
a window for the identification and implementation of preparedness and response
activities before a pandemic occurs (World Health Organization, 2011). Artificial water
ponds in rural and urban communities may be significant habitats for environmental
surveillance for influenza A viruses.
Relevance of the Problem
Scholars have known and accepted certain subjects within the topic of the
influenza. Researchers recognized migratory waterfowl and shorebirds as natural
reservoirs for influenza viruses. The phenomenon of antigenic drift was accepted as a
causative process from which influenza viruses could evade humoral immunity. Further,
researchers accepted the phenomenon of antigenic shift as a causative process that may
lead to pandemic influenza viral strains. Mixing vessel theory has been widely accepted
as the process of creating novel influenza strains that are capable of host switching. The
molecular structure and the RNA genome of the influenza viron have been intensively
studied and well documented. Lastly, the influenza virus genome database (GenBank) is
a resource library to the international community and a repository where new
contributions can be made and data shared. However, there are subjects within the topic
of the influenza that were not well understood in the literature.
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Gaps in the Current Literature
A unique and problematic property of influenza viruses is their ability to evade
host immune responses. The evolutionary traits of antigenic drift and antigenic shift give
influenza viruses a “natural fluid” presence resulting in seasonal outbreaks (Keeler,
2011). Keeler (2011), along with others, asserted that the emergence of novel influenza
viruses through antigenic drift or antigenic shift can result in significant increases in
morbidity and mortality during any given influenza season.
In contrast to seasonal influenza viruses, pandemic strains are the result of major
antigenic changes in the HA or NA protein known as antigenic shift (Matthews &
Orman, 2011). These antigenic shifts may result in novel combination of HA or NA. The
novel influenza virus may spread among the immunologically naive human population
(Matthews & Orman, 2011). The sequence of the emergence of a novel influenza virus
and an immunologically naïve human population may lead to a pandemic.
Potter (2001) asserted two conditions be met for an outbreak of influenza to be
classed as a pandemic: firstly, the outbreak of infection, arising in a specific geographical
area, spreads throughout the world; a high percentage of individuals are infected resulting
in increased mortality rates. Secondly, a pandemic is caused by a new influenza virus A
subtype, the HA of which is not related to that of influenza viruses circulating
immediately before the outbreak, and could not have arisen from those viruses by
mutation (p. 574). Investigation into the molecular mechanisms of influenza A viruses
was prominent in current literature. This was likely due to recent advances in molecular
and genetic sciences.
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As previously noted, the process of antigenic shift and antigenic drift was not well
understood by current researchers. This process of creating novel influenza strains and
subtype(s) of existing strains may result in viruses with molecular characteristics that
allow for animal-to-human transmission (primary) or human-to-human transmission
(secondary). This process is consistent with the assertion by Potter (2001) that a
pandemic is caused by a new influenza virus A subtype, the HA of which is not related to
that of influenza viruses circulating immediately before the outbreak, and could not have
arisen from those viruses by mutation. The molecular characteristics that give an
influenza virus the properties for animal-to-human transmission, or more seriously,
human-to-human transmission, were not well understood. In addition to having the
properties of primary or secondary transmission, mutated influenza viruses may express
varying virulence in different species.
The determinants of influenza virus virulence were not well understood. The
determinants of influenza virus virulence among migratory waterfowl need further
investigation. As previously noted in this chapter, an infected asymptomatic migratory
waterfowl may host and disperse a highly pathogenic influenza strain along the migratory
flyways. This is consistent with the theory of water-borne transmission by Webster et al.
(1992) that migratory waterfowl introduce influenza virus to a water pond from fecal
contamination. Further, there has been a lack of understanding of the association of
which species of waterfowl can host which influenza viral strains and cause viral
shedding along which migratory flyways and watershed breeding grounds. To investigate
this conundrum, geospatial analysis and spatial-temporal distribution studies may be of
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significant interest. In this dissertation, I attempted to fill the gap in the knowledge of the
geographical dispersal of influenza A viruses in aquatic habitats using geospatial
analysis.
Purpose of the Study
At the time of this writing, no known research was underway to investigate and
compare the proportion of influenza A virus in recirculating artificial ponds in rural and
urban geographical locations. A review of current literature did not identify any other
studies that attempted to collect influenza A virus data from artificial water ponds in rural
or urban communities. Several studies investigated the presence or persistence of
influenza viruses to natural waterfowl wetlands (Austin & Hinshaw,1984; Ferro et
al.,2010; Lang et al., 2008). The purpose of this quantitative study was to extend the
previous environmental virology research of influenza in natural waterfowl wetlands to
rural and urban communities.
The role of the aquatic virus reservoir as a human-animal interface has not been
fully understood. The purpose of this dissertation study was to investigate the aquatic
virus reservoir. Three constructs support the investigation of the aquatic virus reservoir.
First, the aquatic virus reservoir is a human-animal interface. Second, researchers have
suggested aquatic virus reservoirs give rise to indirect transmission, which would alter
the transmission dynamics, beyond just direct interactions between infectious and
susceptible individuals (Franklin et al., 2011). Third, researchers have recognized the
human-animal interface as a complex but critical juncture at which new paradigms are
emerging (World Health Organization, 2011).
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For this quantitative dissertation study, I collected and analyzed primary data. The
epidemiological triangle was the framework for the primary data to be collected. The
epidemiological triangle has three vertices: host, agent, and environment. The hosts are
the organisms harboring the disease. The agents are capable of causing the disease. The
environments are where the hosts and the agents can interact. For influenza disease, the
reservoir hosts are migratory waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes)
(Franklin et al., 2011). The agents are influenza A viruses. The environments are the
natural and artificial habitats where the hosts are found.
The independent environmental variables of this study were the geographical
locations of the artificial water ponds and geochemical properties of the artificial water
ponds. The geographical location data included rural or urban community, latitude and
longitudinal coordinates, altitude, and approximate water pond surface area. The
geochemical properties of the artificial water pond sample measure included pH, salinity,
and temperature. Additionally, the presence or absence of waterfowl at the time of sample
collection was included as an independent host variable.
The dependent agent variables were influenza A viruses. Influenza A virus data
included detection for M gene by RT-PCR using World Health Organization
recommended primer sequences, infectivity by hemagglutination assay using MDCK cell
line, and gene sequencing for H5N1 influenza A virus using World Health Organization
recommended primer sequences at Laragen Sequencing and Genotyping Laboratory
(Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California).
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Research Questions
Research Question 1 (R1): Is there a difference in the burden of influenza A virus
in rural ponds compared to urban ponds?
Research Question 2 (R2): Is there an association between geographic location,
altitude, estimated surface area and observed presence of waterfowl, and the proportion
of influenza A virus in rural ponds compared to urban ponds?
Research Question 3 (R3): Is there an association between water pH, salinity, or
water temperature and influenza A virus infectivity in rural and urban water ponds?
Research Question 4 (R4): Are H5N1 influenza A viral subtypes detected in the
sample of rural and urban ponds novel gene sequences or have the gene sequences been
previously identified elsewhere?
Research Hypotheses
Null Hypothesis 1 (H01): The burden of influenza A virus in community ponds
has no association to geographical location.
Alternative Hypothesis 1 (Ha1): The burden of influenza A virus in community
ponds is associated to geographical location.
In this study the proportion and probability of the presence of influenza A virus
were investigated in recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical
locations. Rural ponds were viewed as one population and urban ponds as another
population. The dependent agent variables were influenza A viruses.
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Null Hypothesis 2 (H02): There is no association between geographic location,
altitude, estimated surface area and observed presence of waterfowl, and the proportion
of influenza A virus in rural ponds compared to urban ponds.
Alternative Hypothesis 2 (Ha2): There is an association between geographic
location, altitude, estimated surface area and observed presence of waterfowl, and the
proportion of influenza A virus in rural ponds compared to urban ponds.
In this study, rural community ponds were viewed as one population and urban
community ponds as another population. The comparison of these two populations
included proportion of influenza A viruses. The independent environment and host
variables were as follows: latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates, altitude, approximate
water pond surface area, and the presence of absence of waterfowl (Anseriformes) and
shorebirds (Charadriiformes) at the time of sample collection. The dependent agent
variables were influenza A viruses.
Null Hypothesis 3 (H03): There is no association between water pH, salinity, or
water temperature and influenza A virus infectivity in rural and urban water ponds.
Alternative Hypothesis 3 (Ha3): There is an association between water pH,
salinity, or water temperature and influenza A virus infectivity in rural and urban water
ponds.
Brown et al. (2009) investigated the infectivity of 12 low pathogenic avian
influenza viruses across various pH, salinities, and temperatures in a biosafety level 2
laboratory setting. In this dissertation study, I investigated if the findings of the Brown et
al. study were consistent in rural and urban community pond samples. The independent
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variables were the geochemical properties of the artificial recirculating water ponds: pH,
salinity, and temperature. The dependent agent variables were the infectivity of isolated
influenza A viruses. Influenza A virus infectivity were conducted by hemagglutination
assay using MDCK cell line. The utilization of MDCK cell line to determine infectivity
of influenza A viruses has been used by others (Brown et al., 2009).
Null Hypothesis 4 (H04): The H5N1 influenza A viral subtypes detected in the
sample of rural and urban ponds are not novel gene sequences and the gene sequences
have been previously identified elsewhere.
Alternative Hypothesis 4 (Ha4): The H5N1 influenza A viral subtypes detected in
the sample of rural and urban ponds are novel gene sequences and the gene sequences
have not been previously identified elsewhere.
In this study, water samples were collected directly from rural and urban ponds.
The analysis for the presence of influenza A virus involved commercially available
influenza A/B viral RT-PCR detection kits suitable for water analysis. World Health
Organization recommended RT-PCR primers be used for influenza A virus H5N1 gene
sequencing. The laboratory analysis for the presence of influenza A virus and influenza A
virus infectivity were conducted in a biosafety level 2 laboratory at the California State
University Channel Islands campus. Water samples positive for H5N1 influenza A viral
strains were submitted for gene sequencing analysis to Laragen Sequencing and
Genotyping Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California). The H5N1 influenza A
virus gene sequencing results were compared to the influenza A viral gene sequence
database GenBank (National Institute of Health genetic sequence database).
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Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study was based on the hypotheses proposed
by Webster et al. (1992) and others that (i) migratory waterfowl are the natural reserve of
influenza viruses, and (ii) water-borne transmission of influenza virus occurs between
migratory waterfowl and domestic waterfowl. Adding to the theoretical framework was
Scholtissek et al.’s (1985) mixing vessel theory. Mixing vessel theory posits the viral
adaptation from host animal to human infectivity occurs in an intermediate host animal
such as a swine or waterfowl (Ma, Kahn, & Richt, 2009).
Relationship of Theory to Study Approach and Research Questions
Water analysis has been an important scientific approach to understanding the
epidemiological triangle model of influenza viral diseases. Ferro et al. (2010)
investigated and analyzed host species for the presence of influenza A viruses among the
migratory ducks and the winter breeding grounds along the Texas coast. Other
researchers have investigated waterborne transmission of influenza as a zoonotic disease
in the natural environment (Lang et al., 2008; VanDalen et al., 2010; Webster et al.,
1992). VanDalen et al. (2010) investigated and analyzed influenza virus agents from
waterfowl. VanDalen et al. were able to show viral sheding in fecal material to be of
higher viral concentrations than oropharyngeal or cloacal swabs. Thus, it is possible that
influenza viruses can be detected in open water-sources as wetlands, lakes, and ponds.
Study Approach
For this quantitative dissertation study, I collected and analyze primary data. The
epidemiological triangle provides framework for the primary data collected. The
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epidemiological triangle has three vertices: host, agent, and environment. The host is the
organism harboring the disease. For influenza disease, the reservoir hosts are migratory
waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes) (Franklin et al., 2011). The
agents are the influenza A viruses. The environments are the natural and artificial habitats
where the hosts are found.
The proportion and probability of the presence of influenza A virus were
investigated in recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical locations. I
attempted to isolate influenza A virus from the water samples collected. The detection of
influenza A viruses in the collected water samples were support for the hypotheses
proposed by Webster et al. (1992) and others that (i) migratory waterfowl are the natural
reserve of influenza viruses, and (ii) water-borne transmission of influenza virus occurs
between migratory waterfowl and domestic waterfowl. Further, the detection of influenza
A virus in the collected water samples were used to analyze the difference in the burden
of influenza A virus in rural and urban community ponds.
The environmental factors; geographical location, altitude, estimated surface
areas, and the observed presence of waterfowl were investigated as independent variables
to the outcome of influenza A virus detection. I attempted to answer if there is an
association between environmental factors and the presence of influenza A virus. An
association between environmental factors and the presence of influenza A virus may
allow for the generalization that certain environmental factors are associated to influenza
A virus infected waterfowl.

24
The biochemical properties of pond water; pH, salinity, and temperature were
investigated as independent variables to the outcome of infectivity of influenza A virus.
Brown et al. (2009) conducted a similar study. I attempted to apply the laboratory
findings of the Brown et al. study to artificial recirculating water ponds in the geographic
locations of rural and urban Californian communities. An association between
biogeological factors of pond water and influenza A virus infectivity may allow for the
generalization of certain biogeological properties of pond water as risk factors at the
human-animal interface.
Isolated H5N1 influenza A virus samples were submitted to Laragen Sequencing
and Genotyping Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California) for gene sequencing.
I will used the gene sequencing data to investigate if the isolated H5N1 influenza A
viruses are novel or have been previously identified elsewhere. The detection of various
subtypes of H5N1 influenza A virus may allow for generalization of the phenomena of
antigenic drift and the Mixing Vessel Theory. Mixing Vessel Theory posits the viral
adaptation from host animal to human infectivity occurs in an intermediate host animal
such as a swine or waterfowl (Ma et al., 2009). The detection of novel H5N1 influenza A
viruses may be of significant interest to the scientific community.
Conceptual Framework
The fundamental question of how avian influenza viruses switch hosts remains
unanswered. Additionally, it is poorly understood how the viral genetic changes effect
human adaptation, human-to-human transmissibility, and pathogenesis (Taubenberger &
Kash, 2010). To further understand the characterization of influenza viruses, some
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researchers have approached the topic of avian influenza through the lens of the
epidemiological triangle. A more detailed analysis of the epidemiological triangle as it
pertains to influenza A viruses and this research is included in Chapter 2.
Nature of the Study
Water analysis has been an important scientific approach to understanding the
epidemiological triangle model of influenza viral diseases. A constellation of studies have
investigated influenza A virus using water analysis. Ferro et al. (2010) isolated and
identified the presence of influenza A viruses among the migratory ducks and the winter
breeding grounds along the Texas Coast. Ferro et al. (2010) identified the Blue Winged
Teal (Anas discors), Green Winged Teal (Anas carolinensis), and Northern shoveler
(Anas clypeata) as the three predominate host species for avian influenza viruses. Other
researchers have investigated waterborne transmission of influenza as a zoonotic disease
in the natural environment (Lang et al., 2008; VanDalen et al., 2010; Webster et al.,
1992). VanDalen et al. (2010) were able to show viral sheding in fecal material to be of
higher viral concentrations than oropharyngeal or cloacal swabs. Other researchers have
investigated if influenza A viruses can be detected in these contaminated aquatic habitats
(Lang et al., 2008; Stallknecht & Brown, 2009; Zhang, Shoham, Gilichinsky, Davydov,
Castello, & Rogers, 2006). Zhang et al. (2006) investigated frozen lake water as an
abiotic reservoir for influenza viruses.
Zhang et al. (2006) collected samples of ice or water from three northeastern
Siberian lakes in the Koluma River region. Influenza A viruses were isolated and
analyzed using reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
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methodologies. Other researchers have studied influenza A viruses in surface water
samples to investigate the perpetuation between waterfowl and water-contamination
(Hinshaw et al., 1980; Ito et al., 1995), while others have researched the infectivity and
transmission of influenza A viruses in the aquatic environment (Brown et al., 2009;
Halvorson et al., 1985). These studies support the theory that influenza viruses can be
transfered between organisms via open water-sources as wetlands, lakes, and ponds. A
more detailed analysis of investigating influenza A virus using water analysis is included
in Chapter 2.
Research Approach
In this dissertation study, I upheld society’s trust that scientific research results
are an honest and accurate reflection of a researcher’s work (National Academy of
Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine of the National
Academies, 2010). The primary data analyses were quantitative using a cross-sectional
approach comparing proportions, bivariate and multivariate logistic regression analysis of
recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical locations. The independent
variables included: geographic community location (rural or urban), GPS location
(latitude and longitude), altitude, approximate water pond surface area. The dependent
variables included: influenza A virus detection, influenza A virus infectivity endpoint
titer, influenza A virus (H5N1) characterization. Variables evaluated as possible
mediators and moderators included: water pH at collection, water salinity at collection,
water temperature at collection, and presence or absence of waterfowl (Anseriformes) and
shorebirds (Charadriiformes).
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Sampling and Data Analysis
A convenience sampling approach was used. The geographical area was the state
boundaries of California. Equal sample sizes from rural and urban communities were
attempted. A representative sampling from each of the 21 counties considered rural areas,
and 37 counties considered metropolitan and not rural in California by California
Business and Professions Code Section 19986(l) were attempted. The inclusion criteria of
the study population were artificial recirculating water ponds in the geographic locations
of rural and urban communities.
Water samples were collected as previously published in the U.S. EPA Field
Sampling Guidance Document #1225. A dip sampler for water collection was used. A dip
sampler is useful for situations where a sample is to be recovered from an outfall pipe or
along a pond bank where direct access is limited. The long handle on such a device
allows access from a discrete location so as not to disturb wildlife (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 1999). The water volume per sample was 200 ml. Other researchers
have collected 200 ml volume water samples for influenza studies (Zhang et al., 2011).
The statistical analysis software was IBM SPSS Statistics 21 and Microsoft Office
Excel 2007. Geographical graphing and mapping software were Google Earth. Data
integrity was maintained by recording data and observations with ink into field notebook
and laboratory notebook. Hand written entries were transferred or transcribed to
Microsoft Office Excel 2007 Spreadsheets. All electronic data had digital backup and
was password protected. Since I collected primary data, data cleaning and screening
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procedures were not necessary. A more detailed explanation of the materials and methods
of this dissertation are included in Chapter 3.
Definitions
Several not commonly used terms-outside of the topic of influenza-are necessary
for this dissertation. The manuscript by Reid, Taubenberger, and Fanning (2004) includes
definition of these terms.
Antigenic drift: Minor changes in viral antigens due to gradual accumulation of
mutations over time.
Antigenic shift: Sudden change in viral antigens due to acquisition of one or more
novel surface-protein-encoding genes by the process of reassortment.
Clade: Traits (for example, sequences) that form a distinct group on phylogenetic
analysis.
Non-synonymous substitution: Nucleotide substitution in a codon that results in an
amino acid replacement.
Nucleotide sequences: The genome of the influenza A virus consists of eight
RNA segments coding for 10 different proteins.
Parsimony analysis: A type of phylogenetic analysis in which many possible trees
are compared to find the tree requiring the fewest evolutionary changes.
Phylogenetic analysis: Analysis of the evolutionary connections between traits
(for example, sequences).
Reassortment: Due to the segmented nature of the influenza A virus genome
(eight individual RNA segments), influenza viruses can undergo a process of genetic
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reassortment to produce new variant strains of virus. In a cell infected with two different
influenza A virus strains, gene segments from each can be packaged into viable hybrid
virus strains.
Subtype: A designation for influenza A viruses describing the antigenic group to
which the two dominant surface glycoproteins — haemagglutinin (HA) and
neuraminidase (NA) — belong, written in the form HXNX, wherein one of the 16
possible HAs and one of the nine possible NAs is listed, for example, H1N1 or H3N2.
Synonymous substitution: Nucleotide substitution in a codon that does not result
in an amino acid replacement. These terms are necessary and used throughout this
dissertation for clarity.
Assumptions
There are several assumptions about influenza A viruses that are believed, but
cannot be demonstrated to be true. Firstly, the unique and problematic property of
influenza viruses to evade hosts immune responses. Secondly, the phenomena of humananimal transmission are not well understood. It is possible the ability to evade host
immune responses and the human-animal transmission are the evolutionary traits that
give influenza viruses a “natural fluid” presence resulting in seasonal outbreaks. Keeler
(2011) and others asserted the emergence of novel influenza viruses through antigenic
drift or antigenic shift can result in significant increases in morbidity and mortality during
any given influenza season. The outcome of antigenic drift or antigenic shift are routinely
identified, however the mechanism of the processes are insofar only theorized.
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A pandemic is the outbreak of infection, arising in a specific geographical area
and spreads throughout the world resulting in a high percentage of infected individuals
and resulting in increased mortality rates (Potter, 2001). It has been assumed that
pandemics may be caused by a new influenza A virus subtypes. The new influenza A
virus subtype may have an HA of which is not related to that of influenza viruses
circulating immediately before the outbreak, and could not have arisen from those viruses
by mutation (Potter, 2001). The 1918 Spanish flu is assumed to be caused by a “new
influenza A virus” subtype. Investigation into the influenza virus responsible for the 1918
Spanish flu has not yet been fully discovered. Investigation into the molecular
mechanisms of influenza A viruses is prominent in current literature. This may be due to
recent advances in molecular and genetic sciences.
Artificial water ponds in rural and urban communities are sites of the humananimal interface. The investigation of the burden of influenza A virus in artificial rural
and urban ponds may be of significant interest to the scientific community. In this
dissertation study, I attempted to investigate the burden of influenza A virus in artificial
recirculating water ponds in the geographic locations of rural and urban Californian
communities. The geographical sampling region for rural and urban ponds was the
eastern Pacific flyway for migratory birds in California. For this study, it was necessary
to make the assumption that artificial water ponds in rural and urban communities are
sites of the human-animal interface because of fecal shedding and contamination from
influenza A virus infected waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes). I
attempted to isolate and investigate influenza A viruses in samples collected from water
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ponds in rural and urban Californian communities. My investigation included infectivity
titers and subtyping of influenza A virus (H5N1) strains. Infectivity and subtyping of
isolated influenza A viruses may identify strains previously known capable for animalhuman transmission, or human-human transmission.
Scope and Delimitations
A specific aspect of this dissertation is the isolation and characterization of
influenza A virus (H5N1). To date, avian influenza A (H5N1) has not shown to be
effectively transmitted from person to person, however, the high case fatality rate in
Southeast Asia is alarming (Yuen & Wong, 2005). Ungchusak, et al. (2005) asserted the
reassortment events of avian influenza A (H5N1) since its emergence in China in 1997,
suggests the virus may become more efficient in infecting humans, either by acquiring
genetic material from a human influenza virus through reassortment or by adapting its
receptor binding sites.
Populations Included
Artificial water ponds in the geographic locations of rural and urban communities
are sites of the human-animal interface. The target population for this dissertation is
artificial recirculating water ponds in the geographic locations of rural and urban
Californian communities. There are 21 counties considered rural areas, and 37 counties
considered metropolitan and not rural in California by California Business and
Professions Code Section 19986(l). The population size of artificial recirculating water
ponds in California is unknown.
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Populations Excluded
Excluded from this study were natural ponds and non-recirculating artificial water
environments. Natural bodies of water may be the result of in-flows and out-flows of
water in combination with geographical contours. The in-flow and out-flow of water will
have a rate of water change-over which cannot be addressed in the analysis of the data.
Similarly, non-recirculating artificial water environments will have a rate of water
change-over which cannot be addressed in the analysis of the data. Also excluded from
this study was the Gravity model as applied to infectious disease dynamics.
Gravity Model
The Gravity models of population movements can be traced back the work by
Zifp in the 1940s (Truscott & Ferguson, 2012). Truscott and Ferguson (2012)
investigated gravity models to fit human mobility movements as they applied to epidemic
modelling. Jandarov, Haran, Bjornstad, and Grenfell, (2013) investigated a novel gravity
model for infectious diseae dynamics. The understanding of disease dynamics may be of
significant interest in the management and with pressing disease issues such as disease
emergence and epidemic control strategies (Jandarov, Haran, Bjornstad, & Grenfell,
2013). In both these studies, the probabilistic models for epidemic management require
known human population behaviors.
To investigate gravity model as it pertains to influenza A viruses in nature, will
require a greater understanding of the population behaviors of migratory waterfowl
(Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes). For influenza disease, the reservoir
hosts are migratory waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes) (Franklin
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et al., 2011). Long-range migratory patterns of waterfowl may explain the global
dispersion of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus (HPAI H5N1) (Gaidet et al.,
2010). Migratory bird population data would be necessary to understand population
behaviors. However, Link and Sauer (2002) are critical of the validity of North American
Bird Breeding Survey population data. Link and Sauer reasoned the flight patterns of the
certain migratory waterfowl are not compatible with the observation methods of North
American Bird Breeding Survey. Thus, population studies of migratory birds are not a
reliable influenza disease surveillance tool and would not provide reliable data for gravity
modeling for influenza disease dynamics in nature.
Generalizability
The potential generalizability of this study is to the artificial recirculating water
ponds located in rural and urban Californian communities. This generalizability may be
the findings of the analysis of environmental factors: rural or urban community, latitude
and longitudinal coordinates, altitude, and approximate water pond surface area.
However, the findings of the analysis of geochemical properties of water pond samples;
pH, salinity, and temperature may be generalizable beyond the target populations of this
dissertation.
Limitations
There are two threats to the external validity of this study. The first threat to
external validity is centered to the theoretical framework of this dissertation. The
theoretical framework for this study were based on the hypotheses proposed by Webster
et al. (1992) and others that (a) migratory waterfowl are the natural reserve of influenza
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viruses, and (b) water-borne transmission of influenza virus occurs between migratory
waterfowl and domestic waterfowl. The inclusion criteria of the study population were
artificial recirculating water ponds in the geographic locations of rural and urban
Californian communities. The geographical area was the state boundaries of California.
Thus, the findings of this dissertation are limited to geographical locations along the
migratory flyways of the waterfowl within the boundaries of California.
To address this threat to the external validity of this dissertation study, the
sampling and data analysis plan are presented in a fashion so the study may be
reproduced accurately by others using the same or different geographical locations. The
second threat to external validity is a result of the inclusion criteria.
Recirculating artificial water ponds require mechanical equipment for
recirculation. This study does not include the type or design of the mechanical equipment
used for recirculation as an independent variable. Thus, the mechanical equipment used
for recirculation cannot be evaluated as a mediator or moderator of the outcome variables
of this dissertation study. However, estimated surface area of the recirculating artificial
water ponds as an independent variable may be of significant interest to future studies
seeking to investigate factors that associate to the burden of influenza A virus at the
human-animal interface in communities.
The primary data collection of dissertation study is heavily weighted by
laboratory instrumentation and molecular analysis. There are two threats to the internal
validity of this dissertation study: instrumentation and laboratory assays. Firstly,
inaccuracy of the instrument used for this study may systematically alter the data.
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Secondly, inaccuracy of the laboratory assays may fail to accurately detect influenza A
virus. To address the possible inaccuracy of the instrumentation, the same instruments
were used on all samples. Thus, errors, if identified, may be corrected across all samples
equally. To address the possible inaccuracy of the laboratory assays, positive and
negative control samples were to be processed simultaneously as study samples. The
positive control for influenza A virus was not obtained. The negative control used for
influenza A virus was sterile normal saline. Threats to statistical conclusion validity have
not been identified.
Significance
At the time of this writing, no known research is underway to investigate and
compare the proportion of influenza A virus in artificial rural and urban ponds. The
discovery of the proportion of influenza A virus in rural and urban communities will
establish baseline measures for future monitoring and impact studies in these settings.
These baseline measures may initiate surveillance data for IRAT programs.
Even though the IRAT is not designed to predict the next pandemic, IRAT is
expected to identify gaps in the knowledge, prompt further research, assist with clear
documentation of the thought process, and focus risk management efforts (Trock et al.,
2012). The development of baseline measures of the environmental burden of influenza
A virus in communities will inaugurate new data collection for IRAT.
Contributions of the Study
There are four topic areas where in this dissertation study, I attempted to fill gaps
in the knowledge and extend the knowledge in the discipline. First, I attempted to fill a

36
gap in the knowledge about the human-animal interface of influenza in aquatic habitats. I
attempted to investigate the burden of influenza A virus in rural and urban artificial
recirculating water ponds. Using a cross-sectional study approach, I attempted to apply
geospatial analysis to record baseline measurements of the presence of influenza A
viruses for future surveillance. Future influenza surveillance methods may use the data
from this study to develop spatial-temporal monitoring for influenza viruses. Second, the
materials and methods of this study may be used for future influenza surveillance.
Advantages of the aquatic sampling method and analysis of this study over current
practices are: no live bird capture, no hunter harvest, and no fresh fecal sampling from
waterfowl. Limitation of live bird capture is only being able to capture birds that are
present at the same time as the researchers. Limitation of hunter harvest is not sampling
non-game birds. Limitation of fresh fecal sampling from waterfowl is only being able to
sample birds that are present at the same time as the field researchers. Third, the
geospatial analysis of this dissertation resulted in data that may be useful for future
investigations of the gravity model of infectious disease dynamics as it applies to
influenza A viruses. These future studies may seek to investigate possible association
between influenza A virus contaminated aquatic habitats and human influenza infections.
Fourth, I attempted to investigate the association of geographical and environmental
features of aquatic habitats to the burden of influenza A virus at the human-animal
interface. To add to the conversation of knowledge of influenza disease, this dissertation
will build upon the materials and methods of others.
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Water analysis for influenza virus has been conducted in the natural environment
of Alaskan (Lang et al., 2008). This study extended water analysis from the natural
environment of Alaska to the rural and urban communities of California. The
geographical sampling region for rural and urban ponds were the eastern Pacific flyway
for migratory birds in California. Surface water samples were collected from artificial
recirculating ponds in rural and urban areas. There are 21 counties considered rural areas,
and 37 counties considered metropolitan and not rural in California by California
Business and Professions Code Section 19986(l).
Primary data were collected using commercially available influenza A viral M
gene RT-PCR detection kits suitable for water analysis, influenza A virus viability
through viral culture assay using Madin Darby canine kidney cell lines, and gene
sequencing for influenza A H5N1 viral subtypes following WHO recommended
guidelines for H5N1 primer sequences from a commercial reference laboratory.
The social change implications of this dissertation can be recognized at the
national and international levels, to the population level, and to the individual level. At
the national and international level, I attempted to contribute geospatial analysis and
spatial-temporal data for influenza A surveillance. H5N1 influenza virus surveillance
may detect highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 presence along the eastern
Pacific flyway. The detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 may
initiate biosecurity measures to protect poultry industries in the United States and Brazil.
The United States and Brazil are the world’s largest exporters of poultry (Butler &
Ruttimann, 2006). Additionally, I attempted contribute new H5N1 viral genome
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sequences to the current influenza A virus H5N1 database. An increased database may
provide tools for avian influenza A virus H5N1 vaccine development.
Vaccine developments were positive social change at the population level. Soda,
et al. (2008) suggested the applicability of a virus strain library for vaccine preparation.
The results of this dissertation may contribute to the current virus strain library at
GenBank. Vaccine development may have may positive social change for American
Indian/Alaskan Natives.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2009) reported American
Indian/Alaskan Natives had H1N1 mortality rates four times higher than persons in all
other racial/ethnic populations combined. Poverty and poor living conditions may
predispose American Indian/Alaskan Natives to influenza complications (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). Chakraborty, Papageorgiou, and Sebastián (2008)
suggested the disproportionate share of a developing country disease burden is due to
infectious diseases. Applying this hypothesis to American Indian/Alaskan Natives, whose
H1N1 mortality rates were four times higher than persons in all other racial/ethnic
populations combined, may explain the poverty and poor living conditions that may
predispose this population to influenza complications. At the individual level the findings
of this dissertation may bring about greater awareness of influenza A virus infection.
Shive and Kanekar (2011) suggested the principles of the Health Belief Model
can provide explanation why many people, including high risk individuals, do not receive
influenza vaccination. This dissertation study may bring greater awareness to the
individual, and thus, greater perceived susceptibility to influenza A virus infection.
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Therefore, the findings of this dissertation study may result in improvements in
vaccinations for American Indian/Alaskan Natives resulting in positive social change.
In this dissertation study, I analyzed samples from artificial recirculating water
ponds. Artificial recirculating water ponds are often a decorative feature in parks and golf
courses. The decorative feature is often constructed to attract people. Also, these
decorative features may attract both domestic and migratory waterfowl (Webster et al.,
1992). Migratory waterfowl likely will introduce influenza A viruses to the artificial
recirculating water pond enivronment from viral shedding in feces. If the artificial
recirculating water pond is constructed with an aeration fountain, mist and droplet
formation may occur. As is well established, influenza viruses are transmitted between
individuals through droplets (e.g., coughing, sneezing). An individual who comes in
contact with the droplets from the contaminated artificial recirculating water pond may be
inoculated with influenza A virus. Therefore, the findings of this dissertation study may
bring greater awareness at the individual level, and thus, increase the perceived
susceptibility to influenza A virus infection. As implied by Shive and Kanekar (2011),
perceived susceptibility to influenza A virus infection will have a direct correlation to
influenza vaccination.
Summary
This introduction included a moderately detailed presentation of my dissertation
study. Main points of this chapter include a brief discussion of the research literature
including, gaps in the knowledge and gaps in the current literature. These discussions
were followed by discussion of the problem statement, necessity of the problem and the
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relevance of the problem. Following brief discussion of the problem, are discussions of
the research questions, theoretical framework, and the relationship of the theoretical
framework to the study approach and research questions. Lastly, the nature of the study
including definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance
were discussed. Following this brief introduction of my dissertation study is the literature
review.
The literature review of this manuscript is organized into fourteen sections. The
fourteen sections are arranged to present influenza topics in an hourglass format
beginning with the broad historical background of influenza surveillance, through
pandemic influenza outbreaks, to government responses. Following the historical review
are the less broad sections of the hypothesis of the origin of novel influenza viruses,
Mixing Vessel Theory to explain the emergence of novel influenza viruses, migratory
waterfowl as vectors for global distribution of influenza viruses, and wetland breeding
grounds as hotspots for influenza virus detection. After discussion of influenza in the
aquatic environment, the topic will narrow to water analysis, the molecular structure of
the influenza viron, and laboratory assays. Subsequent to the discussion of laboratory
assays, the topic will broaden to present current influenza surveillance and risk
assessment tools, and social change implications. Preceding the review of the literature is
the theoretical foundation of this dissertation study, the conceptual framework, and the
epidemiological triangle as it applies to pandemic influenza disease.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The “Spanish” influenza H1N1 pandemic of 1918–1919, which caused
approximately 50 million deaths worldwide, remains an ominous warning to public
health (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006). Since then, new subtypes of human influenza A
viruses have been detected at various times: in 1957, the H2N2 subtype (Asian influenza)
replaced the H1N1 subtype; in 1968, the H3N2 subtype (Hong Kong virus) appeared; and
in 1977, the H1N1 virus reappeared (Webster et al., 1992). Influenza disease emergence
data are collected year-round, but economic strain on global public health to prevent and
treat human influenza outbreaks is enormous. Therefore, it is imperative to identify
potential sources of the virus to help minimize outbreak occurrence.
Numerous research studies have indicated migratory waterfowl are a source point
for influenza viruses (Austin & Hinshaw, 1984; Ferro et al., 2010; Gaidet et al., 2010;
Webster et al., 1992). The literature review revealed five key points. First, the long-range
migratory patterns of waterfowl could explain the global dispersion of influenza viruses.
Second, select migratory waterfowl species potentially are the natural reservoir for
influenza viruses. Third, viral antigenic shift occurs by a pre- or post transmission
mechanism from host species to recipient species. Fourth, the transmission of influenza
virus occurs between waterfowl through a water-borne fecal to oral mechanism. Fifth,
waterfowl breeding grounds in the Alaskan watershed, Siberian lakes, and other
migratory waterfowl breeding habitats are potential “hot-zones” for water-borne
transmission of influenza virus. Even though many investigated the persistence of
influenza viruses in aquatic habitats, no known research has analyzed the proportion and
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persistence of influenza viruses in artificial suburban neighborhood water ponds. The aim
of this dissertation study was to investigate the proportion of influenza A viruses in
recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical locations. The proportion of
influenza A virus in rural and urban geographical locations may be dependent on
ecological and contextual aspects of influenza viruses.
There are gaps in knowledge about the association between molecular structure,
epidemiologic and clinical characteristics, and the impact of ecological and other
contextual aspects of influenza viruses. Gaps in understanding the role of the physical
and biogeochemical environment as an integral part of the influenza A viral transmission
also exist (Lang et al., 2008). More importantly, gaps in knowledge about the burden of
influenza A virus in rural and urban community settings remain present. Researchers
have expected IRAT to prompt additional studies to address these key gaps in the
knowledge (Trock et al., 2012).
The problem has been public health scientists have been battling emerging human
influenza diseases with tactile and reactionary methods because of a lack of knowledge
and data at the human-animal interface. The purpose of this baseline study of the
proportion of influenza A virus in urban and rural community settings was to provide
knowledge and biological data of significant interest at the human-animal interface. This
biological data may be of significant interest for the development of IRAT.
International Level
International scientific collaboration suggested pandemic influenza viruses may
arise months prior to their emergence in humans, providing a window for the
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identification and implementation of preparedness and response activities before a
pandemic occurs (World Health Organization, 2011). The 2009 H1N1 outbreak in
Central and South America initiated emergency response and leadership by the World
Health Organization and the Pan American Health Organization. The leadership efforts
by these two organizations aided many municipalities and provinces to formulate policies
to respond to the influenza A virus H1N1 outbreak (Stern, Koreck, & Markel, 2011).
National and State Level
A review of state-level pandemic influenza preparedness plans for the United
States by Thomas and Young (2011) revealed most state plans were incomplete with
many lacking ethics preparedness. Ethics preparedness and planning include the
allocation of vaccine and antiviral medications, legal authority, and quarantine. California
is a state with numerous ethics preparedness recommendations but without
implementation of these recommendations. The primary barrier for lack of ethics
preparedness implementation is a “lack of appreciation for, or priority given to, public
health ethics among those receiving the recommendations” (Thomas & Young, 2011, p.
2081).
Populational Level
At the population level, personal risk perception and health communication
regarding influenza infections has been an emerging and challenging area for public
health professionals (Shive & Kanekar, 2011). Shive and Kanekar (2011) identified
vulnerable populations such as rural residents where improvements in the understanding
between animal disease, human behavior, and the risk of influenza infection needs
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improvement. Many state ethics preparedness plans are mostly incomplete or without
implementation at the rural and/or urban community level. A purpose of this dissertation
was to bring about greater awareness of the relationship the human-animal interface and
preparedness at the rural and urban community level. Thus, the information about ethics
preparedness was relevant to this study.
Human–Animal Interface
Artificial water ponds in rural and urban communities are sites of the humananimal interface. Webster et al. (1992) described this human-animal interface with the
example of domestic ducks in community ponds attracting migratory waterfowl. The
migratory waterfowl introduce the influenza virus to that community’s water pond from
fecal contamination. The contaminated community water pond now becomes a potential
source of influenza virus to both humans and animals.
Franklin et al. (2011) proposed aquatic systems may serve as reservoirs and
sources of infection for both wild birds and mammals. Further, Franklin et al. suggested
aquatic virus reservoirs give rise to indirect transmission, which would alter the
transmission dynamics, beyond just direct interactions between infectious and susceptible
individuals. An investigation of the burden of influenza A virus in artificial rural and
urban ponds may identify aquatic systems that serve as reservoirs for influenza A virus as
described by Franklin et al.. An investigation of the human-animal interface in these
aquatic habits may also bring about significant social change.
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Social Change
Globally, pandemic 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus infection has been found to
cause a disproportionately higher rate of hospitalization and death among indigenous
populations from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2009). Indigenous populations in the United States have also shown a
disproportionately higher rate of hospitalization and death from pandemic 2009 influenza
A (H1N1) virus infection. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2009)
reported American Indian/Alaskan Natives had H1N1 mortality rates four times higher
than persons in all other racial/ethnic populations combined.
The increased mortality among the indigenous people of the United States may be
due to social injustice. These social injustice conditions may include high prevalence of
chronic health conditions (e.g., diabetes and asthma) among American Indian/Alaskan
Natives that predisposes them to influenza complications, poverty (e.g., poor living
conditions), and delayed access to care (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2009). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2009) recommended increased
efforts to increase awareness among American Indian/Alaskan Natives and their healthcare providers of the potential severity of influenza and current recommendations
regarding the timely use of antiviral medications. Investigation into the human-animal
interface in rural communities may lead to increased awareness among American
Indian/Alaskan Natives and their health-care providers of the potential severity of
influenza A viruses. Thus, the results of this dissertation study may bring about positive
social change among the American Indian/Alaskan Native people of the United States.
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Significance
Presently, no known research is underway to investigate and compare the
proportion of influenza A virus in artificial rural and urban ponds. A review of current
literature did not identify any other studies that attempted to collect influenza A virus
data from artificial water ponds in rural or urban communities. Several researchers
investigated the presence or persistence of influenza viruses to natural waterfowl
wetlands (Austin & Hinshaw,1984; Ferro, et al., 2010; Lang et al., 2008). The purpose of
this quantitative study is to extend the previous environmental virology research of
influenza in natural waterfowl wetlands to rural and urban communities. The discovery of
the proportion of influenza A virus in rural and urban communities will establish baseline
measures for future monitoring and impact studies in these settings. These baseline
measures may initiate surveillance data for IRAT programs.
Even though the IRAT is not designed to predict the next pandemic, IRAT is
expected to identify gaps in the knowledge, prompt further research, assist with clear
documentation of the thought process, and focus risk management efforts (Trock et al.,
2012). The development of baseline measures of the environmental burden of influenza
A virus in communities will inaugurate new data collection for IRAT.
Current Literature and the Relevance of the Problem
Seasonal influenza virus outbreaks cause 250,000 to 500,000 deaths annually
(Keeler, 2011). The review of the literature identified many studies and publications
seeking to reduce the morbidity and mortality resulting from influenza virus outbreaks.
One area of significant interest is the human-animal interface. The human-animal
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interface is recognized as a complex but critical juncture to which new paradigms are
emerging (World Health Organization, 2011). Aquatic virus reservoirs is a human-animal
interface. Franklin et al. (2011) suggested aquatic virus reservoirs give rise to indirect
transmission, which would alter the transmission dynamics, beyond just direct
interactions between infectious and susceptible individuals. The review of the literature
identified several studies that establish the relevance of the problem. The problem is there
are gaps in knowledge about the association between molecular structure, epidemiologic
and clinical characteristics, and the impact of ecological and other contextual aspects of
influenza viruses.
Austin and Hinshaw (1984) investigated feral duck species as a source of
transmission of influenza A virus and paramyxoviruses. The authors of this study
suggested surveillance of healthy ducks and the aquatic environment they frequent may
be of significant interest to monitoring and controlling influenza A viruses (Austin &
Hinshaw, 1984). Austin and Hinshaw and others have identified influenza viral subtypes
in various waterfowl breeds (Ferro, et al., 2010; Mehrabanpour, et al., 2012). These
studies support the hypothesis that migratory waterfowl play a role in the natural
influenza virus reservoir(s) and dispersal. Similar studies have been conducted in the
United States.
Ferro et al. (2010) investigated the presence of influenza A viruses among the
migratory ducks and the winter breeding grounds along the Texas Coast. Other
researchers have investigated waterborne transmission of influenza as a zoonotic disease
in the natural environment (Lang et al., 2008; VanDalen et al., 2010; Webster et al.,
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1992). VanDalen et al. (2010) were able to show viral sheding in fecal material to be of
higher viral concentrations than oropharyngeal or cloacal swabs. Thus, it is possible that
influenza viruses can be transfered between organisms via open water-sources as
wetlands, lakes, and ponds. Other researchers have investigated if influenza A viruses can
be detected in these contaminated aquatic habitats.
Lang, et al. (2008) collected and studied sediment samples from three ponds in
the Creamer’s Field Migratory Waterfowl Refuge, Alaska, a location used by a wide
variety of migratory waterfowl. The sediment samples were collected using a time-series
approach and analyzed for influenza A virus RNA using reverse transcription-polymerase
chain reaction (RT-PCR) methodologies (Lang et al., 2008). Zhang et al. (2006) collected
and studied samples of ice or water from three northeastern Siberian lakes in the Koluma
River region. The collected samples were analyzed for the presence of influenza A virus
using reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) methodologies (Zhang et
al., 2006). Other researchers have studied influenza A viruses in surface water samples to
investigate the perpetuation between waterfowl and water-contamination (Hinshaw et al.,
1980; Ito et al., 1995), while others have investigated infectivity and transmission of
influenza A viruses in the aquatic environment (Brown et al., 2009; Halvorson et al.,
1985).
In the longitudinal study by Hinshaw et al. (1980), researchers collected and
analyzed samples from waterfowl, unconcentrated lake water, and feces from lake shores
near Vermillion, Alberta, Canada. These samples were used to isolate influenza viruses
and to investigate whether influenza viruses continually circulate or whether the same or
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different strains are present from year to year (Hinshaw et al., 1980). Hinshaw et al.
hypothesized the longitudinal study of feral ducks would provide data on the size of the
gene pool of influenza A viruses in nature and the number of viruses antigenically related
to human strains present in avian species.
Ito et al. (1995) investigated influenza virus isolates from collected from the fecal
samples of dabbling ducks and also from lake water used by migratory waterfowl. The
results of this investigation showed the viruses remained viable in the lake water after
most ducks left for migration South (Ito et al., 1995). Brown et al. (2009) asserted the pH,
temperature, and salinity-at levels normally encountered in nature-can impact the ablity
of avian influenza A viruses to remain viable in water. Halvorson et al. (1985)
investigated the theory of water-borne transmission of avian influenza A viruses among
wild waterfowl and domestic fowl. However, the research only identified certain duckderived isolates are capable of infecting domestic turkeys (Halvorson et al., 1985).
Further investigation into the molecular structure of the influenza viron were published
by several researchers.
The work by Poulson (2011) and Taubenberger and Kash (2010) is a current
detailed understanding of the molecular structure of influenza A virus. These eight singlestranded RNA gene sequences are: PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, M, and NS
(Taubenberger & Kash, 2010). The methodologies to investigate and understand the
molecular structure of influenza A virus include: virus detection by RT-PCR (Poddar et
al., 2002), virus isolation and characterization by allantoic cavities of embryonic eggs
(Fouchier, et al., 2005), infectivity studies using MDCK cell line (Brown et al., 2009),
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nucleotide sequencing of the RNA genome (Yamamoto, et al., 2011), and phylogenic
analysis using BLAST available from GenBank (Fouchier, et al., 2005).
Zhang et al. (2011) asserted the Dongting Lake wetland as an important habitat
and over-wintering area for East Asian migratory birds. From the 95 water samples
collected by Zhang et al., an H10N8 influenza A virus was isolated, whole genome
genetic sequenced, and pathogenicity investigated in mice and specific pathogen free
(SPF) White Leghorn Chickens. The study by Zhang et al. further supports environmental
water sampling approach for influenza risk assessment. The review of the literature
identified many studies and publications supporting the material and methods of this
dissertation study.
The Zhang et al. (2011) study is support for 200-ml water sample collection in
areas near the habitat of migratory birds and storage of the samples at -80°C until
assayed. Tønnessen, et al. (2013) investigated Mixing Vessel Theory, sampling along
migratory flyways for influenza viruses, genome sequencing, and similarity analysis of
the findings in this dissertation research. Evers et al. (2007) investigated the commercial
preservative RNAlater (Qiagen) against the current method of cryo-freezing, and ethanol
preservatives for influenza A virus samples. The purpose of this investigation was to
determine if using the commercial preservative RNAlater would result in improved RTPCR amplification over the current sample preservation methods of cryo-freezing or
ethanol fixation (Evers, Slemons, & Taubenberger, 2007).
The review of the literature identified many studies and publications seeking to
reduce the morbidity and mortality resulting from influenza virus outbreaks. The
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researchers and scientists of these studies sought to investgate gaps in knowledge about
the association between molecular structure, epidemiologic and clinical characteristics,
and the impact of ecological and other contextual aspects of influenza viruses. The
literature search strategy of this dissertation identified studies that establish the relevance
of the problem and support the investigation of the burden of influenza A virus in rural
and urban ponds.
Literature Search Strategy
A literature search was conducted using (i) relevant textbooks; (ii) electronic
bibliographic databases, namely CINAHL, Medline, Academic Search Premier, JSTOR,
Science Direct, Wiley Interscience Journals, Science, and Nature; (iii) reference lists of
articles published in relevant journals; and (iv) Internet websites for the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, and the World Health Organization. English and nonEnglish language articles and books published between 1844 and 2013 were included in
this study. The search for relevant textbooks was based on more general terms such as
influenza, pandemic, viral biology, and molecular biology. The following key words
were used for the electronic databases: influenza, pandemic, viral biology, molecular
biology, antigenic shift and antigenic drift, influenza virus RT-PCR, migratory
waterfowl, and influenza phylogenic analysis. Several hundred references were found
including textbooks or reports and articles. From the findings, 167 references were
selected including textbooks (n = 6), reports (n = 35), articles (n = 124), and other (n = 2).
The literature review of this manuscript is organized into fourteen sections. The
fourteen sections are arranged to present influenza topics in an hourglass format
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beginning with the broad historical background of influenza surveillance, through
pandemic influenza outbreaks, to government responses. Following the historical review
were the less broad sections of the hypothesis of the origin of novel influenza viruses,
Mixing Vessel Theory to explain the emergence of novel influenza viruses, migratory
waterfowl as vectors for global distribution of influenza viruses, and wetland breeding
grounds as hotspots for influenza virus detection. After discussion of influenza in the
aquatic environment, the topic will narrow to water analysis, the molecular structure of
the influenza viron, and laboratory assays. Subsequent to the discussion of laboratory
assays, the topic will broaden to present current influenza surveillance and risk
assessment tools, and social change implications. Preceding the review of the literature is
the theoretical foundation of this dissertation study, the conceptual framework, and the
epidemiological triangle as it applies to pandemic influenza disease.
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical framework for this study were based on the hypotheses proposed
by Webster et al. (1992) and others that (i) migratory waterfowl are the natural reserve of
influenza viruses, and (ii) water-borne transmission of influenza virus occurs between
migratory waterfowl and domestic waterfowl. Adding to the theoretical framework were
Scholtissek et al. (1985) Mixing Vessel Theory. Mixing Vessel Theory posits the viral
adaptation from host animal to human infectivity occurs in an intermediate host animal
such as a swine or waterfowl (Ma et al., 2009).
The literature suggests novel influenza viruses originate in the Southern China
region where migratory waterfowl become infected (Webster et al., 1992). Infected
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asymptomatic migratory waterfowl transport the novel influenza viruses in their intestinal
tracts to the wetland breeding grounds of Alaska and Siberia (Gaidet, et al., 2010). The
water-borne transmission of the influenza viruses to new hosts (migratory waterfowl
from Northern and Southern American regions) occurs at these Alaskan and Siberian
wetland breeding grounds (Lang et al., 2008). The new host(s) may act as a mixing vessel
for influenza viruses. This may result in an antigenic shift or antigenic drift of influenza
viruses resulting in novel strains (Ma et al., 2009). Infected asymptomatic migratory
waterfowl may then transport these influenza virus strains along the eastern Pacific
flyway for migratory birds (Carver, 2003). The eastern Pacific flyway for migratory birds
extends from the southern regions of South America to Alaska. Thus, novel influenza
viruses originating in the southern China region can be transported to the North, Central,
and South American regions.
Underlining the theoretical framework for this study were Pasteur’s (1857-1858)
Germ Theory and Koch’s (1890) Postulates as adapted for viruses. Pasteur’s Germ
Theory identifies germs of microscopic organisms as the cause of disease, and the theory
of spontaneous generation is chimerical (Pasteur et al., 1878). Koch’s Postulates as
adapted for viruses implies that certain conditions-not all of Koch’s Postulates-have to be
met before a specific relation of a virus to a disease is established. The conditions are: (i)
a specific virus must be found associated with a disease with a degree of regularity, and
(ii) the virus must be shown to occur in the sick individual not as an incidental or
accidental finding but as the cause of the disease under investigation (Rivers, 1937).
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Conceptual Framework
Recent work by Taubenberger and Kash (2010) is an analysis of the current
understanding of the molecular mechanisms of influenza viruses to human adaptation.
The research reviewed by Taubenberger and Kash focused on three subject areas of
influenza: (i) molecular structure of influenza virus, (ii) the evolutionary dynamics of
antigenic shift and drift, and (iii) phylogenic analysis of isolated viruses in animals and
humans. The fundamental question of how avian influenza viruses switch host remains
unanswered. Additionally, it is poorly understood how the viral genetic changes effect
human adaptation, human-to-human transmissibility, and pathogenesis (Taubenberger &
Kash, 2010). To further understand the characterization of influenza viruses, some
researchers have approached the topic of avian influenza through the lens of the
epidemiological triangle.
Epidemiological Triangle
The epidemiological triangle has three vertices: host, agent, and environment. The
host is the organism harboring the disease. For influenza disease, the reservoir hosts are
migratory waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes) (Franklin et al.,
2011). The agents are the influenza A viruses. The environments are the natural and
artificial habitats where the hosts are found. The review of the literature identified many
articles where one or more of the verticles of influenza infection was investigated.
Perez-Ramirez et al. (2011) studied avian influenza in wild birds in Europe, Asia,
and Africa. This article includes detailed information about host species, the presence of
low-pathogenic and high-pathogenic avian influenza, origins of the influenza viruses,
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mechanisms of spread, and geographical areas where the infected birds have been
detected (Perez-Ramirez et al., 2011). Webster et al. (1992) included detailed research
about reservoirs of influenza A viruses in nature, the structure and function of the
influenza virus viron, and mechanisms for the perpetuation of influenza viruses in avian
species. Avian species are the reservoir host for influenza viruses.
Host. The burden of influenza A viruses in nature is widespread (Lebarbenchon
& Stallknecht, 2011). Lebarbenchon and Stallknecht (2011) stated avian influenza virus
has been isolated in more than 105 different bird species worldwide where wild
waterfowl (ducks, geese, and swans) are recognized to be the natural host. Franklin et al.
(2011) supported the hypothesis that waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds
(Charadriiformes) are the animal reservoirs for avian influenza virus. Additionally,
Franklin et al. proposed the natural transmission cycle of avian influenza virus as: first,
viral replication in the gastrointestinal tract of an aquatic bird; second, high
concentrations of virus shed into the aquatic environment through feces; third, sustained
Avian influenza virus viability in aquatic environments; and fourth, subsequent avian
influenza virus infection of other animals in the same aquatic environment. This natural
transmission cycle of avian influenza virus proposed by of the Franklin et al. is known as
water-borne transmission.
The hypothesis of water-borne transmission of influenza virus has been the
foundation for several studies investigating the characterization of influenza viruses in
waterfowl (Ferro, et al., 2010), in surface water (Lebarbenchon, et al., 2011), and in
sediment samples (Lang et al., 2008). Austin and Hinshaw (1984) investigated feral duck
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species as a source of transmission of influenza A virus and paramyxoviruses. The
researchers collected swab samples from tracheal and cloacae from different species of
feral ducks and were able to identify several viral strains of influenza A virus (Austin &
Hinshaw, 1984). The alterations of influenza viral strains occur due to antigenic drift due
to point mutations and antigenic shift caused by genetic reassortment. Austin and
Hinshaw asserted that it was possible these alterations occurred in the intestinal tract of
ducks. The Austin and Hinshaw study is support for the hypothesis that migratory ducks
are a source point for influenza viruses. This article also includes data that suggests
asymptomatic and healthy ducks can host a variety of influenza strains.
Gaidet et al. (2010) focused on the long-range migratory patterns of waterfowl to
explain the global dispersion of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus (HPAI
H5N1). Satellite telemetry was used to study the movements of migratory waterfowl over
Asia, Europe, and Africa. The authors concluded, on average, a migratory bird would
only have 5-15 days per year of infection to disperse HPAI H5N1 (Gaidet, et al., 2010).
Thus, intercontinental virus dispersion requires relay transmission between series of
successfully infected migratory waterfowl. Additionally, only asymptomatic birds could
successfully disperse HPAI H5N1 (Gaidet, et al., 2010). This study supports the theory
the seasonality of influenza outbreaks can be explained, in part, by movements of
migratory birds. However, population studies of migratory birds are not a reliable
influenza disease surveillance tool.
Hierarchical modeling can be used to estimate bird populations. Link and Sauer
(2002) focused on hierarchical modeling for estimating Cerulean Warblers populations
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using North American Bird Breeding Survey data. The work by Link and Sauer is critical
of the validity of North American Bird Breeding Survey data. The authors asserted North
American Bird Breeding Survey data is not well suited for monitoring the Cerulean
Warblers (Link & Sauer, 2002). Reasoning for this critical judgment is the flight patterns
of the Cerulean Warblers are not compatible with the observation methods of North
American Bird Breeding Survey. This article provides opinion about the application and
validity of the population trends of the North American Bird Breeding Survey data.
Additionally, this article rules-out the association of migratory bird population data to
seasonal influenza outbreaks. However, the studies of migratory waterfowl as a host is
still of great importance in influenza A virus surveillance.
Mehrabanpour, Rahimian, Shirazinezhad, Moein, and Shayanfar (2012) focused
on cloacal swabs and samples of bird droppings from the wetland regions of Boushehr,
Iran. Samples were analyzed for influenza viral strains using RT-PCR methodologies.
These studies and others have identified influenza viral subtypes in various waterfowl
breeds (Ferro, et al., 2010; Mehrabanpour, et al., 2012). These studies support the
hypothesis that migratory waterfowl play a role in the natural influenza virus reservoir(s)
and dispersal. Similar studies have been conducted in the United States.
Ferro et al. (2010) focused on the presence of influenza A viruses among the
migratory ducks and the winter breeding grounds along the Texas Coast. Cloacal swabs
were analyzed for influenza A viruses using RT-PCR technique. Over a three year period,
the researchers were able to collect samples from 5,363 birds. Data analysis showed a
prominence of specific sub-strains of influenza viruses and also identified Blue-winged
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Teals and Green-winged Teals as carriers of several influenza viral subtypes (Ferro, et al.,
2010). These studies provide additional evidence that influenza viruses can be identified
among health migratory waterfowl. A different approach to isolating influenza viruses
was conducted in Pennsylvania.
Henzler et al. (2003) investigated the avian influenza H7N2 outbreak in
Pennsylvannia during the years 1996-1998. In this study, the researchers captured and
culled wild-mice from 10 poultry premises where avian influenza H7N2 had been
identified. The authors reported that all of the wild-caught mice intestinal tissue and lung
pool specimens were negative for influenza virus even though poultry on the premises
were positive for avian influenza (Henzler, et al., 2003). The research model investigated
by Henzler et al. rules-out wild-mice as host, and as a surveillance tool for influenza
viruses. Other researchers have investigated other organisms living within the influenza
A virus environment.
Faust, Stallknecht, Swayne, and Brown (2009) focused on the ability of filterfeeeding bivalves to remove influenza virus from contaminated water. The researchers
were able to demonstrate that filter-feeding bivalves can remove influenza virus from
contaminated water, however, the findings of the research suggest that avian influenza
virus is inactivated or sequestered in clam tissue after filtration (Faust, Stallknecht,
Swayne, & Brown, 2009). The research model investigated by Faust et al. rules-out filterfeeeding bivalves as host, and as a surveillance tool for influenza A viruses. These
researchers investigated potential host species for influenza A viruses. Others have
focused investigation on the agent, influenza A virus, itself.
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Agent. Moattari et al. (2010) studied the phylogenic pathways of antigenic
variations of human influenza viruses. The analysis of 300 pharyngeal swab samples
from influenza patients identified several similarities among different influenza viral
subtypes. The purpose of these studies was to compare the effectiveness of a common
vaccination formula to influenza virus (Moattari, et al., 2010). Antigenic shift and
phylogenic analysis of the samples provide evidence and support that RNA mutations in
the influenza virus genome can result in novel outbreak strains. A novel outbreak strain
from a common virus supports the hypothesis that mutagenic change occurs within a
single organism, namely a migratory waterfowl.
Saitou and Nei (1986) posit an explanation to the process of viral evolution for
influenza A viruses. Additionally, this manuscript provides operational definitions of the
terms: phylogenic tree, polymorphism, mutation rate, and nucleotide substitution (Saitou
& Nei, 1986). Recent studies provide more detailed description of the molecular
mutations and evolution of influenza viruses (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006). These
early studies relate the theory of viral evolution to influenza viruses.
Environment. The literature suggests novel influenza viruses originate in the
Southern China region (Webster et al., 1992). Migratory waterfowl become infected with
the novel influenza viruses in this region. Asymptomatic migratory waterfowl transport
the influenza viruses in their intestinal tracts to the wetland breeding grounds of Alaska
and Siberia (Gaidet, et al., 2010). The water-borne transmission of the influenza viruses
to new hosts (migratory waterfowl from Northern and Southern American regions)
occurs at these Alaskan and Siberian wetland breeding grounds (Lang et al., 2008). The
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new host(s) may act as a mixing vessel for influenza viruses. This may cause an antigenic
shift or antigenic drift of influenza viruses resulting in novel strains (Ma et al., 2009).
Infected asymptomatic migratory waterfowl from Northern and Southern American
regions may then transport these influenza virus strains along the eastern Pacific flyway
for migratory birds (Carver, 2003). The eastern Pacific flyway for migratory birds
extends from the southern regions of South America to Alaska. Others have investigated
the transmission to new hosts in the live bird market environments of southern China.
Martin, et al. (2011) investigated the live-bird markets of Southern China as a
potential environment for the transmission of avian influenza viruses. The researchers in
this mixed-methods study interviewed live poultry traders to flesh out incoming and
outgoing trading activities. Additionally, the researchers collected a total of 7050 cloacal
and tracheal swabs, 2415 environmental, and 610 water samples from 30 market nodes to
investigate the burden of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 (Martin, et al., 2011).
From the results of the Martin, et al. (2011) study, the authors concluded that risk-based
surveillance of the live bird markets of Southern China positively supplements China’s
effort and commitment to highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 control. Literature by
others have identified human-to-human transmission as an opportunity to control
influenza A virus transmission.
Animal-to-human transmission is considered “primary” transmission and humanto-human transmission of zoonotic diseases is considered “secondary” transmission
(Lloyd-Smith, et al., 2009). McClure et al. (2011) recognized personal hygiene and
vaccination as the most important and effective methods for controlling for spread of
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influenza viruses. Mao and Yang (2012) posit that human networks, infectious diseases,
and human preventive behavior are intrinsically inter-related. Personal hygiene is an
extension of human preventive behavior for controlling the spread of influenza viruses in
the modern environment.
History of Influenza Surveillance
In 1947, at the 4th International Congress for Microbiology held in Copenhagen, a
group of virologist forwarded a recommendation to the Interim Commission of the World
Health Organization an international program be initiated for influenza surveillance
(Hampson, 1997). The World Health Organization Global Influenza Programme was
established later that year (Fleming, van der Velden, & Paget, 2003). The 1947 influenza
surveillance control programme is the oldest disease control program at the World Health
Organization (World Health Organization, 2005). The World Health Organization (2005)
stated the creation of the 1947 influenza surveillance control programme resulted from
two concerns: first, the inevitable recurrence, at unpredictable intervals, of highly
disruptive pandemics; and second, the significant health and economic impact of seasonal
epidemics, which occur nearly every year (p. 34). Hampson (1997) opinioned the
objectives of the 1947 influenza surveillance control programme as: to gain an
understanding of the epidemiology of influenza, and to promptly isolate influenza viruses
from new outbreaks and distribute them for vaccine production (p. S8). Within four years
of creation, the 1947 influenza surveillance control programme developed into a network
of 60 laboratories across 40 countries (World Health Organization, 2005).
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The influenza surveillance control programme became the WHO Global Influenza
Surveillance Network consisting of 113 national influenza centers located in 84 countries
(World Health Organization, 2005). Following the adoption by the World Health
Organization of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework in May 2011, the
Global Influenza Surveillance Network was changed to Global Influenza Surveillance
and Response System. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the European
Influenza Surveillance Scheme (EISS) collaborate with the WHO Global Influenza
Surveillance and Response System to monitor the evolution of influenza viruses and
provides recommendations in various disciplines including laboratory diagnostics,
vaccines, antiviral susceptibility and risk assessment (World Health Organization, 2013).
The CDC developed its own surveillance control program during the same period. Unlike
the WHO surveillance programme which originated from public health concern about
influenza disease, the CDC surveillance program originated from public health concern
about malaria disease.
The Communicable Disease Center was established July 1, 1947 for the purpose
of continuance of the Malaria Control in War Areas organization into peacetime
(Andrews, 1946). Andrews (1946) described the concern of the U.S. Public Health
Service that servicemen returning from Malaria endemic war areas may act as a reservoir
and a mode of transmission of Malaria viruses (Andrews, 1946). Andrews further
depicted the early organization of the Communicable Disease Center as a result from
revisons of the Malaria Control in War Areas organization. The early administrative and
technical divisions of the Communicable Disease Center include: (i) Epidemiology, (ii)
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Laboratory, (iii) Engineering, (iv) Entomology, (v) Technical Development, (vi) training,
(vii) Production, and (viii) Library and Reports (Andrews, 1946). Over the next decade,
the focus changed from malaria to influenza.
On June 18, 1957 a memorandum from William A. Neill, M.D., Chief, Epidemic
Intelligence Service, and Alexander D. Langmuir, M.D., Chief, Epidemiology Branch,
with the subject: Alert to Possible Influenza Outbreaks was addressed to all Epidemic
Intelligence Service Officiers and other professional personnel at the Epidemiology
Branch (Neill & Langmuir, 1957). Neill and Langmuir (1957) wrote the purpose of the
memorandum was to bring awareness of the 1957 Far East influenza outbreak. The
following month, on July 9, 1957 the CDC Influenza Report No.1 was produced.
The emphasis of the CDC Influenza Report No.1 was to provide summary
information regarding outbreaks and cases of confirmed infections of the Far East strain
of influenza virus, outbreaks of influenza-like illness with specimens under laboratory
study, and outbreaks found not to be influenza or epidemics of influenza-like illness with
no specimen available (Communicable Disease Center, 1957). The title CDC Influenza
Report was changed to CDC Influenza Surveillance Report in Fall of 1957. On October 1,
1957 the CDC Influenza Surveillance Report No. 19 was released. The emphasis of the
CDC Influenza Surveillance Report No. 19 was to provide a summary of the continued
nationwide spread of the Asian Strain Influenza 1957 (Communicable Disease Center,
1957).
The title CDC Influenza Surveillance Report was changed to Influenza
Surveillance Report in early of 1963. On February 15, 1963 the Influenza Surveillance

64
Report No. 74 was released. The emphasis of Influenza Surveillance Report No. 74 was
to provide a state-by-state summary of outbreaks and cases of influenza and influenzalike illness (Communicable Disease Center, 1963). The title Influenza Surveillance
Report was changed to Influenza-Respiratory Disease Report in mid-1965. The new
name reflected the intended expansion of content in future Influenza Surveillance
Summaries resulting as the epidemiology of multitudinous respiratory viruses was better
documented (Communicable Disease Center, 1965). Currently, the Epidemiology and
Prevention Branch in the Influenza Division at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention collect, compiles, and analyzes data on influenza activity throughout the
United States and produces FluView, a weekly influenza surveillance report (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). The European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control has a similar influenza surveillance program as the CDC named European
Influenza Surveillance Network.
The European Influenza Surveillance Network collects influenza surveillance data
from all European Union countries, Iceland and Norway (European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control, 2013). The origin European Influenza Surveillance Network can
be traced back to sentinel practice-based surveillance for influenza-like illness in the
United Kingdom. Fleming, van der Velden, and Paget (2003) provided a historical
account of early 1970s surveillance schemes in the Netherlands, Scotland, and Portugal
based on the practice-based surveillance of the United Kingdom. During the 1980s,
sentinel surveillance networks were established in France, Belgium, and Spain (Fleming
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et al., 2003). Fleming et al. (2003) further detailed the 1989 European Commission
funding of the Eurosentinel Project.
A primary goal of the Eurosentinel Project was to unify the influenza surveillance
networks of each European country (Fleming et al., 2003). In the ensuring years, the
Eurosentinel Project became the ENS-CARE Influenza Early Warning Scheme, followed
by the European Influenza Surveillance Scheme (European Centre for Disease Prevention
and Control, 2013). Currently, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(2013) issues the Weekly Influenza Surveillance Overview which is a surveillance report
based on the data collected by sentinel physicians and data collected and processed by
national co-ordination centers among the member states.
Modern influenza surveillance began with the World Health Organization Global
Influenza Programme in 1947. Since then, many nations and international collaborations
have evolved due to advancements in research and science. Throughout this evolution,
the overarching purpose of influenza surveillance has remained the same: to reduce the
global burden of influenza viruses on the human population. The understanding of the
history of influenza surveillance aids in aligning the research of this dissertation.
Historical study of influenza outbreaks further focuses the research of this dissertation.
Pandemic Flu
Influenza viral infections appear with regular annual frequency that the
phenomenon is common to refer to period as ‘flu season” or “seasonal flu”. However,
pandemic influenza events have not been regular or predictable. Taubenberger and
Morens (2006) identify and provide a brief synopsis of 13 pandemic events between 1510
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and 1978. Wali and Music (2011) provided a summary of public health outcomes of nine
U.S. influenza epidemics that occurred between the period 1972 – 1973 to 1991 – 1992.
Keeler (2011) provided a brief history of influenza pandemics from the time of discovery
of the influenza virus through the last decade. Further, the work by Keeler notably
identified the sharp increase in public awareness of influenza and the potential human
health threat of the virus. One of the greatest human helath threats was the pandemic
Spanish flu of 1918.
1918-1919 (Spanish Flu)
A review of the literature describes the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 as one of
the deadliest disease outbreaks in history (Keeler, 2011; Morens & Fauci, 2007).
Taubenberger and Morens (2006) portrayed the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 as
“…remaining as an ominous warning to public health” (p. 15). Patterson and Pyle (1983)
pictured the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 as “…one of the most pervasive and
devastating biological disasters since the bubonic plague of the fourteenth century” (p.
1299). A review of the literature further provided past and current knowledge of the
Spanish flu of 1918 pandemic.
The current knowledge of the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 stimulates additional
discussion and guides researchers to gaps in the knowledge. Oxford (2000) contended
there are several important and practical questions to ask about the pandemic Spanish flu
of 1918: (i) Where did the 1918 virus originate? (ii) Was there something unique about
the genetic structure of the virus which enabled it to achieve such a high killing potential?
(iii) Were the geographical circumstances of 1918 unique with so many young men
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travelling the world in troopships? (iv) Was the 1918 virus pantropic like H5 influenza in
chickens where it infects all organs including the alimentary tract and nervous system or
did it confine its virulence to the respiratory tract?
There is a lack of consensus in the literature as to the genetic origin of the 1918
pandemic influenza virus. Langford (2005) posits from historical records that that 1918
pandemic influenza virus originated in China. The basis of Langford’s hypothesis is the
lower mortality rates of Chinese during the 1918 influenza pandemic. Lower mortality
rates may have been the result of Chinese having prior exposure to earlier mutations of
the virus and hence some immunity to the virulent strain (Langford, 2005). Langford
further posits the travel routes of Chinese workers to France and other countries during
the period may explain the global spread of the 1918 influenza pandemic virus. Reid et
al. (2004) used phylogenetic analysis data of gene sequences from the 1918 influenza
pandemic virus for investigating the origin of the virus(es).
Formalin-fixed-paraffin-embedded lung tissue from victims of the 1918 pandemic
and exhumed victims of the outbreak in the Artic regions frozen case material has made it
possible to characterize the genetic sequences of the 1918 influenza pandemic virus
(Oxford, 2000; Reid, Taubenberger, & Fanning, 2004). Sequencing of the RNA
fragments identified the 1918 influenza pandemic virus as a novel H1N1 influenza A
virus (Keeler, 2011). Reid et al. (2004) suggested emerging data about the genetic origins
of the 1918 H1N1 pandemic strain indicate some of the genome segments might have a
novel origin that has not been isolated in strains responsible for other pandemics. Morens
and Fauci (2007) attested genetic sequencing identifies the ultimate ancestral source of
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the 1918 H1N1 pandemic virus to be avian. However, this does not explain if there
something unique about the genetic structure of the virus which enabled it to achieve
such a high killing potential (Oxford, 2000).
Current global death toll estimates from the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 is at
least 40 million persons and 500 million infected (Oxford, 2000; Reid et al., 2004;
Tumpey, et al., 2005). An estimated death in the United States from pandemic Spanish
flu of 1918 is 675,000 persons (Tumpey, et al., 2005). Frost (1919) investigated and
compared the mortality rates resulting from influenza and pneumonia disease from the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The investigation by Frost focused on the
mortality rates in major U.S. cities during that time period. Morens and Fauci (2007)
further investigated the mortality rates caused by the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918.
The mortality rates of the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918, unlike seasonal
outbreaks, shows a “W” shape mortality curve (Morens & Fauci, 2007). During most
influenza epidemics and pandemics, the mortality curve is “U” shape where the highest
mortality rates are seen in the very young and very old with lower mortality rates seen in
other age groups (Keeler, 2011). Morens and Fauci (2007) reported that excess mortality
in persons 20 – 40 years of age resulting from the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918
produced the “W” shape mortality curve. Further, Morens and Fauci asserted the
extradordinary excess influenza mortality in persons 20 – 40 years of age from the
pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 may be the most important unsolved mystery of the
pandemic.
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Starko (2009) investigated possible causes of the excess influenza mortality in
persons 20 – 40 years of age from the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918. In this study, it was
hypothesized that salicylate (aspirin) therapy for influenza during the pandemic Spanish
flu of 1918 resulted in toxicity and pulmonary edema, which contributed to the incidence
and severity of severe acute respiratory distress (ARDS) – like condition, subsequent
bacterial infection, and overall mortality (Starko, 2009). Starko reasoned the combination
of the loss of Bayer’s patent on aspirin in February of 1917, and the aspirin regimens
(dose and schedule) recommended in 1918 contributed to the excess mortality rate. The
loss of Bayer’s patent on aspirin in February of 1917 opened the aspirin market to many
manufacturers, and the aspirin regimens in 1918 are now known to regularly produce
toxicity (Starko, 2009). Thus, toxic aspirin regimens in combination with pandemic
Spanish flu of 1918 may have resulted in increased mortality among 20 – 40 year olds.
Unlike Starko who hypothesized salicylate therapy to exacerbate the mortality, Tumpey,
et al. (2005) investigated the high mortality rate using a reconstructed 1918 Spanish
influenza pandemic virus.
Tumpey, et al. (2005) generated a virus containing the complete coding sequences
of the eight viral gene segments from the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic virus. The
purpose of this effort was to understand the molecular basis of the virulence of the 1918
Spanish influenza pandemic virus (Tumpey, et al., 2005). To evaluate the pathogenecity
of the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic virus, the researchers of the Tumpey, et al. study
intranasally inoculated BALB/c mice with two independently generated 1918 viruses and
then determined morbidity, virus replication, and 50% lethal dose titers.
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The histopathology of lung tissue from intranasally inoculated BALB/c mice
showed similarity to lung tissues from human cases who died from primary influenza
pneumonia in 1918 (Tumpey, et al., 2005). Further, the researchers of the Tumpey, et al.
(2005) study were able to show the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic virus HA and
polymerase genes were associated with increased virulence in chicken embryos and also
the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic virus replication rate is significantly greater than
that of the contemporary human Tx/91 (H1N1) virus. However, studies of the virulence
of the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic virus have been unable to explain the three
waves in the 1918-1919 pandemic.
Morens and Fauci (2007) reported the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 spread in
three rapidly recurring waves within a nine month period. Keeler (2011) reported the
three waves occurred over sixteen months. This rapid spread was unprecedented at the
time (Keeler, 2011). The first wave or Spring wave began in March 1918 and spread
heterogeneously through the United States, Europe, and possibly Asia over a six month
period (Langford, 2005; Taubenberger & Morens, 2009). The second wave or Fall wave
appeared in August 1918 in a much more severe form than in the first wave (Keeler,
2011; Langford, 2005). This second wave of August 1918 apparently began in three
locations: Freetown, Sierra Leone; in Brest, France; and in Boston, Massachusets
(Langford, 2005). The third wave appeared in many nations during the early part of 1919
(Langford, 2005; Taubenberger & Morens, 2009).
By the end of the pandemic, approximately one-third of the world population was
infected and death estimates between 50 – 100 million persons (Keeler, 2011). Mortality
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from the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 was highest during the second wave, followed by
the third wave, and then the first wave (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006). The identity of
1918 pandemic virus was completed using formalin fixed lung tissue from more than 80
victims of the second wave (Oxford, 2000). The identity of the viral varients of the first
and third waves is still unknown (Morens & Fauci, 2007). Another unexplained
phenomena is the unprecedented velocity of global spread of the pandemic Spanish flu of
1918.
It is widely accepted in the literature the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 spread
throughout the globe in less than a two year period. Oxford (2000) studied the
geographical circumstances of troopship movements and wartime efforts are asserted to
play an important role in supporting the global spread of the 1918 Spanish influenza
pandemic virus. Patterson and Pyle (1983) investigated the diffusion of the pandemic
Spanish flu of 1918 across sub-Saharan Africa. In the Patterson and Pyle study, the data
analyzed primarily came from published government reports and a few contemporary
articles. The authors acknowledged the reporting of data to be spotty; where times and
places of some outbreaks were missing (Patterson & Pyle, 1983). Patterson and Pyle
asserted the devastation of the second wave of the 1918 – 1919 pandemic was totally
unexpected, unexplainable, and uncontrollable in Africa and thus, more useful data would
not greatly modify the conclusions of the study.
The second wave of the pandemic Spanish flu of 1918 has been reported to have
appeared in Sierra Leone in August 1918 (Langford, 2005). Patterson and Pyle (1983)
reported that Freetown, Sierra Leone was the first place in sub-Sarahan Africa where the
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“Fall wave” hit and subsequently spread to all West Africa. Patterson and Pyle further
asserted that wartime disruption with the movement of troops and laborers, and the newly
created colonial transportion network are two factors that helped spread the disease.
There are several common phenomena to the spread and spatial diffusion of
infectious diseases. These common phenomena underpin the research conclusions of the
Patterson and Pyle (1983) study. These spatial diffusion phenomena are: (i) extremely
virulent agents can penetrate areas rapidly (especially when there are low immunity
levels) and linear pathways result; (ii) radical spatial diffusion takes place from the onset,
with the disease spreading to places adjacent to the major pathways and beyond; and (iii)
these forms of diffusion often coalesce into ‘clinical fronts’, and, in many instances,
spatial-temporal diffusion waves can be identified (Patterson & Pyle, 1983). Patterson
and Pyle concluded the research findings support pandemic disease diffusion along
transportation routes. Additionally, interval-scaled time-distance plots indicate the
velocity of movement along the South Africa/Congo pathway to be much more rapid than
the pathways of the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Benin (Patterson & Pyle, 1983). By
applying Spearman Rank-Order Correlation (RS) to the interval-scaled time-distance plot
data, the researchers of the Patterson and Pyle study were able to estimate pandemic
disease spread velocities. Based on these calculations, Patterson and Pyle asserted the
pandemic did not originate in Africa, and that West and East Africa were infected
separately.
The second wave of the pandemic disease ended in the 1918 summer - fall season
and the third wave of the pandemic disease ended after the 1918-1919 winter season
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(Morens & Fauci, 2007). Taubenberger and Morens (2006) posit the virus may have
shifted due to confrontation by selection pressures of population immunity. Thus, the
pandemic viruses begin to drift genetically and eventually settle into a pattern of annual
epidemic recurrences (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006). Nearly 40 years following the
emergence of the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic virus, an H2 subtype of influenza A
virus emerged in the Yunan Province of China in February 1957 (Oxford, 2000).
1957-1958 (Far East Flu)
The influenza pandemic of 1957-1958 first occurred in the Yunan Province of
China in February of 1957 (Potter, 2001). The manuscript by Payne (1958) included an
early account of the speed and spread of the 1957-1958 pandemic. From the original
outbreak in the Yunan Province, the virus spread throughout the world within seven
months (Payne, 1958). Payne reported that in 1957, initial virus isolation was performed
in four laboratories: Chanchung, China by Chu et al.; Peking, China by Tang and Liang;
Singapore by Hale; and at a United States Army laboratory in Japan. The 1957 pandemic
influenza virus was an H2N2 strain (Pappas, et al., 2010). Webster et al. (1992) reported
the1957 pandemic influenza virus H2N2 strain originated as a reassortant of PB1, HA,
and NA gene segments. Lindstrom et al. (2004) further reported the PB1, HA, and NA
gene segments of the 1957 pandemic influenza virus H2N2 were avian origin and the
remaining five gene segments were of human H1N1 origin.
The 1957 pandemic influenza virus H2N2 developed considerable genetic
variability as the epidemic spread throughout the globe (Lindstrom, Cox, & Klimov,
2004). A few of the 1957 pandemic influenza virus H2N2 sub lineage strains include:
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A/Albany/22/1957, A/Japan/305-/1957, A/Guiyang/1/1957, and A/RI/5+/1957. Xu,
McBride, Paulson, Basler, and Wilson (2010) investigated avian, human, and swine viral
isolates from 1957 H2N2 pandemic to better understand the 1957 pandemic influenza
viral genetic sequencing and molecular structures.
Phylogenetic analysis of 52 viruses isolated between 1957 and 1968 was
conducted by Lindstrom et al. (2004). From this investigation, Lindstrom et al. asserted
the 1957 pandemic influenza viruses diverged into two distinct clades from one common
ancestor. It is pausible the rapid global spread and increased mortality from the 1957
pandemic influenza virus was a result of the genetic diversity of the H2N2 viral
sublineages. Therefore, human populations without previous exposure to viral strains the
humoral immunity and response (antibody-mediated system) would be challenged.
The 1957 pandemic influenza viruses circulated for only 11 years from 1957 to
1968 (Krause, et al., 2012). The mortality from the 1957 H2N2 pandemic is estimated to
be 2 million deaths globally (Pappas, et al., 2010). Potter (2001) reported deaths due to
the 1957 H2N2 pandemic were calculated at approximately 80,000 in the United States.
Simonsen, Clarke, Schonberger, Arden, Cox, and Fukuda (1998) examined age-specific
mortality related to the 1957 H2N2 pandemic in the United States. The researchers of the
Simonsen et al. (1998) study calculated the proportion (%) of excess deaths in persons <
65 years old as: [1957-1958 = 36%], [1959-1960 = 28%], [1962-1963 = 26%], and
[1967-1968 = 4%]. During the 1957-1958 H2N2 pandemic (Far East Flu), persons < 65
years old accounted for 36% of all excess influenza-realted deaths which was lower than
during the 1968-1969 H3N2 pandemic (Hong Kong Flu) where persons < 65 years old
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accounted for 48% of all excess influenza-related deaths (Simonsen, Clarke,
Schonberger, Arden, Cox, & Fukuda, 1998).
1968-1969 (Hong Kong Flu)
In mid-July, 1968, a wide spread outbreak of acute respiratory disease occurred in
Southeast China. This outbreak was reported in The Times of London (Cockburn et al.,
1969). Human-to-human transmission rates of this acute respiratory disease were high.
By the end of July 1968, an estimated one-half a million persons had become infected
(Keeler, 2011). This rapidly spreading influenza disease became known as the “Hong
Kong flu”. Cockburn, Delon, and Ferreria (1969) reported the “Hong Kong flu” first
appeared in the United States in California during October 1968. By the end of December
1968, “Hong Kong flu” infections were reported across the U.S. in nearly every state
(Cockburn et al., 1969). The disease also spread to Australia, India, and Iran by midAugust 1968 (Keeler, 2011). Further, Keeler (2011) reported the disease spread to Europe
by September 1968 and the global epidemic was reported in nearly every country by
January 1969.
Even though the majority of people infected by the “Hong Kong flu” experienced
typical flu-like symptoms, high mortality rates were reported (Keeler, 2011). Simonsen et
al. (1998) reported that during the 1968-1969 “Hong Kong flu” pandemic, persons < 65
years old accounted for 48% of all influenza-realted excess deaths. The findings of this
study is in contrast to the recent work by Keeler (2011). Keeler reported high mortality
rates were observed in the very young and the very old due mainly to pneumonia caused
by secondary infections. This “smoldering” influenza disease was the subject of
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inconsistencies in the news media as well. In the January 18, 1969 publication of the
British Medical Journal, a correspondence by F. Desmond MacCarthy was included.
MacCarthy (1969) wrote:
Sir, I am surprised no one has written to you before concerning the hysterical
outburst by the press and the B.B.C. with regard to this subject. Every day there is
a head line. We must expect a severe epidemic or not; we should be vaccinated or
cannot be because there is no vaccine available; thousands of cases in America
and hundreds of deaths; or, it's not very serious, no worse than previous
epidemics; 250,000 doses of vaccine released next week. Cannot the press and the
B.B.C. be controlled or at least persuaded to behave more responsibly in a matter
which affects every family doctor, and, by the unnecessary anxiety they have
created, increases their work tremendously? (p. 182).
The “Hong Kong flu” has been described as a “smoldering” pandemic because the
first wave (1968 – 1969) resulted in high mortality rates in the United States, and the
second wave (1969 – 1970) resulted high mortality rates in Europe and Asia (Keeler,
2011; Viboud, Grais, Lafont, Miller, & Simonsen, 2005). Viboud, Grais, Lafont, Miller,
and Simonsen (2005) described this phenomena as “counterintuitive” since a novel virus
introduced into a susceptible population should demonstrate decreasing impact over time
as population immunity increases.
The novel virus responsible for the “Hong Kong flu” pandemic is
A/HongKong/68 (H3N2) (Viboud et al., 2005). The literature supports the hypothesis that
A/HongKong/68 (H3N2) resulted from a reassortment event between a circulating human
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H2N2 virus and an avian influenza virus, acquiring novel HA (H3 subtype) and PB1 gene
segments (Lindstrom et al., 2004; Taubenberger & Kash, 2010; Taubenberger & Morens,
2006; Viboud et al., 2005). Taubenberger and Kash (2010) proclaimed the six other gene
segment of the A/HongKong/68 (H3N2) were retained from the 1957 – 1958 H2N2
pandemic virus.
Unlike the 1957 – 1958 H2N2 virus which circulated for 11 years, the 1968 –
1969 H3N2 virus continues to be isolated at low levels around the globe (Taubenberger
& Kash, 2010). Lindstrom et al. (2004) suggested diversity at the protein level among
early H3N2 viruses is an explanation why surviving H3N2 viruses to possess a number of
amino acid changes. These amino acid changes thus render these H3N2 virus strains
more fit (Lindstrom et al., 2004). Less fit is the A/New Jersey/76 (HswlN1) virus. A/New
Jersey/76 (HswlN1) virus is responsible for the 1976 influenza outbreak at Fort Dix, NJ
and was only identifiable in circulation for approximately three months (Gaydos et al.,
2006).
1976 Pandemic Flu Threat (Fort Dix Swine Flu)
During the months of January and February 1976, novel swine influenza A virus
outbreak occurred in Fort Dix, New Jersey. More than 230 soldiers were affected of
which 13 soldiers (12 basic trainees and one cadre office worker) developed severe
respiratory illness with one death (Gaydos et al., 2006). Kendal, Goldfield, Noble, and
Dowdle (1977) described the laboratory procedures of identification and preliminary
antigenic analysis of the novel swine influenza A virus outbreak at Fort Dix, New Jersey.
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A collaborative effort by the New Jersey Department of Health and the World
Health Organization Collaborating Center at the Center for Disease Control identified the
novel virus and designated it A/New Jersey/76 (HswlN1) influenza virus (Kendal,
Goldfield, Noble, & Dowdle, 1977). Kendal et al. (1977) asserted the A/New Jersey/76
(HswlN1) influenza virus was transmitted from swine to man. Top and Russell (1976)
further suggested a new recruit introduced A/New Jersey/76 (HswlN1) to Fort, Dix, NJ
early in 1976 after the holidays. Gaydos et al. (2006) speculated human-to-human
transmission of A/New Jersey/76 (HswlN1) occurred because of the close contacts in the
unique basic training environment, with limited transmission outside the basic training
environment. Further, Gaydos et al. (2006) suggested the Fort Dix outbreak may have
been a zoonotic anomaly caused by introduction of an animal virus into a stressed
population in close contact in crowded facilities during a cold winter.
A seroepidemiologic study of basic combat training trainees at the time of the
Fort Dix, NJ outbreak strongly supported human-to-human transmission among the
contacts of the case (Hodder, Gaydos, Allen, Top, Nowosiwsky, & Russell, 1977).
Interestingly, the A/New Jersey/76 (HswlN1) influenza outbreak was limited to Fort Dix,
NJ, and was no longer isolated after March 19, 1976 (Gaydos et al., 2006). It has been
hypothesized in the literature that a co-circulating and widely prevalent in the civilian
population seasonal influenza virus, Influenza A/Victoria may have been in competition
with A/New Jersey/76 (HswlN1) (Top & Russell, 1976). Top and Russell (1976)
speculated the continual introduction of A/Victoria virus into the reception center at Fort
Dix, NJ, in contrast to the limited introduction of A/New Jersey/76 (HswlN1) virus may
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have resulted in a gradual reduction in the possibility of individual exposure to A/New
Jersey/76 (HswlN1) virus and a greater possibility of exposure to A/Victoria virus. A
little over a year later, in 1977, influenza A subtype of H1N1 emerged in China (Kung et
al., 1978).
1977 Pandemic Flu Threat (New Flu Virus in Northern China, aka Russian Flu,
1977)
By the end of May and the beginning of June 1977, another outbreak of influenza
was identified in Liaoning Province and Tientsin Municipality in China (Kung et al.,
1978). Also known as the 1977 Russian flu, this outbreak is often considered the fourth
pandemic of the twentieth century (Keeler, 2011). Kung, Jen, Yuan, Tien, and Chu
(1978) reported sera samples were collected from four different areas of China and
submtted to Peking for identification. The influenza was identified to be H1N1 (Oxford,
2000). During this outbreak, the disease concentration was around middle and primary
schools (Kung et al., 1978). Oxford (2000) reasons persons over twenty years possessed
antibodies to the virus so illness was limited mostly to children and adolescents.
The Peking Health and Anti-epidemic Station conducted a survey immediately
following the July – August epidemic. The Peking Health and Anti-epidemic Station
surveillance revealed mortality was highest in people aged 7 – 12 years and 13 – 20
years, and was notably lower in those aged 21 – 30 years and further declined thereafter
(Kung et al., 1978). Further, Kung et al. (1978) reported the 1977 H1N1 pandemic virus
spread rather slowly. The virus first emerged in Liaoning in May and covered the whole
province by August, and spread to different parts of China gradually between June and
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October (Kung et al., 1978). In contrast to Kung et al., Oxford (2000) described the
spread of the 1977 H1N1 pandemic virus as rapid; causing outbreaks in Russia and 7 – 9
months later causing outbreaks in the United Kingdom, United States, Europe, and
Australia.
Phylogenetic analysis of the 1977 H1N1 pandemic virus showed genetic and
antigenetic similarity to previously identified strains circulating in the 1950s (Keeler,
2011; Oxford, 2000). The genetic and antigenetic similarities to previously circulating
influenza A viruses may provide insight and explanation as to why mortality was highest
in people aged 7 – 12 years and 13 – 20 years. Persons older than 20 years may have had
pre-existing humoral immunity to the 1977 H1N1 pandemic virus. Kung et al. (1978)
asserted that an ancestral H1N1 virus was preserved either in the form of a latent
infection in certain human individuals, or in some animal host. Further, Kung et al. posit
the reappearance and epidemicity could be explained either by reactivation of the latent
virus, reacquisition of human virulence, or from the opportunity for transmission to a
susceptible human being. Oxford (2000) contended the 1977 H1N1 pandemic virus reemerged from a laboratory freezer by error. Keeler (2011) upheld the Oxford contention
by suggesting the virus release was the result of accidental laboratory release or some
type of experimentation with influenza vaccination.
1996 Pandemic Flu Threat (Avian Flu H5N1)
In 1996, the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 (HPAI H5N1)
emerged in southern China. This influenza A virus caused a moderate number of deaths
in geese in the Guangdong region of China (Webster et al., 2006). Webster, Peiris, Chen,
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and Guan (2006) reported that this goose virus acquired internal gene segments found in
quail (A/Quail/HK/G1/97 [H9N2]) and also the neuraminidase gene segment from the
duck virus (A/Teal/HK/W312/97 [H6N1]) before becoming widespread in the live bird
markets of Hong Kong. This highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus
decimated three chicken farms in the new Territories Hong Kong in March 1997 (Hatta &
Kawaoka, 2002). Following this event, an epizootic outbreak of HPAI H5N1 occurred in
Hong Kong that resulted in 18 human cases and six deaths (Taubenberger & Morens,
2009; Webster et al., 2006).
The genetic nature of HPAI H5N1 RNA results in a relatively high rate of
nucleotide substitutions (Pfeiffer, Otte, Roland-Holst, Inui, Tung, & Zilberman, 2011).
These nucleotide substitutions result in point mutations, a process known as “antigenic
drift” (Aldras, 2011). The literature suggests that antigenic drift is the principle reason
why particular influenza strains continue to circulate (Pfeiffer et al., 2011). Six years after
the epizootic outbreak in China, HPAI H5N1 reappeared in epizootic form and spread
widely throughout Southeast Asia (Taubenberger & Morens, 2009).
The first reported human case of avian influenza A (H5N1) infection was a three
year old boy (Hatta & Kawaoka, 2002). Hatta and Kawaoka (2002) reported that a three
year boy began to show influenza-like-illness in May 1997, and died on day 16 of
extensive influenza-related pneumonia complicated by Reye’s syndrome. By the end of
1997, a total of 18 Hong Kong residents had become infected with avian influenza A
(H5N1) virus including the six fatalities (Hatta & Kawaoka, 2002). Hatta and Kawaoka
reported the RNA gene segments isolated from the human cases were identical to the
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RNA gene segments isolated from the live bird markets of Hong Kong. Thus, this avian
influenza A (H5N1) virus was able to cross the species barrier without genetic
reassortment with human viruses (Hatta & Kawaoka, 2002). The mass culling of all
domestic poultry in Hong Kong eradicated this avian influenza A (H5N1) virus and the
genotype has not been detected since that time (Webster et al., 2006). An estimated 1.5
million poultry were culled in Hong Kong (Yuen & Wong, 2005). However, various
reassortments of the virus continue to emerge from goose and duck reservoirs resulting in
animal-to-human transmission.
In February 2002, a descendant of the 1997 avian influenza A (H5N1) virus
infected two persons of whom one died (Webster et al., 2006). Webster et al. (2006)
reported that by the end of 2002, this single H5N1 genotype was responsible for killing
most wild, domestic, and exotic waterfowl in Hong Kong nature parks. This virus was the
precursor of the Z genotype which rapidly spread across Southeast Asia, affecting
Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Korea, Japan, China, and later Malaysia
(Webster et al., 2006).
In late April 2005, an avian influenza A (H5N1) outbreak occurred at Qinghai
Lake, China (Chen, et al., 2005). Chen, et al. (2005) reported the mortality rate of birds
was more than 100 per day during the outbreak. An estimated 1,500 bird deaths resulted
of this outbreak (Chen, et al., 2005). Further, Chen, et al. reported 90% of the affected
birds were bar-headed geese, and the remainder being brown-headed gulls and great
black-headed gulls. Kou, et al. (2009) reported worldwide decrease of bar-headed goose
population decreased by 5% - 10% resulting from this epizootic disease alone. Virus
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sequencing comparisons of samples taken from the Qinghai outbreak revealed the avian
influenza A (H5N1) viruses were almost identical across the whole genome (Chen, et al.,
2005). The authors of the Chen, et al. study asserted the phylogenic analysis of the
Qinghai viral samples showed a close relationship to the avian influenza A (H5N1)
viruses isolated from the poultry markets in Fujian, Guangdong, Hunan, and Yunnan
provinces in 2005.
In the Wan, et al. (2005) study, whole genome sequencing and phylogenic
analysis of four strains of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus isolated from different territory
areas [A/Duck/Guangdong/173/04 (H5N1) (Dk/GD/173/04 in brief, Central Guangdong),
A/Chicken/Guangdong/174/04 (H5N1) (Ck/GD/174/04 in brief, Western Guangdong),
A/Chicken/Guangdong/178/04 (H5N1) (Ck/GD/178/04 in brief, Eastern Guangdong),
and A/Chicken/Guangdong/191/04 (H5N1)(Ck/GD/191/04 in brief, Northern
Guangdong)] was completed. Wan, et al. asserted the results of this investigation
demonstrated the four viruses retained most of the reported H5N1 AIV sequence
properties relevant to virus virulence and host adaptation. Kou, et al. (2009) mentioned
that prior to 1997, it was believed that avian influenza virus could not host adapt to
humans until the genes of avian influenza virus mixed with those of human viruses,
which was deduced by swine-Mixing Vessel Theory-the intermediate host. The avian
influenza A (H5N1) outbreak which has been traced back to March of 1996 in the
Guangdong region of China dispelled this belief.
China is in a critical position along the migration flyways for migratory birds
across Eurasia which may provide explanation for the unprecendented spread and human
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cases virus infection (Kou, et al., 2009). World Health Organization (2004) reported in
December 2003 and outbreak of avian influenza A (H5N1) occurred in the Republic of
Korea and on January 12, 2004 Japanese authorities announced the death of
approximately 6000 chickens at a single poultry farm due to infection from a single strain
of the same virus. For the period 2004-2005, 88 human cases with 55 deaths (overall
case-fatality rate of 58%) of H5N1 virus infection have been reported in Cambodia,
Thailand, and Vietnam (Yuen & Wong, 2005). For the same period, Yuen and Wong
(2005) reported an estimated 3.835 million poultry have been affected or destroyed in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. By November 2005, the World Health
Organization reported 133 human cases of H5N1 AIV in Southeast Asian countries with
a case fatality rate approximately 50% (Spicuzza, Spicuzza, La Rosa, Polosa, & Di
Maria, 2007).
As of April 17, 2008 the World Health Organization reported 381 human cases of
avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection with 240 deaths from 15 countries (Australian
Nursing Journal, 2008). At the time of this writing there are no confirmed case of humanto-human transmission of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus. However, a review of the
literature revealed possible events of human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A
(H5N1).
Ungchusak, et al. (2005) investigated a possible human-to-human transmission of
avian influenza A (H5N1) in a family cluster. The index patient was an 11 year ago girl
who lived with her aunt and became ill three to four days following exposure to dying
household chickens (Ungchusak, et al., 2005). Ungchusak, et al. indicated the index
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patient’s mother came from a distant city, had no recognized exposure to poultry,
provided care for her in the hospital, and died from pneumonia after providing 16 to 18
hours of unprotected nursing care. Additionally, the aunt also provided unprotected
nursing care; had fever five days after the mother first had fever, followed by pneumonia
seven days later (Ungchusak, et al., 2005). Ungchusak, et al. reported autopsy tissue from
the mother and nasopharyngeal and throat swabs from the aunt were positive for avian
influenza A (H5N1) by RT-PCR. The Australian Nursing Journal (2008) reported the
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention has investigated the case of a 24 year
old man and his 52 year old father diagnosed with avian influenza A (H5N1) within a
week of each other in the Jiangsu Province in China December 2007. The son’s exposure
to avian influenza A (H5N1) was attributed to a poultry market six days prior to the onset
of illness, and the father’s exposure is attributed to unprotected exposure to his ill son
(Australian Nursing Journal, 2008).
The World Health Organization requires member states to report every sporadic
case of H5N1 human infection (World Health Organization, 2013). During December of
2012, Egypt confirmed its 169th human case of H5N1 in a 2-year-old girl, and Indonesia
confirmed its 192th human case of H5N1 in a 4-year-old boy (World Health
Organization, 2012). A challenge to monitoring H5N1 human cases is confirming truepositive infections. Rapid diagnostic tests for influenza A virus identification have been
developed. However, even though most rapid tests are more than 70% sensitive and more
than 90% specific, this yields a 30% false-negative sample result (Shive, 2011b).
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A cohort study for serologic detection for anti-H5 antibody was conducted shortly
after the HPAI H5N1 Hong Kong outbreak of 1997 (Katz, et al., 1999). In this study,
household and non-household contacts of the 18 human case of H5N1 were investigated
for antibody response and exposure to poultry. The results of this study showed only
seven of the 124 persons studied were serologically positive for H5 antibody. The
researchers concluded that of the seven cases, only one H5 antibody-positive household
contact with no exposure to poultry was evidence for human-to-human transmission
(Katz, et al., 1999).
To date, avian influenza A (H5N1) has not shown to be effectively transmitted
from person to person, however, the high case fatality rate in Southeast Asia is alarming
(Yuen & Wong, 2005). Ungchusak, et al. (2005) asserted the reassortment events of
avian influenza A (H5N1) since its emergence in China in 1997, suggests the virus may
become more efficient in infecting humans, either by acquiring genetic material from a
human influenza virus through reassortment or by adapting its receptor binding sites.
Chen, et al. (2005) forewarned that if current strains of avian influenza A (H5N1) become
established in bar-headed geese, there is the danger the virus may be carried along the
birds’ wintering migratation routes to densely populated areas in the South Asian
subcontinent. This event could possibly result in further distribution of avian influenza A
(H5N1) along the flyways to Europe which would vastly expand the global distribution
of H5N1 (Chen, et al., 2005). At the time of this writing the WHO reported there have
been a total of 637 cases of avian influenza A virus infection with 378 deaths. There are
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no reported cases of avian influenza A virus infection in North, Central, or South
America (World Health Organization, 2013a).
Animal-to-human transmission is considered “primary” transmission and humanto-human transmission of zoonotic diseases is considered “secondary” transmission
(Lloyd-Smith, et al., 2009). The literature recognizes personal hygiene and vaccination as
the most important and effective methods for controlling for spread of influenza viruses
(McClure, Gleason, & Brenner, 2011). Mao and Yang (2012) posit human networks,
infectious diseases, and human preventive behavior are intrinsically inter-related.
Personal hygiene is an extension of human preventive behavior for controlling the spread
of influenza viruses. Avoidance of animal-human contact with dead or sick birds is the
best prevention for preventing H5N1 infection (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2010). Vaccination is another approach to zoonotic disease control.
Vaccine development is a process which can take months to years to develop and
produce ample supply for national distribution (Hessel, 2011). Vaccine production and
availability cannot guarantee full compliance by all individuals. One group of individuals
is pregnant women. A recent study found that 80% of pregnant women believed flu
vaccines could cause birth defects and only 50% of the women were aware of the
national recommendations for vaccination during pregnancy (Durica, Murchison, &
Weiss, 2011). Another approach to zoonotic disease control is surveillance.
A predominance of the monitoring and control of highly pathogenic avian
influenza H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) has been accomplished by cloacal swab sampling of
migratory birds and monitoring for morbidity and mortality events. This process is labor
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intensive, and morbidity and mortality trending tends to strongly bias towards birds
which are susceptible to the virus (Farnsworth, et al., 2011). Migratory birds that are
asymptomatic can spread the virus across long distances including national borders
(Gaidet, et al., 2010). Control measures for outbreaks of avian influenza have included
the depopulation of commercial birds and flocks. During the October 1984 HPAI H5N2
outbreak in Pennsylvania, more than 17 million birds were depopulated (Okonkwo &
Lupankwa, 2011). Oyana et al. (2011) estimated between 2004 to 2008, nearly 29 million
birds had been culled in China in an effort to control HPAI H5N1.
The review of the literature about the topic of the current avian influenza A
(H5N1) pandemic revealed the seriousness and global concern as a major pandemic
threat to humans. As of date, the current WHO phase of pandemic alert for avian
influenza A (H5N1) is: ALERT (World Health Organization, 2013). The potential for
further spread of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus and the high case fatality rate warrants
further surveillance.
A different approach to monitoring and controlling for HPAI H5N1 human cases
would be water monitoring for HPAI H5N1 viruses. As previously noted, the review of
the literature identified research studies that support migratory waterfowl as the natural
reservoir for influenza A viruses (Webster et al., 1992). Further, the review of the
literature identified research studies that support fecal-oral transmission of influenza A
viruses between waterfowl (Franklin et al., 2011). Therefore, geographical water
analysis-where waterfowl are found-for influenza viruses may be an approach to
monitoring and controlling for HPAI H5N1 strains.
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An environmental monitoring approach could provide public health officials with
geographic specific data for influenza intervention and response efforts. Additionally, by
not culling flocks of birds, evolutionary pathways may develop poultry lineages that are
HPAI H5N1 resistant. For these reasons, in this dissertation study, I investigated the
burden of avian influenza A (H5N1) in rural and urban artifical recirculating water ponds.
While global public health efforts have focused on controling HPAI H5N1, a swine flu
H1N1 outbreak occurred in 2009.
2009-2010 (Swine Flu H1N1 in United States)
In Mid-March of 2009, Mexican health surveillance began identifying cases of
influenza-like-illness during a time when seasonal outbreaks are usually declining (World
Health Organization, 2009a). World Health Organization (2009a) reported Mexican
health officials suspected these phenomena to be an outbreak of a newly emerged
influenza virus. Shortly after, the newly emerged influenza virus was detected in the
United States. By mid-April 2009, two children in Southern California developed febrile
respiratory illness caused by infection from genetically similar swine virus (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(2009) reported this virus contained a unique combination of gene segments that had not
been previously reported among human or swine influenza viruses in the United States or
internationally.
Mexican health officials continued enhanced surveillance and by April 27, 2009
reported 26 confirmed cases with 7 deaths, 286 probable cases and 1551 suspect cases
with 84 deaths (World Health Organization, 2009a). By mid-May, 11,932 suspected
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cases, 949 laboratory confirmed cases of novel influenza A (H1N1) infection, including
41 deaths were reported in Mexico (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009).
Two possible human cases were reported in Guadalupe, Texas by mid-April 2009
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). The novel influenza A (H1N1) virus
quickly spread across the United States.
In early May 2009, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2009)
reported 1,487 confirmed (n = 642) and probable cases (n = 845) had been reported in 43
states. The novel influenza A (H1N1) virus began appearing globally. By early May
2009, 309 laboratory-confirmed cases had been identified in 21 countries other than the
United States and Mexico (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). This novel
influenza A (H1N1) virus demonstrated efficient and rapid spread across the human
population.
By the end of May 2009, nearly 13,000 novel influenza A (H1N1) virus infection
cases had been reported in over 40 countries (World Health Organization, 2009b). By
mid-June 2010, the CDC reported approximately 740,000 samples were tested for
influenza, and the number of laboratory-confirmed positives was approximately fourtimes the average for the previous four seasons (Centers for Disese Control and
Prevention, 2010). The rapid spread across the human population was enhanced by
antigenic drift of the novel influenza A (H1N1) virus.
The novel influenza A (H1N1) virus is a reassortant of swine influenza A viruses
from North American and Eurasian lineages (H1N1, H1N2 and/or H3N2) which has gene
segments originating from swine, human and avian influenza A viruses (World Health
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Organization, 2009b). The 2009 H1N1 reference vaccine virus selected by the WHO was
the A/California/7/2009 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010). The Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (2010) reported that from antigenic characterization
of 944 viruses that were 2009 H1N1, 942 (99.8%) were related to the
A/California/7/2009 virus. Interestingly, a mutation of the novel influenza A (H1N1)
2009 virus was suspect to be resistant to the oral antiviral drug, Tamiflu (Genetech oseltamivir phosphate).
In mid-July 2009, two adolescent girls, both receiving oseltamivir
chemoprophylaxis after exposure to a person with influenza like illness (ILI), became ill
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (2009) reported that influenza samples collected from both adolescent girls
showed the presence of pandemic 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus and similar genetic
mutations. These findings are suggestive of evolutionary development of an antiviral
resistent 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus. Although pandemic 2009 influenza A (H1N1)
virus infection causes mild disease disease, severe illnesses resulting in hospitalization
and death have occurred in many countries, including: Canada, Costa Rica, Mexico, and
the United States (World Health Organization, 2009b).
Globally, pandemic 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus infection has been found to
cause a disproportionately higher rate of hospitalization and death among indigenous
populations from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2009). Indigenous populations in the United States have also shown a
disproportionately higher rate of hospitalization and death from pandemic 2009 influenza
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A (H1N1) virus infection. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2009)
reported American Indian/Alaskan Natives had H1N1 mortality rates four times higher
than persons in all other racial/ethnic populations combined.
The increased mortality among the indigenous people of the United States may be
due to social injustice. These social injustice conditions may include: high prevalence of
chronic health conditions (e.g., diabetes and asthma) among American Indian/Alaskan
Natives that predisposes them to influenza complications, poverty (e.g., poor living
conditions), and delayed access to care (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2009). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2009) recommended increased
efforts to increase awareness among American Indian/Alaskan Natives and their healthcare providers of the potential severity of influenza and current recommendations
regarding the timely use of antiviral medications. This dissertation study may bring about
positive social change among the American Indian/Alaskan Native people of the United
States.
In this dissertation study, I investigated the burden of influenza A virus in aquatic
environments in urban and rural community settings. The aquatic environment is
understood in the literature to be a human-animal interface for influenza A virus
(Franklin et al., 2011; Lebarbenchon & Stallknecht, 2011). The American Indian/Alaskan
Native populations are spread among approximately 560 federally recognized
communities in 34 states and multiple urban areas (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2009). The findings of this dissertation study did not show excess burden of
influenza A virus in rural aquatic habits. However, further studies in these areas are
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warranted. Excess burden of influenza A virus in rural communities may initiate
government direction to health-care providers of American Indian/Alaskan Natives to
promote greater awareness of influenza A virus. An influenza awareness campaign may
include: the potential severity of influenza A virus infection and current
recommendations regarding the timely use of antiviral medications. At the time of this
writing the current WHO phase of pandemic alert for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was postpandemic (World Health Organization, 2013).
Government Responses to Pandemic Flu
Government responses to pandemic influenza outbreaks have been both
reactionary and tactile. Government responses have been the mass culling of wild and
domestic bird flocks. In Pennsylvania following the April to October 1983 outbreak of
H5N2 avian influenza virus (low-pathogenicity to high-pathogenicity transformation), the
depopulation of over 16 million birds from 380 flocks over three states was accomplished
(Henzler, et al., 2003). This was followed by a second depopulation of 350,000 birds in
December 1985. Henzler, et al. (2003) wrote the aggressive control and eradication
efforts of the second depopulation resulted from the detection of H5N2 low pathogenic
avian influenza virus in 10-week-old rosters associated to the New York live-bird
markets and examined at the Pennsylvania State University Animal Diagnostic
Laboratory.
In May 2005, HPAI H5N1 virus caused an outbreak in migratory waterfowl in
Qinghai Lake, western China (Tang, et al., 2009). Tang, et al. (2009) wrote that hundreds
of millions of chickens and ducks have been depopulated to control the global spread.
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However, HPAI H5N1 outbreaks have been reported in at least 60 countries (Tang, et al.,
2009). Wibawa, et al. (2011) wrote that following the 1997 H5N1 outbreaks in the Hunan
Province of China, Indonesia reported the majority of H5N1 outbreaks worldwide, with
31 of 33 provinces in the country affected and more than 11 million chicken deaths or
depopulated. In 1997, a subtype of H5N1 avian influenza virus outbreak occurred in
Hong Kong infecting 18 residents and killing 6 (Laver & Garman, 2001). Laver &
Garman (2001) wrote that even though the highly lethal H5N1 avian influenza virus did
not effectively spread from person to person, culling of all chickens in Hong Kong
effectively stopped the epidemic.
On March 29, 2013, an avian influenza A virus (H7N9), not previously reported
in humans, was confirmed by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (2013) reported, as of April 29, 2013, China reported 126 confirmed H7N9
humans cases of which 24 (19%) died. In reaction to contain the outbreak, China’s
Ministry of Agriculture Officials depopulated some 98,000 poultry and subsequently
stopped the sale of live birds as city markets (Cohen, 2013). Other government responses
to control the spread of pandemic influenza A virus outbreaks have been less extreme.
Government responses to pandemic influenza outbreaks include the WHO
guidelines for pandemic preparedness and response in non-health sector and the HHS
Pandemic Influenza Plan (November 2005). The “WHO guidelines for pandemic
preparedness and response in non-health sector” plan involves various sectors of society
including: health and non-health sectors, communities, families, and individuals (World
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Health Organization, 2009). The “HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan (November 2005)” plan
further addresses issues outlined in the “WHO guidelines for pandemic preparedness and
response in non-health sector” plan. These issues include: the provision of anti-viral
medications, social distancing, and treatment of secondary infections (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 2005). The Shive (2011a) manuscript is a well-detailed
framework of public health response to pandemic influenza outbreaks that further
complements the WHO and HHS pandemic influenza plans.
Shive (2011a) proposed public health response to influenza virus to be based on
principles of infection control as applied to general and specific populations. Primary
prevention of influenza infection is the application of universal precautions in the
management of influenza-like-illness (Shive, 2011a). Shive contends that secondary
prevention of influenza epidemic is early detection and identification. Methods for early
detection and identification influenza viruses include: rapid antigen tests, reversetranscription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), viral isolation, immunofluorescence
assays (IFA) and serology (Shive, 2011a). Shive predicates that tertiary prevention of
influenza epidemic is the treatment of influenza using anti-viral medications as
amantadine, rimantadine, peraivir, oseltamivir, and zanamivir. Additionally, Shive
asserted that earlier in the course of influenza infection anti-viral medications are
administered, the more effective it is for the patient. This dissertation study to survey
artificial aquatic environments is supported by the work of Shive and the WHO and HHS
pandemic influenza plans.

96
Shive and Kanekar (2011) contended one of the emerging areas concerning
pandemic influenza is “risk perception”. A purpose of this dissertation study is to bring
greater public awareness to the human-animal interface of influenza A virus at artificial
recirculating water ponds. This investigation may lessen the pyschological threat of
unknown risk by bringing greater awareness of how influenza is introduced into the
human population. Section 3 of the “WHO guidelines for pandemic preparedness and
response in non-health sector” plan described current surveillance assessment and
included recommendations for improvement for pre-pandemic and during pandemic
events (Shive & Kanekar, 2011). Part 2 of the “HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan
(November 2005)” plan also covered pandemic influenza surveillance. The findings of
this dissertation study can be used as baseline measures for the burden of influenza A
virus in aquatic environments in urban and rural community settings. The baseline
measures may be of importance to future influenza pandemic surveillance efforts as
described in the WHO and HHS pandemic influenza plans. Further, this investigation
may detect influenza A viruses originating in southern China.
Origin of Influenza (China)
The literature suggests China, with its abundance of live poultry and swine
markets, maybe the epicenter of novel influenza viruses. Wan, et al. (2005) proclaimed
that southern China has been shown to be the avian influenza virus pool for flu outbreaks
in history including H2N2 (1957), H3N2 (1968), H5N1 (1997 & 2003), and H9N2
(1999). Webster et al. (1992) noted historical records and the appearance of the Asian,
Hong Kong, and Russian pandemic strains of influenza virus in China suggest the
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majority of pandemics of human influenza since about 1850 have originated in China.
Perez-Ramirez et al. (2011) described how large parts of Asia support high densities of
humans, backyard poultry (ducks, geese, and chickens), pigs, and wild birds. These high
density areas provide opportunities for close interaction between influenza reservoir
animals and create a unique environment for influenza evolution (Perez-Ramirez et al.,
2011). These unique environments may be considered an expansion of the mixing vessel
theory; whereas these high density areas may be identified as “mixing vessel
environments”.
Using historical records, Langford (2005) defended the argument the 1918 – 1919
Spanish influenza pandemic originated in China and global spread resulted from the
transportation of Chinese laborers worldwide. Webster et al. (1992) notably suggested the
1918 – 1919 Spanish influenza pandemic originated in military camps in Kansas and was
taken to Europe by U.S. Troops in 1918. Nearly ninety years following the pandemic
1918 Spanish flu, there is evidence suggestive that novel influenza outbreaks originate in
China.
In May 2013, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2013) reported the
March 2013 outbreak of H7N9 was confirmed in eight contiguous provinces in eastern
China (Anhui, Fujian, Henan, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shandong, and Zhejiang), two
municipalities (Beijing and Shanghai), and Taiwan. Further, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention reported that no other human cases of H7N9 virus infection have been
detected outside of China, including the United States. The early reports of the March
2013 outbreak of avian influenza A (H7N9) suggested China to be the geographical
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origin. However, Chinese news media has not shown to be supportive that China is the
epicenter of influenza viruses.
In the retrospective study by Heffernan, Misturelli, & Thomson (2011),
researchers examined Chinese news media reporting of avian influenza outbreaks. The
results suggested the Chinese government “down played” the events leading to underreporting/misrepresenting of the disease while depiction of a strong and efficient ‘China’
that was a global leader in the fight against the disease. The literature support of the
hypothesis that China is the epicenter for influenza viruses underscores this dissertation
study.
Ito et al. (1995) asserted waterfowl as ducks and geese in the northern hemisphere
migrate between Alaska, Canada, and Siberia resulting in the transportation and shedding
of influenza virus. Additionally, a majority of migratory ducks in Asia are from Siberia
(Ito et al., 1995). An avian influenza A virus infected migratory bird could potentially
carry the virus to the migratory bird breeding grounds of Siberia from where transmission
to another migratory bird could possible occur. This second bird could potentially carry
the virus to the breeding grounds of Alaska or Canada where transmission to another
migratory bird could possible occur. This third bird could potentially carry the virus
South from the breeding grounds of Alaska or Canada to Central and South America.
Therefore, it is possible for a novel avian influenza A virus originating in China to be
detected in waterfowl or wetlands along the eastern Pacific flyway region. The
contamination of aquatic habitats with influenza A viruses along the migratory flyways
may result in influenza A virus infection of other animals. Other animals may include
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swine. Swine are susceptible to avian and human influenza A viruses which is the
foundation of the Mixing Vessel Theory.
Scholtissek et al. (1985) Mixing Vessel Theory
Mixing vessel theory consists of three parts: (i) swine are susceptible to avian and
human influenza A viruses, (ii) reassortment of swine/avian/human viruses occurs in the
pig, and (iii) pigs can transmit reassortant influenza viruses to people (Ma et al., 2009 p.
330). Ma et al. (2009) investigated the validity of the three parts of Mixing Vessel Theory
using published literature. Ma et al. concluded in support of Mixing Vessel Theory and
swine as a potential mixing vessel for influenza viruses. Additionally, the scientific
literature supports Mixing Vessel Theory not to be limited only to swine; domestic fowl
are also considered to be intermediate hosts for virus reassortment (Ma et al., 2009).
Bergsmedh, Ehnfors, Spetz, and Holmgren (2007) investigated if the theory of
horizontal gene transfer applied to viruses, including influenza viral strains. The
researchers applied advanced biotechnology techniques including cell culture and
fluorescence in-situ hybridization techniques. The proposed theoretical view is
phagocytosis of apoptotic cells (the clean-up of dead cell by macrophages) is a method
for RNA transfer between cells, and hence, larger organisms. The researchers were
successful in replicating this process in-vitro (Bergsmedh, Ehnfors, Spetz, & Holmgren,
2007). However, in-vivo RNA transfer is still hypothetical. Bergsmedh et al. (2007)
contributed to the theoretical view that dabbling ducks can introduce and host influenza
A viruses through the process of ingestion and defecation.
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Eastel (1988) focused on molecular clock hypothesis as it applies to placental
mammals. The research by Easteal computed phylogenetic analysis to genetic data from
GenBank. These studies contribute a temporal comparison of DNA evolutionary rates to
RNA viral (influenza viruses) evolutionary rates.
Louis Pasteur’s Germ Theory
Pasteur’s Germ Theory identifies germs of microscopic organisms as the cause of
disease, and the theory of spontaneous generation is chimerical (Pasteur et al., 1878).
Underlining the theoretical framework for this study were Pasteur’s (1857-1858) Germ
Theory and Koch’s (1890) Postulates as adapted for viruses.
Koch’s Postulates Applied to Viruses
Koch’s Postulates as adapted for viruses implies certain conditions-not all of
Koch’s Postulates-have to be met before a specific relation of a virus to a disease is
established. The conditions are: (i) a specific virus must be found associated with a
disease with a degree of regularity, and (ii) the virus must be shown to occur in the sick
individual not as an incidental or accidental finding but as the cause of the disease under
investigation (Rivers, 1937).
Theories in the Literature
Applications of Pasteur’s Germ Theory and Koch’s Postulates as adapted for
viruses are present in the literature. As previously noted in this chapter, animal-to-human
transmission of influenza virus is considered “primary” transmission and human-tohuman transmission of influenza virus is considered “secondary” transmission (LloydSmith, et al., 2009). The literature recognizes personal hygiene and vaccination as the
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most important and effective methods for controlling for transmission of influenza
viruses (McClure et al., 2011). Mao and Yang (2012) posit human networks, infectious
diseases, and human preventive behavior are intrinsically inter-related (Mao & Yang,
2012). Personal hygiene is an extension of human preventive behavior for controlling the
spread and secondary transmission of influenza viruses. Avoidance of animal-human
contact with dead or sick birds is the best prevention for preventing H5N1 primary
transmission and infection (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010).
Vaccine and vaccination is another topic where Pasteur’s Germ Theory and
Koch’s Postulates as adapted for viruses are present in the literature. Vaccination is an
accepted method for reducing transmission and infection from germs. However, vaccine
development is a process which can take months to years to develop and produce ample
supply for national distribution (Hessel, 2011). Additionally, vaccine production and
availability cannot guarantee full compliance by all individuals. A recent study found that
80% of pregnant women believed flu vaccines could cause birth defects and only 50% of
the women were aware of the national recommendations for vaccination during
pregnancy (Durica et al., 2011). These findings by Durica et al. (2011) bring to light the
challenges of secondary transmission monitoring and control of influenza viruses.
A predominance of the monitoring and control of HPAI H5N1 has been
accomplished by cloacal swab sampling of migratory birds. This is a process of
monitoring for morbidity and mortality events. Morbidity and mortality events are
consistent with Pasteur’s Germ Theory and Koch’s Postulates as adapted for viruses. This
process is labor intensive, and morbidity and mortality trending tends to strongly bias
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towards birds which are susceptible to the virus (Farnsworth, et al., 2011). Migratory
birds that are asymptomatic can spread the virus across long distances including national
borders (Gaidet, et al., 2010).
Attempts to control the spread of avian influenza viruses are consistent with
Pasteur’s Germ Theory and Koch’s Postulates as adapted for viruses. Control measures
for outbreaks of avian influenza viruses have included the depopulation of commercial
birds and flocks. The depopulation of bird flocks is an attempt to control primary and
secondary transmission of avian influenza viruses. During the October 1984 HPAI H5N2
outbreak in Pennsylvania, more than 17 million birds were depopulated (Okonkwo &
Lupankwa, 2011). A recent study estimated between 2004 to 2008, nearly 29 million
birds had been culled in China in an effort to control HPAI H5N1 (Oyana, McGoy, &
Dai, 2011). However, by not culling flocks of birds, evolutionary pathways may develop
poultry lineages that are HPAI H5N1 resistant.
A different approach to monitoring and controlling for HPAI H5N1 human cases
would be environmental water monitoring for HPAI H5N1 viruses. The literature
supports migratory waterfowl as the natural reservoir for influenza A viruses (Webster et
al., 1992). Additionally, the literature supports a fecal-oral transmission between
waterfowl of influenza A viruses (Franklin et al., 2011). Geographical water analysiswhere waterfowl are found-for influenza viruses may detect HPAI H5N1 strains. This
environmental monitoring approach could provide public health officials with geographic
specific data for influenza intervention and response efforts. As aforementioned, by not
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culling flocks of birds, evolutionary pathways may develop poultry lineages that are
HPAI H5N1 resistant.
Migratory Waterfowl (Vector for Global Distribution)
Austin and Hinshaw (1984) investigated feral duck species as a source of
transmission of influenza A virus and paramyxoviruses. The researchers collected swab
samples from tracheal and cloacae from different species of feral ducks (Austin &
Hinshaw, 1984). Austin and Hinshaw and were able to identify several viral strains of
influenza A virus. Additionally, Austin and Hinshaw asserted the alterations of influenza
viral strains occur due to antigenic drift at point mutations and antigenic shift is caused
by genetic reassortment. The authors contended it was possible these alterations occurred
in the intestinal tract of ducks (Austin & Hinshaw, 1984). This article provides support to
the hypothesis that migratory ducks are a source point for influenza viruses. Therefore,
surveillance of healthy ducks and the aquatic environment they frequent may be of
significant interest to monitoring and controlling influenza A viruses.
Gaidet et al. (2010) focused on the long-range migratory patterns of waterfowl to
explain the global dispersion of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus (HPAI
H5N1). Satellite telemetry was used to study the movements of migratory waterfowl over
Asia, Europe, and Africa. The authors concluded, on average, a migratory bird would
only have 5-15 days per year of infection to disperse HPAI H5N1 (Gaidet, et al., 2010).
Thus, intercontinental virus dispersion requires relay transmission between series of
successfully infected migratory waterfowl. Additionally, only asymptomatic birds could
successfully disperse HPAI H5N1 (Gaidet, et al., 2010). This study supports the theory
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the seasonality of influenza outbreaks can be explained, in part, by movements of
migratory birds. However, population studies of migratory birds are not a reliable
influenza disease surveillance tool.
Hierarchical modeling can be used to estimate bird populations. Link and Sauer
(2002) focused on hierarchical modeling for estimating Cerulean Warblers populations
using North American Bird Breeding Survey data. The work by Link and Sauer is critical
of the validity of North American Bird Breeding Survey data. The authors asserted that
North American Bird Breeding Survey data is not well suited for monitoring the Cerulean
Warblers (Link & Sauer, 2002). Reasoning for this critical judgment is the flight patterns
of the Cerulean Warblers are not compatible with the observation methods of North
American Bird Breeding Survey. This article provides opinion about the application and
validity of the population trends of the North American Bird Breeding Survey data.
Additionally, this article rules-out the association of migratory bird population data to
seasonal influenza outbreaks. However, the studies of migratory waterfowl as a host is
still of great importance in influenza A virus surveillance.
Mehrabanpour et al. (2012) focused on cloacal swabs and samples of bird
droppings from the wetland regions of Boushehr, Iran. Samples were analyzed for
influenza viral strains using RT-PCR methodologies. These studies and others have
identified influenza viral subtypes in various waterfowl breeds (Ferro, et al., 2010;
Mehrabanpour, et al., 2012). These studies support the hypothesis that migratory
waterfowl play a role in the natural influenza virus reservoir(s) and dispersal. Similar
studies have been conducted in the United States.
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Breeding Grounds as Hotspots
Ferro et al. (2010) focused on the presence of influenza A viruses among the
migratory ducks and the winter breeding grounds along the Texas Coast. Cloacal swabs
were analyzed for influenza A viruses using RT-PCR technique. Over a three year period,
the researchers were able to collect samples from 5,363 birds. Data analysis showed a
prominence of specific sub-strains of influenza and also identified Blue-winged Teals and
Green-winged Teals as carriers of several influenza viral subtypes (Ferro, et al., 2010).
These studies provide additional evidence that influenza viruses can be identified among
health migratory waterfowl.
Water Analysis
Water analysis has been an important scientific approach to understanding the
epidemiological triangle model of influenza viral diseases. The epidemiological triangle
model of disease causation is the relationship of transmission, agent, and host. In the
early study by Cumming (1919), a case-control approach was used to better understand
the transmission and infectivity of the causitive agent of influenza-pneumonia. The
influenza-pneumonia organism was suspected to be sputum-borne and transmission
occurred through inanimate objects by the hand and mouth route (Cumming, 1919). In
the Cumming study, the agent was the influenza-pneumonia organism, the route of
transmission was contaminated eating utensils, and aquatic dishwashing was the
environment.
The case-control approach of the Cumming (1919) study compared influenzapneumonia rates in populations of public institutions: aged, State hospitals, State prisons,
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Federal prisons, Tuberculosis sanatoriums, Feeble-minded, and Children where
mechanical dishwashing was used and not used (Cumming, 1919). Cumming
hypothesized that scalding hot water used in mechanical dishwashing disinfected the
eating utensils and dishware, whereas luke warm water would not. The data for the
Cumming study was culminated from questionaires returned from 370 public institutions.
The institutuional population for this study is [n = 252,186] (Cumming, 1919). The data
analysis showed an inverse relationship between scalding hot water use for dishwashing
and influenza-pneumonia illness. Recent studies by others have investigated waterborne
transmission of influenza as a zoonotic disease in the natural environment (Lang et al.,
2008; VanDalen et al., 2010; Webster et al., 1992).
Webster et al. (1992) asserted waterborne transmission of influenza viruses occurs
due to the viral shedding in the fecal material of waterfowl (Anseriforms) and shorebirds
(Charadriiformes). VanDalen et al. (2010) investigated waterborne transmission of
influenza A H4N6 in mallards (Anas platyyrhychos) in a controlled laboratory
environment. The finding of this research showed that influenza A H4N6 can be
successfully transferred to naive ducks via influenza contaminated water (VanDalen et
al., 2010). Additionally, VanDalen et al. were able to show viral sheding in fecal material
to be of higher viral concentrations than oropharyngeal or cloacal swabs. Thus, it is
possible that influenza viruses can be transfered between organisms via open watersources as wetlands, lakes, and ponds. Other researchers have investigated if influenza A
viruses can be detected in these contaminated aquatic habitats (Lang et al., 2008;
Stallknecht & Brown, 2009; Zhang et al., 2006).
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Lang, et al. (2008) collected and analyzed sediment samples from three ponds in
the Creamer’s Field Migratory Waterfowl Refuge, Alaska, a location used by a wide
variety of migratory waterfowl. The sediment samples were collected using a time-series
approach and analyzed for influenza A virus RNA using reverse transcription-polymerase
chain reaction (RT-PCR) methodologies (Lang et al., 2008). Lang, et al. sequenced the
sediment samples for influenza A virus M gene, H3 gene, H8 gene, H11 gene, and H12
gene. The sediment samples from the three ponds were positive for various combinations
of influenza A virus M, H3, H8, H11, and H12 genes (Lang et al., 2008).
Lang, et al. (2008) asserted that pond sediment sampling and analysis is a
powerful technique to study the diversity of influenza viruses present in an enviromental
location, and therefore present in birds that utilize the location. Additionally, the authors
asserted pond sediment sampling is advantagous to direct sampling of birds because
direct sampling of birds is limited to times when birds can be captured efficiently and
effectively (Lang et al., 2008). Thus, the viral samples collected from direct bird
sampling may be temporally limited. Another method of environmental sampling for
influenza A viruses, similar to the approach in the Lang, et al. study, is the collection and
analysis of samples of frozen lake ice where migratory birds may refuge or over winter.
Zhang et al. (2006) collected and analyzed samples of ice or water from three
northeastern Siberian lakes in the Koluma River region. The samples were analyzed for
the presence of influenza A virus using reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction
(RT-PCR) methodologies (Zhang et al., 2006). Zhang et al. asserted these lakes are
covered by ice for more than 6 months a year and are frequented by Chinese-Siberian
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axis populations of migratory waterfowl, some of which travel to North America and
others that travel as far as southern Asia, Europe, and Africa.
Three notable findings in the Zhang et al. (2006) study are: (i) the highest
frequencies of detection of influenza A virus RNAs are in the lakes with the highest
concentrations of migratory waterfowl, (ii) influenza A virus RNA is preserved in higher
concentrations in lake ice than in lake water, and (iii) the H1 gene population in the lakes
is genetically heterogeneous. Additionally, the authors of the Zhang et al. study posit ice
may act as a reservoir for influenza A viruses, preserving them for later release and
infection of animals, including migratory waterfowl and humans. If lake ice is a natural
reservoir for influenza A viruses, the Zhang et al. study may provide valuable insight to
explaining the phenomena of influenza A viral strains emerging, disappearing, and then
re-emerging over time. However in the Worobey (2008) study, the findings by Zhang et
al. are challenged.
Worobey (2008) asserted the influenza A virus hemagglutinin gene sequences
detected in the Siberian lake ice by Zhang et al. (2006) study originated from a laboratory
reference strain derived from the earliest human influenza A virus isolate, WS/33. If the
research by Worobey is correct, the Siberian “ice-viruses” identified in the Zhang et al.
study are contaminants and there is no credible evidence that environmental ice acts as
biologically revalent reservior for influenza viruses (Worobey, 2008). Other researchers
have studied influenza A viruses in surface water samples to investigate the perpetuation
between waterfowl and water-contamination (Hinshaw et al., 1980; Ito et al., 1995),
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while others have researched the infectivity and transmission of influenza A viruses in
the aquatic environment (Brown et al., 2009; Halvorson et al., 1985).
Hinshaw et al. (1980) collected samples from waterfowl, unconcentrated lake
water, and feces from lake shores near Vermillion, Alberta, Canada. These samples were
used to isolate influenza viruses and to investigate whether influenza viruses continually
circulate or whether the same or different strains are present from year to year (Hinshaw
et al., 1980). Hinshaw et al. asserted this longitudinal study of feral ducks would provide
data on the size of the gene pool of influenza A viruses in nature and the number of
viruses antigenically related to human strains present in avian species. Additionally, the
authors concluded that this study shows that (i) many different ortho and
paramyxoviruses circulate every year in various species of apparently healthy ducks in
the marshalling areas of Vermillion; (ii) the antigenic subtypes and the frequency of the
viruses change from year to year; (iii) antigenic drift occurs in the avian viruses; and (iv)
viruses antigenically related to previous human strains continue to circulate in the ducks
(Hinshaw et al., 1980). Ito et al. (1995) conducted a similar investigation in Alaska.
Ito et al. (1995) collected and analyzed influenza virus isolates from the fecal
samples of dabbling ducks and also from the lake water used by migratory waterfowl.
The purpose of this study was to investigate the theory of water-borne transmission of
influenza virus (Webster et al., 1992) as a mechanism of year-to-year perpetuation of the
viruses in lakes where migratory waterfowl may breed (Ito et al., 1995). The researchers
of the Ito et al. study collected fecal and water samples each July from 1991 to 1994. The
fecal samples were collected from 15 different points in Alaska, and 81 water samples
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were collected from 11 different ponds and lakes where ducks and geese were nesting
(Ito et al., 1995). The authors of the Ito et al. research asserted the findings of viral
isolation from multiple lake and pond samples of the same subtypes over the course of
this longitudinal study support the hypothesis that influenza viruses are maintained in
waterfowl by a water-borne transmission mechanism. Additionally, the researchers were
able to show the viruses remained viable in the lake water after most ducks left for
migration South (Ito et al., 1995). Further analysis of influenza virus viability and
infectivity in water was investigated by Brown, Goekjian, Poulson, Valeika, and
Stallknecht, (2009).
Unlike the natural environmental studies by Hinshaw et al. (1980), and Ito et al.
(1995), the investigation by Brown et al. (2009) was performed in a laboratory setting.
The researchers of the Brown et al. study sought to evaluate abiotic environmental factors
affecting avian A influenza virus persistence in aquatic habitats. Specifically, the
researchers of the Brown et al. study investigated the duration of infectivity for avian
influenza viruses representing a diversity of HA subtypes (H1 – H12) isolated from
anseriforms and charadriiforms over a range of pH, salinity, and temperature conditions
that are common in aquatic habitat environments utilized by these wild aquatic birds. For
each virus/pH/salinity/temperature trial, infectivity assay endpoints were measured at
100% destruction of a monolayer of Madin Darby canine kidney cells (Brown et al.,
2009).
Brown et al. (2009) summarized that infectivity of most avian influenza A virus
strains persisted longest at slightly basic water conditions (for both 17°C and 28°C), pH
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values 7.4 – 8.2; that increasing water temperatures had a negative effect on the
persistence of all avian influenza A viruses examined; and increasing salinity also had a
negative effect of avian influenza A viral persistence in water (for both 17°C and 28°C).
Brown et al. further asserted the findings of this study indicate the pH, temperature, and
salinity-at levels normally encountered in nature-can impact the ablity of avian influenza
A viruses to remain infective in water. Early research by others directly investigated the
infectivity and water-borne transmission of of avian influenza A viruses using sentinel
ducks and sentinel turkeys (Halvorson et al., 1985).
In the four year study by Halvorson et al. (1985), flocks of sentinel ducks
(negative for avian influenza) were allowed to comingle with released ducks and wild
ducks in specially constructed pens located at selected marshes. During the third and
fourth years of this study, sentinel turkeys were introduced into pens at two locations
where the turkeys could comingle with ducks, share feed sources, and drink pond water
(Halvorson et al., 1985). The data analysis of the Halvorson et al. investigation showed a
seasonal pattern to the detection of influenza A virus isolations in both the sentinel ducks,
as well as, the sentinel turkeys.
Interestingly, there was a six to eight week lag period from the onset of infection
in sentinel ducks and turkey flocks (Halvorson et al., 1985). The authors of the Halvorson
et al. (1985) study suggested that this six to eight week lag of the onset of infection in
turkey flocks maybe due to several possibilities: waterfowl activity and duck movements;
other vectors or vehicles such as transportation vehicles to move turkey flocks; abiotic
environment conditions such as temperature; ambient surface water temperature;
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groundwater contamination; and viral adaptation. Halvorson et al. provides support for
the theory of water-borne transmission of avian influenza A viruses among wild
waterfowl and domestic fowl, even though the research only identified certain duckderived isolates are capable of infecting domestic turkeys. Other researchers have
investigated animal-to-animal and human-to-animal transmission of influenza outside of
water-borne transmission to fill gaps in the knowledge of the molecular characterization
of influenza A viruses.
Influenza Virus Molecular Structure
Gibson, Bowman, and Connor (1919) investigated sputum collected from patients
infected with influenza in early stages of the disease. In this first phase of the
investigation, emusions of filtered and unfiltered sputum preparations were inoculated to
baboons, Macacus rhesus monkeys, rabiits, guinea pigs, and mice (Gibson, Bowman, &
Connor, 1919). The researchers of the Gibson et al. study reported that by inoculation of
sputum, both filtered and unfiltered, from cases of influenza, successfully produced, in all
animals, lesions that appeared to be similar to those seen in human cases of the disease.
The second phase of the Gibson et al. research continued inoculation-animal experiments
using blood from human cases of influenza infection. The outcomes of human blood
inoculation of animals was a mix of positive and negative results (Gibson et al., 1919).
The third phase of the Gibson et al. (1919) research investigated the passage of
the virus from animal to animal. The findings of this phase of the research suggested that
there may be an increase in the virulence when the virus is passed through one animal to
another (Gibson et al., 1919). The fourth phase of the Gibson et al. research investigated
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inoculation of animals using cultures. The influenza cultures were prepared using
selected ascites fluid in the Noguchi method (Gibson et al., 1919). The prepared Noguchi
culture solutions were inoculated in to animals and post-mortem examination followed
(Gibson et al., 1919). Gibson et al. concluded the cultures when inoculated into animals
produced typical “experimental influenza” lesions. Reproduction and isolation of the
influenza virus by animal-culture was further investigated by Bashford (1919) and
(Wilson, 1919).
Bashford (1919) investigated animals inoculated with pure culture and subcultures to investigate the reproduction of influenza disease. Inoculation from first
generation animals to second generation animal to third generation animals was done
using blood, bile, or urine (Bashford, 1919). Bashford concluded the positive findings of
inoculation using pure and sub-cultures satisfied the requirements of Koch’s Law. Wilson
(1919) investigated cultures of certain filter-passing organisms, including influenza,
using the Noguchi method. Wilson reported positive growth in culture and described
influenza organism as a “minute rounded or oval coccus-like body of very definite
outline and of uniform appearance…varies from 0.15 μ to 0.5 μ…” (p. 603). Shortly after
the work by Wilson was published in The British Medical Journal; Arkwright (1919)
challenged the findings and conclusions by Bashford (1919) and (Wilson, 1919).
Arkwright (1919) proclaimed the filter-passing influenza organisms isolated and
studies by Bashford (1919) and Wilson (1919) were bacterial contaminants. Bashford and
Wilson reported the macroscopic appearance of the Noguchi culture tubes as having a
high degree of turbidity. Arkwright argued these highly-turbid tubes in question could

114
have been demonstrated to contain bacterial growth by readily available methods as
Giemsa, Gram and fuchsin, and by culture in agar and in broth. As is commonly known,
viruses cannot be seen macroscopically or microscopically. Thus, the argument presented
by Arkwright that Bashford and Wilson isolated bacterial organisms, not influenza
viruses is likely valid.
Influenza viruses are named Orthomyxoviridae (ortho meaning “standard,
correct” and myxo meaning “mucus”) because of their ability to bind mucus and to
differentiate them from Paramyxoviridae, another group of negative-sense RNA viruses
(Poulson, 2011). There are five genera of Orthomyxoviridae: influenza A virus, influenza
B virus, influenza C virus, thogoto-virus, and isa-virus (Taubenberger & Kash, 2010).
The work by Poulson (2011) and Taubenberger and Kash (2010) provides current
detailed understanding of the molecular structure of influenza A virus. Wali and Music
(2011) summarized current understanding of influenza viron structure. As is currently
accepted, the influenza viruses envelop contains two virus-coded glycoproteins spikes,
the hemaggultinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) proteins which are the primary antigens
in the host response to influenza virus inflection (Wali & Music, 2011).
Influenza A subtypes are classified by the antigenic groups HA and NA. At the
time of this writing, the World Health Organization recognizes 16 HA (H1 to H16) and 9
NA (N1 to N9) subtypes (Poulson, 2011). There are eight discrete single-stranded RNA
gene segments found in influenza A and B viruses (Lebarbenchon & Stallknecht, 2011).
These eight single-stranded RNA gene sequences are: PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, M,
and NS (Taubenberger & Kash, 2010).
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PB2 Polymerase
Basic Polymerase Protein 2 (PB2) RNA polymerase subunit is encoded in
segment 1 of the influenza A virus (Cheung & Poon, 2007). Cheung and Poon (2007)
stated that PB2 is required for viral transcription and replication. PB2 polymerase
functions during initiation of influenza A viral mRNA transcription as the protein which
recognizes and binds the 5' capI structures of host cell mRNAs for use as viral mRNA
transcription primers (Webster et al., 1992). Cheung and Poon suggested PB2 has
endonuclease activity and uses host mRNA to generate cap primers for viral RNA
synthesis. Apart from the biological functions of PB1, the literature suggests PB1 maybe
a major determinant in controlling the pathogenecity of the influenza A virus (Cheung &
Poon, 2007).
PB1 Polymerase
Basic Polymerase Protein 1 (PB1) RNA polymerase subunit is encoded in
segment 2 of the influenza A virus (Cheung & Poon, 2007). Cheung and Poon (2007)
suggested that PB1, itself, is an RNA polymerase. PB1 polymerase functions in the RNA
polymerase complex as the protein responsible for elogation of the primed nascent viral
mRNA and also as elongation protein for template RNA and vRNA synthesis (Webster et
al., 1992). Further, the PB1 subunit is involved in the assembly of three polymerase
protein subunits and the catalytic function of RNA polymerization (Cheung & Poon,
2007).
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PA Polymerase
Acidic Polymerase Protein (PA) is encoded in segment 3 of the influenza A virus
(Cheung & Poon, 2007). PA polymerase localizes in the infected cell nucleus and
functions as part of the RNA-dependent RNA polymerase complex in conjunction with
PB1 and PB2, however, its role in viral RNA synthesis is not well understood (Webster et
al., 1992). Cheung and Poon (2007) identified several biological functions of PA
polymerase: nuclear transportation signals required for effcient nuclear accumulation of
the PB1 subunits, endonucleolytic cleavage of capped RNAs, and the initiation of
proteolysis in infected cells. However, the complete functions of PA are still not well
understood (Cheung & Poon, 2007).
Hemagglutination
Hemaggultination (HA) is encoded in segment 4 of the influenza A virus (Cheung
& Poon, 2007). The HA protein is an integral member protein and a primary surface
antigen of the influenza viron (Webster et al., 1992). At the time of this writing, there
were 16 HA subtypes recognized by the WHO (Poulson, 2011). The HA protein is
responsible for the binding for viral particles to sialic acid-containing receptors on host
cells and is a major target for humoral neutralizing antibodies (Cheung & Poon, 2007).
According to Taubenberger and Kash (2010), HA protein recognizes sialic acid bound to
underlying sugars on the tips of host cell glycoproteins. This recognition leads to HAreceptor binding followed by internalization of the virus, and where the acidic pH of the
endosomal compartment causes a conformational change of HA resulting in mediating
fusion of the viral and endosomal membranes, thus allowing release of viral
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ribonucleoprotein complexes into the host cytoplasm (Cheung & Poon, 2007;
Taubenberger & Kash, 2010). Prior to internalization, the HA protein is synthesized as a
precursor polypeptide, HA0, which is post-translationally cleaved in to two subunits: HA1
and HA2 (Cheung & Poon, 2007). Cheung and Poon stated the cleavage of the HA0 is a
prerequisite for viral infectivity. Additionally, Cheung and Poon (2007) further asserted
there is a direct relationship between the quantity of basic amino acids near the HA
protein cleavage site and the virulence of highly pathogenic viruses.
Nulceoprotein
Nucleoprotein (NP) is encoded in segment 5 of the influenza A virus (Cheung &
Poon, 2007). Nucleoprotein is transported into the infected cell nucleus where it binds to
and encapsidates viral RNA (Webster et al., 1992). Taubenberger and Kash (2010) stated
each influenza A virus RNA segment is encapsidated by NP. Cheung and Poon (2007)
stated NP is one of the essential components for transcription and replication of influenza
A virus RNA. However, dissociation of the NP from the RNA template is not thought to
be required for viral transcription and replication (Cheung & Poon, 2007). Webster et al.
(1992) suggested nucleoprotein may play a role in the switching of viral RNA
polymerase activity from mRNA synthesis to cRNA and vRNA synthesis.
Neuraminidase
Neuraminidase (NA) is encoded in segment 6 of the influenza A virus (Cheung &
Poon, 2007). The NA protein is an integral membrane glycoprotein and a second major
surface antigen of the influenza viron (Webster et al., 1992). Similar to HA, NA is a
major antigenic target for humoral neutralizing antibodies (Taubenberger & Kash, 2010).
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At the time of this writing, there were 9 NA subtypes recognized by the WHO (Poulson,
2011). Taubenberger and Kash (2010) identified NA as a type II integral membrane
glycoprotein with sialidase enzymatic activity required for cleavage of both host cell
sialic acids, thus allowing release of newly produced virons, and sialic acids on viral
glycoproteins to prevent aggregation of nacent viral particles. Cheung and Poon (2007)
suggested the glycosylation of cell surface NA might be an important determinant of the
neurovirulence of influenza viruses. Even though the literature contains a constellation of
studies investigating NA, the function of NA activity in the influenza life cycle is not
fully understood (Cheung & Poon, 2007).
M1 Protein
Matrix Protein 1 (M1) is encoded in segment 7 of the influenza A virus (Cheung
& Poon, 2007). M1 protein is the most abundant protein in the influenza A virus viron
(Webster et al., 1992). Webster et al. (1992) explained the colinear transcription of
segment 7 produces mRNA for the matrix protein. It is the matrix protein that forms a
shell surrounding the virion nucleocapids underneath the viron envelope (Webster et al.,
1992).
The shell formed by the matrix protein interacts with cytoplasmic domains of the
surface glycoproteins and also with the viral ribonucleoprotein (Taubenberger & Kash,
2010). Cheung and Poon (2007) suggested that M1 protein and vRNA together promote
the self-assembly of the influenza A virus NP into a typical quanternary helical structure
of viral ribonucleoprotein (vRNP) complexes. Further, the interaction of NP protein with
vRNA and M1 in a system devoid of other viral proteins may lead to translocation of
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vRNP form the nucleus to the cytoplasm (Cheung & Poon, 2007). Cheung and Poon
suggested previously reported studies showing that M1 protein synthesized at high
temperatures (41°C) is unable to interact with vRNP and the transfer of vRNP into the
cytoplasm is blocked, thus the association between M1 and vRNP is essential for the
nuclear export of vRNP. This assertion by Cheung and Poon may provide a mechanism
for inhibiting the successful replication of influenza A viruses using a heat-shock
treatment.
M2 Protein
Matrix Protein 2 (M2) is encoded in segment 7 of the influenz A virus (Cheung &
Poon, 2007). M2 protein is an integral membrane protein (Webster et al., 1992). Webster
et al. (1992) suggested the membrane-spanning domain of the M2 protein also serves as a
signal for transport to the cell surface. Cheung and Poon (2007) supported this suggestion
by Webster et al. by noting the M2 tetramer has ion channel activity for pH regulation.
The ion channel activity of M2 is reported to maintain a high pH in the Golgi vessicles so
as to stabilize the native conformation of newly synthesized HA during intercellular
transport for viral assembly.
Nonstructural NS1 and NS2 Proteins
Nonstructural Protein 1 (NS1) and Nonstructural Protein 2 (NS2) are encoded in
segment 8 of the influenza A virus (Cheung & Poon, 2007). Webster et al. (1992)
asserted that NS1 and NS2 are abundant in the infected cells; NS1 primarily in the
nucleus, and NS2 primarily in the cytoplasm. It is known both NS1 and NS2 play a role
in viral replication, however, these roles are not well understood (Webster et al., 1992).
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NS1 is the only non-structural protein of the influenza A virus (Cheung & Poon, 2007).
Taubenberger & Kash (2010) reported NS1 has multiple functional domains and
pleiotrophic functions. In early studies, NS2 was believed to be a non-structural protein,
however, Cheung and Poon (2007) reported that several recent studies have indicated
NS2 is incorporated into viral particles in amounts. Taubenberger and Kash identified
NS2 as a nuclear export protein found in virons and facilitating nuclear export of viral
RNP complexes.
Antigenic Shift
Reassortment, also known as Antigenic shift, are the sudden changes in the amino
acids of the RNA sequences of the HA and NA strands (Poulson, 2011). Poulson (2011)
identified three mechanisms of antigenic shift: first, genetic reassortment can occur
between circulating human influenza A virus and an avian influenza A virus; second,
possible direct transmission of an avian or swine influenza virus from birds to humans
and their establishment in the human population; and third, the reintroduction of an “old”
or “previous strain” into the population (p. 38).
In 1996, HPAI H5N1 viruses caused and epizootic outbreak in southern China.
One year later, the HPAI H5N1 an epizootic outbreak occurred in Hong Kong that
resulted in 18 human cases and six deaths (Taubenberger & Morens, 2009). The genetic
nature of HPAI H5N1 RNA results in a relatively high rate of nucleotide substitutions
(Pfeiffer et al., 2011). These nucleotide substitutions result in point mutations, a process
known as “antigenic drift” (Aldras, 2011). The literature suggests that antigenic drift is
the principle reason why particular influenza strains continue to circulate (Pfeiffer et al.,
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2011). Six years after the epizootic outbreak in China, HPAI H5N1 reappeared in
epizootic form and spread widely throughout Southeast Asia (Taubenberger & Morens,
2009).
Antigenic shift occurs only in influenza A strains and results in the emergence of
completely new subtypes (Wali & Music, 2011). Antigenic shift is a process of genetic
reassortment involving the gene segments encoding the HA and/or NA genes
(Taubenberger & Kash, 2010). At the time of this writing, there were sixteen HA and
nine NA known subtypes, therefore, theoretically there are 144 possible HA-NA subtype
combinations possible. Further, there are theoretically 256 (28) possible combinations of
the eight RNA gene segments from reassortment between two parental viruses
(Taubenberger & Kash, 2010).
Antigenic Drift
Wali and Music (2011) and others asserted that antigenic drift is the result of
mutation(s) affecting the RNA segments coding for either hemagglutinin or
neuraminidase, but more commonly hemagglutinin. These mutations are changes in the
amino acid sequences of the antigenic portions of the surface glycoproteins HA and NA
(Taubenberger & Kash, 2010). Taubenberger and Kash (2010) and others asserted
antigenic drift may produce selective advantages for viral strains by allowing them to
evade pre-existing immunity. The term “mutation” is synonymously used to describe
“antigenic drift”. Poulson (2011) asserted antigenic drift is the result of the lack of a
proofreading mechanism and the relatively low fidelity of the RNA-dependent RNA
polymerase causing errors to be made during the RNA replication process (p. 38).
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Antigenic shift is a gradual process, unlike the sudden and more disruptive process of
antigenic shift (Poulson, 2011).
Laboratory Assays
A constellation of influenza virus investigations have been supported by
laboratory assays. Some research studies have investigated influenza viruses in the
natural environment (Vong, Ly, Mardy, Holl, & Buchy, 2008), while others have
approached the topic in the laboratory setting (Faust et al., 2009). The methodology for
characterization of influenza viruses has shown similarity across the literature.
Overarching methodologies include: virus detection by RT-PCR (Poddar et al., 2002),
virus isolation and characterization by allantoic cavities of embryonic eggs (Fouchier, et
al., 2005), infectivity studies using MDCK cell line (Brown et al., 2009), nucleotide
sequencing of the RNA genome (Yamamoto, et al., 2011), and phylogenic analysis using
BLAST available from GenBank (Fouchier, et al., 2005). The majority of influenza
samples for laboratory analysis have been cloacal swabs and oropharyngeal swabs from
migratory waterfowl (VanDalen et al., 2010). A limited number of studies have collected
environmental water samples from migratory waterfowl breeding grounds (Zhang et al.,
2011).
RT-PCR
Perez-Ramırez, et al. (2012) investigated influenza A virus detection by real time
RT-PCR was conducted on Spanish wetland water samples. The purpose of the PerezRamırez, et al. study was to determine the influence of a range of ecological factors
(climate conditions, density and diversity of wild birds, water physico-chemical
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properties and shelter and food availability) in avian influenza virus dynamics in the
Spanish wetlands under field conditions. The researchers in this study used TaqMan RRTPCR specific for the matrix gen (M gene) in the segment 7 of avian influenza A virus, the
Qiagen QIAamp viral RNA extraction for the viral extration, and the Life TechnologiesApplied Biosystems one-step RT-PCR kit for amplification (Perez-Ramırez, et al., 2012).
The Perez-Ramırez, et al. study is support for the use of real time RT-PCR specific for the
matrix gene (M gene) to identify influenza A virus from environmental water samples in
this dissertation research.
Evers et al. (2007) investigated the commercial preservative RNAlater (Qiagen)
by testing and comparing against the current method of cryo-freezing, and ethanol
preservatives for influenza A virus samples. The purpose of this investigation was to
determine if using the commercial preservative RNAlater would result in improved RTPCR amplification over the current sample preservation methods of cryo-freezing or
ethanol fixation (Evers et al. 2007). From the findings of this study, the authors asserted
the commercial preservative RNAlater held at ambient temperatures might be useful for
the identification of influenza A virus in samples collected from infected waterfowl
(Evers et al. 2007). The application of the Evers et al. study may provide an alternative
surveillance method influenza A virus using commercially available preservative to
reduce costs, time, labor, and be more practical in remote areas. The Evers et al. study is
support for the use of the commercial preservative RNA later in this dissertation research.
Vong, Ly, Mardy, Holl, and Buchy (2008) invesigated H5N1 influenza A virus
detection by real time RT-PCR using viral collection swabs. The purpose of this

124
investigation was to determine the potential risk of bird-to-human transmission of H5N1
influenza A virus outbreaks among backyard poultry in Cambodia (Vong et al. 2008). The
authors of the Vong et al. study concluded viral RNA was frequently present on various
enviromental surfaces or materials in H5N1 influenza A associated households and their
surroundings. The Vong et al. study is support for the use of RT-PCR for H5N1 influenza
A virus detection for environmental surveillance.
Poddar, Espina, and Schnurr (2002) investigated a single-step multiplex RT-PCR
methodology against standard laboratory methods for influenza virus detection, type, and
subtype identification. The purpose of this investigation was to determine if a single-step
multiplex RT-PCR methodology could effectively reduce the time and labor required to
determine influenza A and B virus types in comparison to standard culture and/or
monclonal antibody-based immunofluorescence methods (Poddar et al., 2002). The
authors of the Poddar et al. study asserted the single-step multiplex RT-PCR methodology
is potentially applicable to succesful type and subtype detection of clinical specimens
suspect for influenza virus of type A, with subtype H1N1 or H3N1, or type B virus. The
Poddar et al. study is support for the use of RT-PCR for influenza A virus detection in my
dissertation study.
Lu (2006) conducted a comparison of a novel dot-enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay against the commercial Directigen kit (Becton Dickson Microbiology Systems,
Cockeysville, MD) to detect influenza A virus. The purpose of this study was to
determine if dot-enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay showed higher sensitivity and
specificity against the commercial Directigen kit (Lu, 2006). Lu asserted the sensitivity
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and specificity of the novel dot-enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay was comparable
against the commercial Directigen kit for the detection of influenza A virus. The Lu study
is support for the use of commercially available standard of practice influenza A virus
detection assays for this dissertation research.
Harmon, Bower, Kim, Pentella, and Yoon (2010) investigated a novel multiplex
real-time RT-PCR to detect the matrix gene (M gene) sequence of the U.S. human
pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus. The objective of this study was to develop a real-time
RT-PCR test for the detection and differentiation of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 and
endemic influenza A viruses in North America (Harmon, Bower, Kim, Pentella, & Yoon,
2010). The authors of the Harmon et al. study cited the M gene is known to be genetically
conserved among all influenza A viruses, therefore it was selected as the target for a realtime RT-PCR assay capable of detecting all influenza A viruses and differentiating
pandemic H1N1 from endemic influenza A virus directly from clinical specimens of
various species origin. Further, the authors of this study asserted this newly developed
real-time RT-PCR assay is rapid and the results were confirmed by other PCR tests
(Harmon et al., 2010). The Harmon et al. study is support for the use of RT-PCR to target
the M gene sequence for influenza A virus detection in this dissertation study.
Lee, Loh, Lee, Tang, Chiu, and Koay (2012) conducted a validation investigation
of a sensitive and specific high-throughput duplex universal influenza A and B real time
RT-PCR assay. The researchers of this study utilized primers and probes targeted to the
matrix protein (M gene) of influenza A and the nucleoprotein of influenza B (Lee, Loh,
Lee, Tang, Chiu, & Koay, 2012). The authors of the Lee et al. study stated that for
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influenza A virus matrix proteins; a forward primer, a reverse primer, and a direct probe
were utilized, and for influenza B nucleoproteins; a forward primer, a reverse primer, a
commercial probe, and a modified probe specific for novel influenza B varient
(B/Singapore/1/2011) were utilized for the assays. Further, the authors of this study
concluded from the results that this universal influenza A/B assay was able to achieve
better specificity and sensitivity compared to existing monoplex assays (Lee et al., 2012).
The Lee et al. study is support for the use of RT-PCR to target the M gene sequence for
influenza A virus detection in this dissertation study.
Magnard, Valette, Aymard, and Lina (1999) investigated two nested RT-PCR
assays using previously frozen prepared nasal swap samples from outpatients presenting
with acute respiratory infection during the peak influenza season of 1998. The goal of this
investigation was to highlight the need for a global approach to influenza
detection/culture that would encompass both WHO requirements for influenza
surveillance and laboratory management for rapid diagnosis of influenza (Magnard,
Valette, Aymard, & Lina, 1999). The PCR-1 assay for this investigation was a multiplex
RT-PCR designed to detect specifically the haemagglutinin genes of influenza A H1N1, A
H3N2, and influenza B viruses the PCR-2 assay was used to detect the M gene of
influenza A viruses only (Magnard et al., 1999). The authors of the Magnard et al. study
asserted the findings of the research successfully demonstrated the nested RT-PCR assays
of this study is more sensitive screening method than IC-ELISA, and comparable to an
optimised culture methodology. Further, the authors noted the nested RT-PCR assays of
this study can yield results in 24 hours, whereas the optimised culture methodology
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requires up to four days (Magnard et al., 1999). The Magnard et al. study is support for
the use of RT-PCR to target the M gene sequence for influenza A virus detection and the
use of frozen samples in this dissertation study.
Daum et al. (2007) investigated a single-step/reaction vessel format real-time RTPCR for the detection of influenza A virus subtypes H1, H3, and H5; and influenza B
virus. The goal of this study was to develop the single-step/reaction vessel format realtime RT-PCR, and evaluate the detection of influenza A virus subtypes H1, H3, and H5;
and influenza B virus against well established conventional “gold standard” procedures
for viral identification in the clinical setting (Daum et al., 2007). The researchers of the
Daum et al. study used primer/probes to target the highly conserved region of the matrix
protein (M gene) for all 16 influenza A virus subtypes and two influenza B lineages
(B/Victoria and B/Yamagata). The authors of this study asserted the study results
demonstrate high specificity and sensitivity in the absence of cross-reactivity (Daum et
al., 2007). The Daum et al. study is support for the use of single-step real-time RT-PCR to
target the M gene sequence for influenza A virus detection in this dissertation study.
Heijnen and Medema (2011) investigated ultrafiltration methods along with realtime quantitative reverse transcriptase PCR (qRT-PCR) assays to analyze samples of
sewage influent, effluent, and surface water for the pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009
virus. The samples were collected in the Netherlands during the time of the influenza A
(H1N1) 2009 virus epidemic (Heijnen & Medema, 2011). The researchers of the Heijnen
and Medema study used water concentrates that were artifically contaminated with the
pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus as postive controls for the qRT-PCR

128
methodologies. The researchers of the Heijnen and Medema study used primers and
probes specifically targeted for all influenza A viruses and specifically for the pandemic
influenza A (H1N1) virus. The authors asserted the results of this study confirm the
suitability of the laboratory methods to concentrate influenza virus from sewage and
surface water and demonstrates the applicability of the qRT-PCR method to detect
influenza virus in environmental samples (Heijnen & Medema, 2011). The Heijnen and
Medema study is support for the analysis of environmental water samples for influenza A
viruses using PCR methodologies in this dissertation study.
Agüero, San Miguel, Sánchez, Gómez-Tejedor, and Jiménez-Clavero (2007)
investigated fully automated high-throughput real-time RT-PCR methodology against
conventional manual real-time RT-PCR methodology for the detection of influenza A
viruses. The goal of this study was to provide a rapid methodology for influenza A virus
genome and the differentiation of H5N1 variants in a high number of samples (Agüero,
San Miguel, Sánchez, Gómez-Tejedor, & Jiménez-Clavero, 2007). The researchers of the
Agüero et al. studied field samples of cloacal/fecal and tracheal/oropharyngeal swabs,
tissue homogenates, and feces from birds. In this study, for the detection of avian
influenza virus the researchers targeted the matrix protein (M gene) (Agüero et al., 2007).
The authors of the Agüero et al. asserted the results of the automated high-throughput
real-time RT-PCR methodology of this study provides higher sensitivity and specificity
when compared to traditional nucleic acid methods. Further, the authors propose the
automated high-throughput real-time RT-PCR methodology allows for the analysis of
large numbers of samples with fast turnaround time making it feasible for the screening
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of virus circulation in animal populations at large scale (Agüero et al., 2007). The Agüero
et al. study is support for the use of RT-PCR to target the M gene sequence for influenza
A virus detection in this dissertation study.
Infectivity
Brown et al. (2009) investigated the infectivity of 12 low pathogenic avian
influenza viruses across various pH, salinities, and temperatures in a biosafety level 2
laboratory setting. The researchers of this study utilized MDCK cell line to determine
endpoint titers for infectivity of the different viruses (Brown et al., 2009). The authors of
the Brown et al. study reported that endpoint titers for infectivity were measured at 100%
monolayer destruction of the MDCK cells.
In the study by Brown, Swayne, Cooper, Burns, and Stallknecht (2007), a similar
laboratory method using MDCK cell line was used for low pathogenic avian influenza A
virus and high pathogenic avian influenza A virus infectivity assays. In this this study,
endpoint titers were measured at 100% monolayer destruction of the MDCK cell line
(Brown, Swayne, Cooper, Burns, & Stallknecht, 2007). Faust et al. (2009) investigated
the biological effect of filter-feeding bivalves to remove influenza viruses from water and
to reduce viral infectivity. The researchers of this study reported that endpoint titers for
infectivity was measured at 100% monolayer destruction of the MDCK cells. These
studies are support for the use of MDCK cell line protocols for infectivity assay for this
dissertation research.
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Gene Sequencing
Gene sequencing or nucleotide sequencing, and phylogenetic analysis of isolated
influenza A viruses has been a source of data from where researchers have hypothesized
the origins and sources of the components of the viral RNA sequences. Yamamoto et al.
(2011) investigated fecal samples from migratory waterfowl from Siberia for the
presence of H5 HA and N1 NA genes of influenza viruses. Nulceotide sequencing was
performed on samples positive for H5 HA and N1 NA genes (Yamamoto et al., 2011).
The authors of the Yamamoto et al. study concluded the results of nucleotide sequencing
indicate highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus had not become dominant in the
nesting lakes of Siberia prior to this study. The Yamamoto et al. study is support for the
importance and usefulness of genetic sequencing of isolated H5 HA and N1 NA viruses
in this dissertation study. Further, the Yamamoto et al. study associated viral presence in
nesting lakes in Siberian to urban ponds in Hokkaido, Japan via migratory flyways. This
migratory flyway association were of importance to mapping of the burden of influenza
A viruses in rural and urban ponds in this dissertation.
Zhang et al. (2011) collected 200-ml water samples from areas near the habitat of
migratory birds in East Dongting Lake, Yueyang City, Hunan Province for laboratory
analysis. The authors of the Zhang et al. study asserted the Dongting Lake wetland as an
important habitat and over-wintering area for East Asian migratory birds. From the 95
water samples collected, an H10N8 influenza A virus was isolated, whole genome
genetic sequenced, and pathogenicity investigated in mice and specific pathogen free
(SPF) White Leghorn Chickens (Zhang et al., 2011).
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The phylogenic analysis of the isolated H10N8 virus indicated all the eight gene
segments were of aquatic avian origin and belonged to a Eurasian lineage (Zhang et al.,
2011). The authors of the Zhang et al. (2011) study concluded the H10N8 subtypes of
avian viruses might pose a potential threat to mammals and multiple amino acid
substitutions are liklely to be involved in the adaptation of H10N8 influenza virus to
mice. This study supports environmental water sampling approach for influenza risk
assessment of this dissertation research. Notably, the researchers of the Zhang et al.
collected 200-ml water samples in areas near the habitat of migratory birds and stored the
samples at -80°C until assayed. Similar sampling methods were used in this dissertation
study.
Fouchier, et al. (2005) isolated influenza A viruses from black-headed gill (Larus
ridibundus) in Sweden. These isolated influenza A viruses could not be classified to the
15 known HA subtypes. The authors hypothesized the HA of the black-headed gull
viruses represent a new HA subtype (Fouchier, et al., 2005). The researchers of the
Fouchier, et al. study applied nucleotide sequence analysis, phylogenic analysis, and
double immunodiffusion assay methods to the ten samples from black-headed gulls. The
results of the assay methods were further analyzed with BLAST available from GenBank
(Fouchier, et al., 2005). The authors of the Fouchier, et al. study asserted the results
provide strong evidence for the classification of the HA of the Swedish black-headed gull
virus as H16. The Fouchier et al. study is support for nucleotide sequence analysis and
BLAST analysis from GenBank in this dissertation study.
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Tang, et al. (2009) investigated the biological properties and virulence of four
H5N1 influenza subtypes [A/mallard/Huadong/Y/2003 (Y), A/mallard/Huadong/hn/2005
(hn), A/mallard/Huadong/S/2005 (S), and A/mallard/Huadong/lk/2005 (lk)] were
investigated in different animal models. The results of the animal models showed all four
H5N1 influenza strains to be highly pathogenic in specific pathogen free (SPF) chickens;
the (S) and (Y) isolates were moderately pathogenic in mice; and in mallard ducks, two
isolates (Y & hn) had low pathogenicity, and the other two (S & lk) had high
pathogenicity and caused lethal infection (Tang, et al., 2009).
The researchers of the Tang, et al. (2009) study further sequenced the whole
genome of the four H5N1 influenza subtypes and compared the findings to other H5N1
sequences available in GenBank. The results of this study supports the theory that
influenza viruses that were previously transmissible in one species can infect a broader
range of hosts by reassortment (Tang, et al., 2009). The authors of the Tang, et al. study
stressed more and more H5N1 viruses are capable of causing disease and mortality in
ducks, and there is a need to understand the molecular basis of the two viruses with
different pathogenicity for ducks. The Tang, et al. study is support for the investigation of
H5N1 virus subtypes in aquatic environments in this dissertation research.
Tønnessen, et al. (2013) studied influenza viral swabs collected from hunterharvested dabbling ducks and gull in the south-west of Norway for the period of 2005 to
2010. Norway has the longest coastline in Europe and is located along the East Atlantic
flyway of migratory waterfowl (Tønnessen, et al., 2013). The authors of the Tønnessen,
et al. study conveyed the purpose of this research to: (i) describe the prevalence and
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subtype diversity of avian influenza viruses in dabbling ducks and gulls in the south-west
(SW) of Norway, (ii) test whether the virus prevalence was influenced by host species
and sampling time, (iii) determine the genetic similarity of the Norwegian avian influenza
viruses to previously characterized avian influenza viruses, and to (iv) search for
evidence of intracontinental and intercontinental reassortment of gene segments encoding
the internal viral proteins in avian influenza viruses from gulls in Eurasia.
Influenza RNA extraction, virus isolation, hemagglutination assay, genomic
sequencing, similarity searches, and phylogenic analysis were performed on the samples
(Tønnessen, et al., 2013). The authors of the Tønnessen, et al. (2013) study presented
collected data in tables and figures. The phylogenic relationships of the internal gene
segments are presented in a phylogenic tree diagrams. The phylogenic tree diagrams
provide a visual supplement to the discussions of intracontinental reassortment and
intercontinental reassortment. The authors of the Tønnessen, et al. asserted the results
indicate that gulls that interact with dabbling ducks are likely to be mixing vessels for
avian influenza viruses from waterfowl and gulls. Additionally, the results indicated
intercontinental reassortment is rare in avian influenza viruses from gulls in Eurasia
(Tønnessen, et al., 2013). The Tønnessen, et al. study is support for mixing vessel theory,
sampling along migratory flyways for influenza viruses, genome sequencing, and
similarity analysis of the findings in this dissertation study.
Borm et al. (2011) conducted an in-depth analysis of the complete genome
sequences of three avian influenza viruses co-occurring in wild mallards at a single
location at the same time was conducted. The influenza samples were collected from
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trapped mallards as part of a long-term wild bird monitoring program on a pond in La
Hulpe, a nature reserve approximately 20 km southeast of Brussels, Belgium (Borm et
al., 2011). The authors of the Borm et al. study stated La Hulpe is visited during the
migration period by mallards originating from the north and northeast (Fenoskandia and
Western Russia), using the site as a stopover to more southern wintering areas. The
characterization of three avian influenza viruses co-occurring in wild mallards at a single
location at the same time provides a baseline measure for the long-term wild bird
monitoring program. The Borm et al. (2011) study is support for genome sequencing as
part of baseline measurements for aquatic environments visited by migratory waterfowl
in this dissertation study.
Mishra, et al. (2009) investigated the genetic characterization of an H5N1 viral
isolate from Manipur, India from 2007. The purpose of this investigation by Mishra, et al.
was to understand the relationship of the H5N1 viral isolate to other H5N1 isolates and to
trace the possible source of introduction into the country. Hemagglutination and
Hemaggultination inhibition assays were performed for identification of the Manipur
isolate (Mishra, et al., 2009). The researchers of the Mishra, et al. used WHO
recommended diagnostic primers sets specific for influenza A HA (H5) and NA (N1)
genes. Additionally, the researchers conducted whole genome sequencing and phylogenic
analysis of H5N1 viruses (Mishra, et al., 2009).
The authors of the Mishra, et al. (2009) study reported the phylogenic analysis of
41 whole genomes of all eight gene segments concatenated showed the Manipur isolate
was unique in the clade 2.2. All influenza A viruses that caused outbreaks in China,
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Europe, Middle-East, and Africa regions are grouped in genotype Z, clade 2.2 (Mishra, et
al., 2009). The authors of the Mishra, et al. study asserted the phylogenetic
characterization of the Manipur isolate is evidence the H5N1 virus isolated in 2007 in
India was a unique varient and not related to the 2006 Indian isolate. The Mishra, et al.
study is support for the application of genome sequencing and phylogenic analysis as part
of national and international surveillance programs.
Shan et al. (2010) studied animal models in part to investigate the biological and
genetic characteristics of influenza A/Eurasian coot/WA/2727/79 (H6N2) virus. For
genetic characterization, the researchers used primers for amplification of the HA, NP,
and NA genes for A/Eurasian coot/WA/2727/79 (H6N2) virus (Shan et al., 2010). The
authors reported that similarity analysis to GenBank showed the HA sequence obtained in
this study to be identical to the HA sequence for this virus submitted previously
(accession number CY028243) (Shan et al., 2010). Additionally, the authors of the Shan
et al. manuscript asserted that this study documented the biological and genetic
characteristics of an H6N2 subtype virus of wild-bird origin which are consistent with
those of other LPAI viruses. The Shan et al. study is support for the investigation and
analysis of influenza A viruses among waterfowl for it may provide useful information on
the spectrum of avian influenza viruses existing in wild bird populations around the
world.
In the Soda, et al. (2008) study, researchers investigated the applicability of a
virus strain library for vaccine preparation. For the model, an H5N1 virus strain
[R/(Dk/Mong-Dk/Mong)] was selected for whole virus vaccine preparation (Soda, et al.,
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2008). The researchers of the Soda, et al. study isolated 524 influenza strains from 10,549
fecal samples of migratory birds. The 10,549 fecal samples were collected from
waterfowl in 1996-2007 in Siberia, Mongolia, China, Australia, and Japan (Soda, et al.,
2008). From the 524 influenza strains isolated in the Soda, et al. study, 14 were identified
H5 influenza viruses. The researchers evaluated the relationships among the H5 influenza
virus strains and the nucleotide sequences of the HA genes were determined and
compared to those of H5 viruses from the NCBI database. To assess the potency of the
R/(Dk/Mong-Dk/Mong) vaccine, mice models (case-control) were H5 HPAI challenged
(Soda, et al., 2008). The authors of the Soda, et al. study reported that all of the control
mice died within nine days after challenged, and survival rate was correlated to vaccine
dose. The Soda, et al. study is support for the establishment of a library of vaccine strain
candidates from isolates of waterfowl. The establishment of a library database may be of
biological importance to vaccine development and influenza risk assessment tools.
Influenza Risk Assessment Tools
The ultimate goal for epidemiologists and other influenza researchers is to
identify pandemic influenza viruses before they emerge in animal or human populations
so that interventional strategies may be implemented that would prevent or reduce the
impact of the influenza outbreak (Keeler, 2011). Doherty and McLean (2011) included
several conceptual and practical issues associated to monitoring influenza virus in wild
animal populations. This work includes discussions of the philosphical approaches to
monitoring, design and methodological issues, probabilities of detection, and a review of
several current monitoring plans (Doherty & McLean, 2011). Several of the monitoring
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plans share similar characteristics to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Influenza Risk Assessment Tools.
CDC and ECDC IRAT
The CDC IRAT being developed consisted of ten criteria grouped within three
overarching categories: (i) properties of the virus, (ii) attributes of the population, and
(iii) ecology and epidemiology (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , 2012). The
ten evaluation criteria are: (i) Genomic variation, (ii) Receptor binding, (iii) Transmission
in laboratory animals, (iv) Antiviral treatment susceptibility/resistance, (v) Existing
population immunity, (vi) Disease severity and pathogenesis, (vii) Antigenic relationship
to vaccine candidates, (viii) Global distribution in animals, (ix) Infection in animal
species, and (x) Human infections. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control (ECDC) was developing an IRAT similarly to the CDC model.
The ECDC IRAT model is heavily focused on the human features of influenza
outbreaks. The ECDC IRAT model has three overarching categories: (i) Basic
epidemiology and basic parameters of human infection, (ii) Disease characteristic in
humans, and (iii) Features of the virus in infected persons (European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control, 2009). At the time of this writing, the ECDC IRAT model
primarily focused on attributes of the population, and does not emphasize properties of
the virus or ecology and epidemiology of the virus.
New World Organization for Animal Health Standards of Reporting
Thiermann (2007) presented a summary of new international standard on avian
influenza as developed by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). This work
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provides a summary of international efforts to control and monitor for High and Low
Pathogenic Avian Influenza viruses. The importance of the work by World Organisation
for Animal Health is the international uniformity in reporting standards and the support
provided to poor countries where avian influenza is endemic.
Geographical Ranking for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
Gonzales et al. (2010) investigated and wrote a critical review of the active
surveillance of avian influenza among European Union countries. These critical reviews
identified methodologies used by the international community to monitor the presence of
influenza among poultry and waterfowl. These studies provide validation to research
surveillance methods used to study of influenza virus infected birds and also provide
support for further research to understand influenza at the human-animal interface.
Ranking of Vectors for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
Carver (2003) crafted a risk assessment strategy for the transmission of highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) among commercial poultry flocks. The importance of
this work is the recognition and ranking of transportation vectors for risk. From
calculating risk assessment to transportation vectors, biosecurity measures may be
implemented to reduce risk and still maintain national and international commerce.
Mathematical Model for Pre- and Postinfection of Bird Flocks
Hollingsworth (2009) investigated previous influenza outbreaks by applying
mathematical modeling. This article provides mathematical modeling technique and
detailed definition of terms so that epidemiologists and other influenza researchers can
further apply the principles. Hollingsworth concluded that mathematical modeling of
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influenza outbreaks is an essential tool for understanding and controlling directly
transmissible pathogens.
Social Change Implications
The social change implications of this dissertation can be recognized at the
national and international levels, to the population level, and to the individual level. At
the national and international level I attempted to contribute geospatial analysis and
spatial-temporal data for influenza A surveillance. H5N1 influenza virus surveillance
may detect highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 presence along the eastern
Pacific flyway. The future detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1
may initiate biosecurity measures to protect poultry industries in the United States and
Brazil. The United States and Brazil are the world’s largest exporters of poultry (Butler &
Ruttimann, 2006). Additionally, I attempted to contribute new H5N1 viral genome
sequences to the current influenza A virus H5N1 database. An increased database may be
a resource for avian influenza A virus H5N1 vaccine development.
Vaccine developments were positive social change at the population level. In the
Soda, et al. (2008) study, researchers investigated the applicability of a virus strain library
for vaccine preparation. I attempted to contribute to the current virus strain library at
GenBank. Vaccine development may have may positive social change for American
Indian/Alaskan Natives. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2009) reported
American Indian/Alaskan Natives had H1N1 mortality rates four times higher than
persons in all other racial/ethnic populations combined. Poverty and poor living
conditions may predispose American Indian/Alaskan Natives to influenza complications
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(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009). Chakraborty et al. (2008) suggested
the a disproportionate share of a developing country disease burden is due to infectious
diseases. Applying this hypothesis to American Indian/Alaskan Natives, whose H1N1
mortality rates were four times higher than persons in all other racial/ethnic populations
combined, may explain the poverty and poor living conditions that may predispose this
population to influenza complications. At the individual level the results of this
dissertation may bring about greater awareness of influenza A virus infection.
Shive and Kanekar (2011) suggested the principles of the Health Belief Model
can provide explanation why many people, including high risk individuals, do not receive
influenza vaccination. The results of this dissertation study may bring greater awareness
to the individual, and thus, greater perceived susceptibility to influenza A virus infection.
In this dissertation study, I analyzed samples from artificial recirculating water ponds.
Artificial recirculating water ponds are often a decorative feature in parks and golf
courses. The decorative feature is often constructed to attract people. These decorative
features may also attract both domestic and migratory waterfowl (Webster et al., 1992).
Migratory waterfowl likely will introduce influenza A viruses to the artificial
recirculating water pond enivronment from viral shedding in feces.
If the artificial recirculating water pond is constructed with an aeration fountain,
mist and droplet formation may occur. As is well established, influenza viruses are
transmitted between individuals through droplets (e.g., coughing, sneezing). An
individual who comes in contact with the droplets from the contaminated artificial
recirculating water pond may be inoculated with influenza A virus. Therefore, the
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findings of this dissertation study may bring greater awareness at the individual level, and
thus, increase the perceived susceptibility to influenza A virus infection. As implied by
Shive and Kanekar (2011), perceived susceptibility to influenza A virus infection will
have a direct correlation to influenza vaccination.
Major Themes in the Literature
The major themes in the literature are aligned to the epidemiological triangle for
influenza viruses. The major theme of the environment is continued surveillance. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control, Chinese Center for Disease Control, and the World Health Organization are in
agreement that continued influenza surveillance will lead to reduced morbidity and
mortality from influenza virus infection. The literature review revealed many studies
support and contribute to influenza surveillance. A portion of this literature has focused
on the role of migratory waterfowl.
The major theme of the host is migratory waterfowl are the natural reservoir of
influenza viruses and the cause of global dispersal of influenza viruses. Investigations by
others have concentrated and pinpointed to migratory waterfowl breeding grounds, global
migratory flyways, and the phylogenic analysis of influenza viruses isolated from
migratory waterfowl. Phylogenic analysis investigations used molecular techniques and
the GenBank data base to flesh out the evolutionary patterns and changes of the influenza
viron. These discoveries support Mixing Vessel Theory. Another application of
molecular techniques was to characterize isolated influenza viruses.
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The major theme of the agent is the influenza viron is not completely understood.
Studies have attempted to discover characterizations of influenza virus strains that are
pathogenic in some animals and non-pathogenic in others. Other studies have attempted
to better understand the molecular level dynamics of the influenza viron that leads to
animal-to-human transmission (primary) and human-to-human transmission (secondary).
Another field of studies has investigated vaccine development against the mutable
influenza virus. The major themes of the literature shape an organization to what is
known and what is not known about the global influenza burden.
What Is Known as Well as What Is Not Known
There are subjects with in the topic of the influenza that are known and accepted
in the literature. First, in the literature migratory waterfowl and shorebirds are recognized
as natural reservoirs for influenza viruses. Second, antigenic drift is accepted as a
causative process from which influenza viruses can evade humoral immunity. Third,
antigenic shift is accepted as a causative process which may lead to pandemic influenza
viral strains. Fourth, the Mixing Vessel Theory is widely accepted as the process of
creating novel influenza strains that are capable of host switching. Fifth, the molecular
structure and the RNA genome of the influenza viron are well documented. Sixth, the
influenza virus genome database (GenBank) is available as a resource library to the
international community and also a repository where new contributions can be made.
However, there are subjects within the topic of the influenza that are not well understood
in the literature.
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The process of antigenic shift and antigenic drift is not well understood in the
literature. This process of creating novel influenza strains and sub-type(s) of existing
strains may result in viruses with molecular characteristics that allow for animal-tohuman transmission, or human-to-human transmission. The molecular characteristics that
give an influenza virus the properties for animal-to-human transmission, or more
seriously, human-to-human transmission are not completely understood. In addition to
having the properties of primary or secondary transmission, mutated influenza viruses
may express varying virulence in different species.
The determinants of influenza virus virulence are not completely understood. The
determinants of influenza virus virulence among migratory waterfowl need further
investigation. An infected asymptomatic migratory waterfowl may host and disperse a
highly pathogenic influenza strain along the migratory flyways. There is a lack of
understanding of the association of which species of waterfowl can host which influenza
viral strains and cause viral shedding along which migratory flyways and watershed
breeding grounds. To investigate this conundrum, geospatial analysis and spatialtemporal distribution studies may be of significant interest. In this dissertation, I
attempted to fill the gap in the knowledge of the geographical dispersal of influenza A
viruses in aquatic habitats using geospatial analysis.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The “Spanish” influenza H1N1 pandemic of 1918–1919, which caused
approximately 50 million deaths worldwide, remains an ominous warning to public
health (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006). Since then, new subtypes of human influenza A
viruses have been detected at various times: in 1957, the H2N2 subtype (Asian influenza)
replaced the H1N1 subtype; in 1968, the H3N2 subtype (Hong Kong virus) appeared; and
in 1977, the H1N1 virus reappeared (Webster, et al., 1992). Influenza disease emergence
data are collected year-round, but economic strain on global public health to prevent and
treat human influenza outbreaks is enormous. Therefore, it is imperative to identify
potential sources of the virus to help minimize outbreak occurrence.
The problem in this study was that public health scientists have been battling
emerging human influenza diseases with tactile and reactionary methods because there
was a lack of knowledge and data at the human-animal interface. This baseline study of
the proportion of influenza A virus in urban and rural community settings may provide
knowledge and biological data of significant interest at the human-animal interface. This
biological data may be of significant interest for the development of IRAT.
Organization of the Chapter
This chapter includes the materials and methodology of this dissertation study.
The underpinning organization of materials and methodology of this dissertation was the
epidemiological triangle as it pertains to influenza A viruses in the aquatic habitat. The
organization of this chapter begins with the research design and rationale. This section is
followed by presentation of the research questions and the connection to the research
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design. Succeeding this section is a presentation of the research design connection to the
literature. The methodology of the sample selection, pre-analytical, analytical, and postanalytical phases of the study follows. The research questions are again presented for the
ease of the reader. This is followed by a presentation of the statistical analysis approaches
to each research question and the threats to validity. The ethical procedures of the study
and summary are presented to conclude the chapter.
Research Design and Rationale
For this quantitative dissertation study, I collected and analyzed primary data. The
epidemiological triangle provided framework for the primary data collected. The
epidemiological triangle has three vertices: host, agent, and environment. The host is the
organism harboring the disease. For influenza disease, the reservoir hosts are migratory
waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes; Franklin et al., 2011). The
agents are the influenza A viruses. The environments are the natural and artificial habitats
where the hosts are found.
The independent environmental variables of this study were the geographical
locations of the artificial water ponds and geochemical properties of the artificial water
pond samples. The geographical location data included rural or urban community, latitude
and longitudinal coordinates, altitude, and approximate water pond surface area. The
geochemical properties of the artificial water pond sample measure included pH, salinity,
and temperature. Additionally, the presence of absence of waterfowl at the time of sample
collection was included as an independent host variable. The dependent agent variables
were influenza A viruses. Influenza A virus data included detection for M gene by real
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time RT-PCR using World Health Organization recommended primer sequences,
infectivity by hemagglutination assay using MDCK cell line, and gene sequencing for
H5N1 influenza A virus using World Health Organization recommended primer
sequences at Laragen Sequencing and Genotyping Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver
City, California).
Researchers have recognized the human-animal interface as a complex but critical
juncture at which new paradigms have been emerging (World Health Organization,
2011). The aquatic virus reservoir is a human-animal interface. Franklin et al. (2011)
suggested aquatic virus reservoirs give rise to indirect transmission, which would alter
the transmission dynamics, beyond just direct interactions between infectious and
susceptible individuals. The quantitative research design of this dissertation was used to
investigate aquatic virus reservoirs as a human-animal interface. Further, the quantitative
design of this dissertation sought to answer the research questions.
Research Questions
R1: Is there a difference in the burden of influenza A virus in rural ponds
compared to urban ponds?
H01: The burden of influenza A virus in community ponds has no association to
geographical location.
Ha1: The burden of influenza A virus in community ponds is associated to
geographical location.
In this study the proportion and probability of the presence of influenza A virus
were investigated in recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical
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locations. Rural ponds were viewed as one population and urban ponds as another
population. The dependent agent variables were influenza A viruses.
R2: Is there an association between geographic location, altitude, estimated
surface area and observed presence of waterfowl, and the proportion of influenza A virus
in rural ponds compared to urban ponds?
H02: There is no association between geographic location, altitude, estimated
surface area and observed presence of waterfowl, and the proportion of influenza A virus
in rural ponds compared to urban ponds.
Ha2: There is an association between geographic location, altitude, estimated
surface area and observed presence of waterfowl, and the proportion of influenza A virus
in rural ponds compared to urban ponds.
In this study, rural community ponds were viewed as one population and urban
community ponds as another population. The comparison of these two populations
included proportion of influenza A virus(s), latitude and longitudinal coordinates,
altitude, and approximate water pond surface area, and the presence of absence of
waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes) at the time of sample
collection were included as an independent environment and host variables. The
dependent agent variables were influenza A viruses.
R3: Is there an association between water pH, salinity, or water temperature and
influenza A virus infectivity in rural and urban water ponds?
H03: There is no association between water pH, salinity, or water temperature and
influenza A virus infectivity in rural and urban water ponds.
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Ha3: There is an association between water pH, salinity, or water temperature and
influenza A virus infectivity in rural and urban water ponds.
Brown et al. (2009) investigated the infectivity of 12 low pathogenic avian
influenza viruses across various pH, salinities, and temperatures in a biosafety level 2
laboratory setting. In this dissertation study, I investigated if the findings of the Brown et
al. study were consistent in rural and urban community pond samples. The geochemical
properties of the artificial water pond sample measure included: pH, salinity, and
temperature. The dependent agent variables were infectivity influenza A viruses.
R4: Are H5N1 influenza A viral subtypes detected in the sample of rural and
urban ponds novel gene sequences or have the gene sequences been previously identified
elsewhere?
H04: The H5N1 influenza A viral subtypes detected in the sample of rural and
urban ponds are not novel gene sequences and the gene sequences have been previously
identified elsewhere.
Ha4: The H5N1 influenza A viral subtypes detected in the sample of rural and
urban ponds are novel gene sequences and the gene sequences have not been previously
identified elsewhere.
In this study, water samples were collected directly from rural and urban ponds.
World Health Organization recommended RT-PCR primers were used for influenza A
virus H5N1 gene sequencing. The laboratory analysis for the presence of influenza A
virus and influenza A virus infectivity were conducted in a biosafety level 2 laboratory at
the California State University Channel Islands campus. The analysis for the presence of
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influenza A virus involved commercially available influenza A/B viral RT-PCR detection
kits suitable for water analysis. Water samples verified positive for H5N1 influenza A
viral strains were submitted for gene sequencing analysis to Laragen Sequencing and
Genotyping Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California). The H5N1 influenza A
virus gene sequencing results were compared to the influenza A viral gene sequence
database GenBank (National Institute of Health genetic sequence database).
Time and Resource Constraints
Applied environmental studies can be classified as baseline, monitoring, or impact
studies (Green, 1979). This dissertation is a baseline environmental study. Green (1979)
asserted a baseline study is one in which data are collected and analyzed for the purpose
of defining the present state of the biological community, the environment, or both (p.
68). In this dissertation study, I attempted to define the present state of the biological
community of recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical locations in
California. The temperate climate of California did not pose seasonal constraints.
However, to define the present state of the biological community, a cross-sectional
sampling approach were used. To limit threats to the internal validity of the study, pond
water samples were collected over the shortest time period, as possible. At the time of
this writing, there were no resource contraints apparent.
Research Design Choice
Water analysis has been an important scientific approach to understanding the
epidemiological triangle model of influenza viral diseases. Ferro et al. (2010) focused on
the presence of influenza A viruses among the migratory ducks and the winter breeding
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grounds along the Texas Coast. Studies by others have investigated waterborne
transmission of influenza as a zoonotic disease in the natural environment (Lang et al.,
2008; VanDalen et al., 2010; Webster et al., 1992). VanDalen et al. (2010) were able to
show viral sheding in fecal material to be of higher viral concentrations than
oropharyngeal or cloacal swabs. Thus, it is possible that influenza viruses can be
transfered between organisms via open water-sources as wetlands, lakes, and ponds.
Other researchers have investigated if influenza A viruses can be detected in these
contaminated aquatic habitats (Lang et al., 2008; Stallknecht & Brown, 2009; Zhang et
al., 2006). Lang, et al. (2008) studied sediment sample from three ponds in the Creamer’s
Field Migratory Waterfowl Refuge, Alaska, a location used by a wide variety of
migratory waterfowl. The sediment samples were collected using a time-series approach
and analyzed for influenza A virus RNA using reverse transcription-polymerase chain
reaction (RT-PCR) methodologies (Lang et al., 2008).
Zhang et al. (2006) studied samples of ice or water from three northeastern
Siberian lakes in the Koluma River region collected and analyzed for the presence of
influenza A virus using reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
methodologies. Other researchers have studied influenza A viruses in surface water
samples to investigate the perpetuation between waterfowl and water-contamination
(Hinshaw et al., 1980; Ito et al., 1995), while others have researched the infectivity and
transmission of influenza A viruses in the aquatic environment (Brown et al., 2009;
Halvorson et al., 1985).
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Ito et al. (1995) investigated influenza virus isolates they collected fecal samples
of dabbling ducks and also from lake water used by migratory waterfowl. The purpose of
this study was to investigate the theory of water-borne transmission of influenza virus
(Webster et al., 1992) as a mechanism of year-to-year perpetuation of the viruses in lakes
where migratory waterfowl may breed (Ito et al., 1995). The results of this research
support the hypothesis the viruses remained viable in the lake water after most ducks left
for migration South (Ito et al., 1995). Brown et al. (2009) asserted the pH, temperature,
and salinity-at levels normally encountered in nature-can impact the ablity of avian
influenza A viruses to remain infective in water.
In the longitudinal study by Hinshaw et al. (1980), researchers collected and
analyzed samples from waterfowl, unconcentrated lake water, and feces from lake shores
near Vermillion, Alberta, Canada to isolate influenza viruses. The samples were used to
investigate whether influenza viruses continually circulate or whether the same or
different strains are present from year to year (Hinshaw et al., 1980). The authors of the
Hinshaw et al. (1980) study asserted this longitudinal study of feral ducks would provide
data on the size of the gene pool of influenza A viruses in nature and the number of
viruses antigenically related to human strains present in avian species.
Methodology
Artificial water ponds in the geographic locations of rural and urban communities
are sites of the human-animal interface. Webster et al. (1992) described this humananimal interface with the example of domestic ducks in community ponds attracting
migratory waterfowl. The migratory waterfowl introduce the influenza virus to that
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community’s water pond from fecal contamination. The contaminated community water
pond now becomes a potential source of influenza virus to both humans and animals.
Population
The target population for this dissertation was artificial recirculating water ponds
in the geographic locations of rural and urban Californian communities. There are 21
counties considered rural areas, and 37 counties considered metropolitan and not rural in
California by California Business and Professions Code Section 19986(l). The population
size of artificial recirculating water ponds in California is unknown.
Sampling and Sampling Procedures
The dissertation study method was quantitative using a cross-sectional design. A
convenience sampling approach was used. The geographical area was the state
boundaries of California. Equal sample sizes from rural and urban communities were
attempted. A representative sampling from each of the 21 counties considered rural areas,
and 37 counties considered metropolitan and not rural in California by California
Business and Professions Code Section 19986(l) were attempted. The inclusion criteria of
the study population were artificial recirculating water ponds in the geographic locations
of rural and urban communities.
The number of research articles that have either focused on, or have included
water sample analysis for influenza viruses has been limited (Runstadler, Hill, Hussein,
Puryear, & Keogh, 2013). Henaux, Samuel, Dusek, Fleskes, and Ip (2012) collected
water samples (n = 597) from wetlands of Sacramento Valley, California and Yolo
Bypass, California and analyzed them for the presence of avian influenza virus. The
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overall detection rate for avian influenza virus in the Henaux et al. study was [12/597 =
2.0 ± 0.6%]. For water samples collected from wetlands of Sacramento Valley,
California, the detection rate for avian influenza virus was [2.7%] and for water samples
collected from wetlands of Yolo Bypass, California, the detection rate for avian influenza
virus was [1.7%] (Henaux, Samuel, Dusek, Fleskes, & Ip, 2012). The authors of the
Henaux et al. study asserted these findings show no difference between the two locations.
The wetlands of Sacramento Valley, California and Yolo Bypass, California are
designated urban areas in the California Business and Professions Code Section 19986(l).
Similar results to the Henaux et al. study were found in the Ito et al. (1995) study.
Ito et al. (1995) collected water samples (n = 103) from wetlands in Alaska and
analyzed them for the presence of avian influenza virus. For water samples collected
from wetlands proximal to Anchorage, Alaska, the detection rate for avian influenza virus
was [1/17 = 5.9%] and for wetlands proximal to Fairbanks, Alaska, the detection rate for
avian influenza virus was [0/5 = 0.0%] (Ito et al., 1995). According to the State of
Alaska, Department of Labor and Workforce Development (2010), Anchorage, Alaska is
considered an Urbanized Area and Fairbanks, Alaska is considered an Urban Cluster. The
remaining locations where Ito et al. collected water samples could not be determined is
assumed to be rural municipalities (non-Urbanized Areas or non-Urban Clusters). For
water samples collected from wetlands proximal to rural municipalities of Alaska, the
detection rate for avian influenza was [11/81 = 13.6%]. Similar results to the Henaux et
al. (2012) study were found in the Perez-Ramırez, et al. (2012) study.
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Perez-Ramırez, et al. (2012) collected water samples (n = 98) from wetlands in
predominantly urban areas of Spain and analyzed them for the presence of avian
influenza virus. The detection rate for avian influenza virus in the Perez-Ramırez, et al.
(2012) study was [0/98 = 0.0%]. Since the proportion of influenza A virus in rural and
urban ponds is unknown, findings of the Ito et al. study, the Henaux et al. (2012) study,
and the Perez-Ramırez, et al. study were used to support the sample size calculations for
this dissertation study. The likely estimate for the proportion of influenza A virus in
urban ponds were [13/717 = 1.8%]. The likely estimate for the proportion of influenza A
virus in urban ponds were [11/81 = 13.6%].
The sample size formula for number to estimate prevalence in a survey is: n =
(Zα/2+Zβ)2 * (p1(1-p1)+p2(1-p2)) / (p1-p2)2. Since the proportion of influenza A virus in
rural is likely estimated to be [1.8%, p1 = 0.018] and urban ponds is likely estimated to be
[13.6%, p2 = 0.136], the minimum sample size for each will need to be [n = 77, Z = 1.96,
precision (e) = ± 0.05]. Risk difference (RD), relative risk (RR), odds ratio (OR), and
Cohen’s g were reported posteriori.
RD, RR, and OR are common effect size indices reported for groups (the d
family) compared on dichotomous outcomes (Ellis, 2010). Cohen’s g [Cohen’s g = p –
0.5, where p estimates a population proportion] can be used to define the effect size for a
proportion (Furr, 2008). Effect size classes for Cohen’s g are: [small = 0.05, medium =
0.15, large = 0.25] (Ellis, 2010). Logistic regression was used in this study and the
regression coefficient was reported as a measure of effect size. Breaugh (2003) asserted
the regression coefficient can be interpreted as a measure of the effect size. Further, the
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regression coefficient reflects the expected change in the log of the odds associated with a
one unit change in the independent variable (Breaugh, 2003).
The alpha value were [alpha = 0.05] and power level were [power = 0.80] for this
study. The alpha value is the probability of making a false positive result (Type I errors)
(Motulsky, 1995). Hence, rejecting the null hypothesis when in fact, the null hypothesis
is true. [Alpha = 0.05] is selected to maintain continuity with the level of precision
chosen for the minimum sample size for a population unknown proportion [precision (e)
= ± 0.05]. The power value is a transformation [power = 1 – beta] of the probability of
making a false negative result (Type II error) (Motulsky, 1995). Hence, accepting the null
hypothesis when in fact, the null hypothesis is false. [Power = 0.80] is commonly used in
the literature (Forthofer, Lee, & Hernandez, 2007).
Since the samples will likely be under public or private ownership, a signed
Collection Site Contact Letter were offered and Letter of Cooperation were received
before any field analysis or water collection were conducted (see Appendices A and B for
templates of letters). Preliminary inquiry with local public officials to the acceptance of
the Letter of Cooperation and feasibility of water sample collection for this dissertation
study has been positive. The calculated total sample size (NCalc = 154) for this dissertation
study was exceeded. The actual collected samples size is (N = 182). Artificial
recirculating water ponds with an approximate surface area less than 900 square feet were
excluded.
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Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
The inclusion criteria of the study population were artificial recirculating water
ponds in the geographic locations of rural and urban Californian communities. The
geographical area was the state boundaries of California. Equal sample size from rural
and urban communities were attempted (n = 77). A representative sampling from each of
the 21 counties considered rural areas, and 37 counties considered metropolitan and not
rural in California by California Business and Professions Code Section 19986(l) were
attempted.
The methodology for characterization of influenza viruses has shown similarity
across the literature. Overarching methodologies include: virus detection by RT-PCR
(Poddar et al., 2002), virus isolation and characterization by allantoic cavities of
embryonic eggs (Fouchier, et al., 2005), infectivity studies using MDCK cell line (Brown
et al., 2009), nucleotide sequencing of the RNA genome (Yamamoto, et al., 2011), and
phylogenic analysis using BLAST available from GenBank (Fouchier, et al., 2005).
Water Sampling (Preanalytical Phase)
Water samples were collected as previously published in the U.S. EPA Field
Sampling Guidance Document #1225. A dip sampler for water collection was used. A dip
sampler is useful for situations where a sample is to be recovered from an outfall pipe or
along a pond bank where direct access is limited. The long handle on such a device
allows access from a discrete location so as not to disturb wildlife (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 1999). The water volume per sample was 200 ml. Other researchers
have collected 200 ml volume water samples for influenza studies.
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Zhang et al. (2011) collected 200-ml water samples from areas near the habitat of
migratory birds in East Dongting Lake, Yueyang City, Hunan Province for laboratory
analysis. The authors of the Zhang et al. study asserted the Dongting Lake wetland as an
important habitat and over-wintering area for East Asian migratory birds. From the 95
water samples collected, an H10N8 influenza A virus was isolated, whole genome
genetic sequenced, and pathogenicity investigated in mice and specific pathogen free
(SPF) White Leghorn Chickens (Zhang et al., 2011). Others have investigated the abiotic
environmental factors affecting avian influenza A virus persistence in aquatic habitats.
Brown et al. (2009) investigated the duration of infectivity for avian influenza
viruses representing a diversity of HA subtypes (H1 – H12) isolated from waterfowl
(Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes) over a range of pH, salinity, and
temperature conditions that are common in aquatic habitat environments utilized by these
wild aquatic birds. The findings of this study indicate the pH, temperature, and salinity-at
levels normally encountered in nature-can impact the ability of avian influenza A viruses
to remain infective in water (Brown et al., 2009).
In this dissertation, I tested the laboratory findings of the Brown et al. (2009)
study to artificial recirculating water ponds in the geographic locations of rural and urban
communities. The pH, salinity, and temperature conditions of water samples were
analyzed using an Oakton Multi-Parameter Tester 35 Series Model 35425-10 (Eutech
Instruments, Thermo Fisher Scientific, Huntington Beach, California) according to
manufacturer’s instructions. Approximate water pond surface areas were calculated using
a Carl Zeiss Victory 8 x 26 T* PFR (Carl Zeiss, Sports Optics Gmbh, Germany) laser
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rangefinder for X-axis and Y-axis measurements, or a GARMIN® eTrex model 20
(Garmin, Ltd.) handheld GPS device using the “Calculate Area” function, or Google
Earth estimated measurement function. Measurements of distance were taken along the
long and short axis of the body of water. Approximate surface area was calculated using
the formula for the area of an ellipse: Area = π(x/2)(y/2) where x = distance of long axis
of body of water, and y = distance of short axis of body of water, and π = 3.141592654.
Sampling procedures were as follows:
1. Determine the extent of the sampling effort, the sampling methods to be
employed, and which equipment and supplies are needed.
2. Obtain necessary sampling and monitoring equipment.
3. Decontaminate or preclean equipment, and ensure that it is in working order.
4. Prepare scheduling and coordinate with staff, clients, and regulatory agency, if
appropriate.
5. Provide confidentiality agreement and obtain release for data and sample
collection.
6. Perform a general site survey prior to site entry and evaluate for health and
safety.
7. Measure and calculate approximate surface area of body of water.
8. Use handheld GPS unit and handheld altimeter unit to identify and mark all
sampling locations. If required, the proposed locations may be adjusted based
onsite access, property boundaries, and surface obstructions.
9. Assemble the device in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.
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10. Extend the device to the sample location and collect the sample.
11. Retrieve the sampler and transfer the sample to the appropriate sample
container.
12. Approximately 200 ml of sample surface water were collected.
13. Transfer the sample(s) into suitable labeled sample containers.
14. Cap the container, put it in a Ziploc plastic bag and place it on ice in a cooler.
15. Perform pH, salinity, and water temperature tests.
16. Make observations for presence or absence of waterfowl (Anseriformes) and
shorebirds (Charadriiformes).
17. Make observations of location setting (park land, golf course, University
campus, business district, or other).
18. Record all pertinent data in the site notebook and on a field data sheet.
19. Complete the chain of custody form.
20. Attach custody seals to the cooler prior to shipment, as needed.
21. Decontaminate all sampling equipment prior to the collection of additional
samples.
Sample Preparation (Preanalytical Phase)
Sample integrity was maintained until received in the laboratory for processing.
Sample identification was maintained throughout the laboratory testing. Filtering of
samples removed particulate matter and other suspended contaminates. Evers et al.
(2007) studied the commercial preservative RNAlater (Qiagen) by evaluating against the
current method of cryo-freezing, and ethanol preservatives for influenza A virus samples.
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From the findings of the Evers et al. study, the authors asserted the commercial
preservative RNAlater held at ambient temperatures might be useful for the identification
of influenza A virus in samples collected from infected waterfowl.
Materials required:


Filter paper of 0.4 μm pore or smaller



250ml centrifuge tubes



Microvials



QIAamp® Viral RNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN® Cat#52904 or 52906)



RNAlater RNA Stabilizer reagent (Qiagen)

Sampling procedures are as follows:
1. Samples were filtered using standard grade laboratory filter paper of 0.4 μm
pore or smaller.
2. The filtered sample were poured into 250 ml centrifuge tubes and
concentrated at 10,000 rpm for 20 minutes at 4°C using a Sorvall SL-1500
Super-Lite centrifuge rotor or equivalent.
3. Pour off supernatant, vortex, and transfer the remaining pellet by clean pipette
to a polypropylene microvial. This was the influenza virus stock for the
hemagglutination assay.
4. Add 100 μL of RNAlater RNA Stabilizer reagent (Qiagen) to 100 μL of
influenza virus stock in a separate polypropylene microvial for viral RNA
extraction.
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5. Proceed to extract viral RNA using QIAamp® Viral RNA Mini Kit
(QIAGEN® Cat#52904 or 52906) following manufacturer recommended
protocol.
6. Store the extracted viral nucleic acid elute samples according to
manufacturer’s instructions.
7. Retain unused influenza virus stock (from Step 3) for Hemagglutination assay
(infectivity assay).
8. Record all pertinent data in the laboratory notebook.
Hemagglutination Assay (Analytical Phase)
Virus isolation is a highly sensitive and useful technique for the identification of
influenza viruses in the environment (Szretter, Balish, & Katz, 2006). Szretter, Balish,
and Katz (2006) asserted influenza viruses are quantified either by a “unit” of
hemagglutination, which is not a measure of an absolute amount of virus but is an
operational unit dependent on the method used for the hemagglutination assay titration or
plaque assay. Hemagglutination is the ability to bind red blood cells (Szretter et al.,
2006). Szretter et al. asserted hemagglutination is a property of all influenza viruses that
can be utilized as a rapid assay for determining the presence of virus in samples. MDCK
cells (ATCC# CCL-34) are the preferred host for the isolation and characterization of
influenza A and B viruses, but not influenza C viruses due to the incompatibility of sialic
acid moieties on the cell surface with the viral receptor specificity (Szretter et al., 2006).
Other researchers have used hemagglutination MDCK plaque assay to investigate
influenza virus infectivity. Brown et al. (2009) studied MDCK cell line to determine
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endpoint titers for infectivity of twelve low pathogenic avian influenza viruses across
various pH, salinities, and temperatures. Faust et al. (2009) investigated the biological
effect of filter-feeding bivalves to remove influenza viruses from water and infectivity
was investigated. The researchers of these studies reported endpoint titers for infectivity
measured at 100% monolayer destruction of the MDCK cells (Brown et al., 2009; Faust
et al., 2009). In this dissertation study, I utilized the hemagglutination properties of
influenza A viruses on MDCK cells to characterize infectivity in concentrated water
samples.
Materials:


Phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) containing potassium



Influenza virus stock (concentrated pond water sample)



MDCK cells



96-well U-bottom microtiter plate (Nunc)

Procedure:
1. Pipet 50 μl PBS into wells 2 through 12 across a 96-well U-bottom plate
2. Pipet 100 μl influenza virus stock into the first column of the 96-well plate.
3. Perform a two-fold dilution series across the 96-well plate by transferring 50
μl between wells, disposing of the final 50 μl from the last well.
4. Add 50 μl MDCK cells to all wells. Tap the plate gently to mix.
5. Approximately 5 ml MDCK cells were needed per 96-well plate used in this
assay.

163
6. Incubate 96-well plate for 60 min at room temperature (24◦ to 27◦C). Avian
red blood cells in V-well microtiter plates require 30-min incubation at room
temperature, whereas mammalian red blood cells require a U-well microtiter
plate with a 60-min incubation at room temperature.
7. Observe endpoint of agglutination and record titer per 50 μl of sample.
8. Red blood cells will settle to the bottom of the U-bottom well in negative
samples, while red blood cells will agglutinate in positive samples. The
endpoint should be read as the last well showing complete agglutination.
9. Dispose of materials in an appropriate biological waste container.
10. Record all pertinent data in the laboratory notebook.
Real Time RT-PCR (Analytical Phase)
Reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) is a powerful
technique for the identification of influenza virus genomes (World Health Organization,
2007). A constellation of studies have targeted the M gene sequence of the influenza A
viral genome by RT-PCR as an indicator of influenza A virus positivity (Harmon et al.
2010; Lee et al., 2012; Magnard et al.,1999; Perez-Ramırez, et al., 2012). In the analytical
phase of this dissertation study, I used real time RT-PCR. Using real time RT-PCR
allows for the detection of products as amplification is ongoing, allowing quantification
(World Health Organization, 2007). The analytical phase of this dissertation followed
World Health Organization Real-time RT-PCR Protocol 2 for influenza A virus (H5N1)
detection.
Materials required:
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QIAGEN® QuantiTect®, Probe RT-PCR kit (#204443):



2 x QuantiTect®, Probe RT-PCR Master Mix



QuantiTect®, RT Mix



RNase free Water



Primers



Probe



Equipment: Chromo-4 ™ Real-time PCR Detection system (BioRad)

Primers and probes:
Real-time PCR is performed by One-step RT-PCR using TaqMan® probe
Gene
Clade
Primers sequences
Probe sequences

Gene
Clade
Primers sequences
Probe sequences

Gene
Clade
Primers sequences
Probe sequences

Type A (M)
1, 2, 3
MP-39-67For CCMAGGTCGAAACGTAYGTTCTCTCTATC (10 μM)
MP-183-153Rev TGACAGRATYGGTCTTGTCTTTAGCCAYTCCA (10 μM)
MP-96-75ProbeAs FAM-ATYTCGGCTTTGAGGGGGCCTG-MGB (5pmol/μl)

H5
1, 2, 3
H5HA-205-227v2-For CGATCTAGAYGGGGTGAARCCTC (10 μM)
H5HA-326-302v2-Rev CCTTCTCCACTATGTANGACCATTC (10 μM)
H5-Probe-239-RVa FAM-AGCCAYCCAGCTACRCTACA-MGB (5pmol/μl)
H5-Probe-239-RVb FAM-AGCCATCCCGCAACACTACA-MGB (5pmol/μl)

N1
1, 2, 3
N1-For-474-502-v2 TAYAACTCAAGGTTTGAGTCTGTYGCTTG (10 μM)
N1-Rev-603-631-v2 ATGTTRTTCCTCCAACTCTTGATRGTGTC (10 μM)
N1-Probe-501-525-v3 FAM-TCAGCRAGTGCYTGCCATGATGGCAMGB
(5pmol/μl)

Real time RT-PCR procedures are as follows:
Extract viral RNA from clinical specimen with QIAamp® Viral RNA Mini Kit or
equivalent extraction kit according to manufacturer’s instructions.
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Reaction Mixture:


2x QuantiTect® Probe RT-PCR Master Mix 12.5 μl



Forward Primer (10μM) 1.5 μl



Reverse Primer (10μM) 1.5 μl



*Probe (5pmol/μl) 0.5 μl



QuantiTect® RT Mix 0.25 μl



RNase free Water 3.75 μl



Total 20 μl

*For the reaction of H5 detection, a mixture of two probes is used.


H5-Probe-239-RVa 0.375 μl



H5-Probe-239-RVb 0.125 μl

Procedure:
1. Dispense 20 μl of the reaction mixture to each RT-PCR reaction plate.
2. Add 5 μl sample RNA to the reaction mixture. For control reactions, use 5 μl
of distilled water for negative control, and 5 μl of appropriate viral RNAs for
positive control.
3. Program the thermal cycler according to the program outlined in below.
4. Start the Real-time RT-PCR program while RT-PCR reaction plates are still
on ice.
5. Wait until the thermal cycler has reached at 50 °C.
6. Then place RT-PCR reaction plates in the thermal cycler.
7. Record all pertinent data in the laboratory notebook.
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RT-PCR temperature-cycling conditions:
1. Reverse transcription 50°C 30min.
2. Denaturation 95°C 15min.
3. PCR 94°C 15sec.
4. 56°C 1min. [45 cycles]
Record all pertinent data in the laboratory notebook.
Genetic Sequencing
Gene sequencing or nucleotide sequencing, and phylogenetic analysis of isolated
influenza A viruses has been a source of data from where researchers have hypothesized
the origins and sources of the components of the viral RNA sequences. Yamamoto, et al.
(2011) investigated fecal samples collected from Siberian migratory waterfowl for the
presence of influenza viral H5 HA and N1 NA genes. Nulceotide sequencing was
performed on samples positive for H5 HA and N1 NA genes (Yamamoto, et al., 2011).
The authors of the Yamamoto, et al. study concluded the results of nucleotide sequencing
indicate highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus had not become dominant in the
nesting lakes of Siberia prior to this study.
As aforementioned in chapter 2, Zhang et al. (2011) collected 200 ml water
samples from areas near the habitat of migratory birds in East Dongting Lake, Yueyang
City, Hunan Province for laboratory analysis. The phylogenic analysis of the isolated
H10N8 virus indicated all the eight gene segments were of aquatic avian origin and
belonged to a Eurasian lineage (Zhang et al., 2011). The authors of the Zhang et al. study
concluded the H10N8 subtypes of avian viruses might pose a potential threat to mammals
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and multiple amino acid substitutions are liklely to be involved in the adaptation of
H10N8 influenza virus to mice.
As previously detailed in chapter 2, Fouchier, et al. (2005) isolated influenza A
viruses from black-headed gill (Larus ridibundus) in Sweden. These isolated influenza A
viruses could not be classified to the 15 known HA subtypes. The authors hypothesized
the HA of the black-headed gull viruses represent a new HA subtype (Fouchier, et al.,
2005). The researchers of the Fouchier, et al. study applied nucleotide sequence analysis,
phylogenic analysis, and double immunodiffusion assay methods to the 10 samples from
black-headed gulls. The results of the assay methods were further analyzed with BLAST
available from GenBank (Fouchier, et al., 2005). Fouchier, et al. asserted the results
provide strong evidence for the classification of the HA of the Swedish black-headed gull
virus as H16.
The review of the literature about the topic of the current avian influenza A
(H5N1) pandemic revealed the seriousness and global concern as a major pandemic
threat to humans. As of date, the current WHO phase of pandemic alert for avian
influenza A (H5N1) is: ALERT (World Health Organization, 2013). The potential for
further spread of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus and the high case fatality rate warrants
further surveillance. For these reasons, I investigated the burden of avian influenza A
(H5N1) in recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical locations.
For this dissertation study, I utilized Laragen Sequencing and Genotyping
Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California) for influenza A virus (H5N1) gene
sequencing. Water samples positive for hemagglutination properties of influenza A
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viruses on MDCK cells and positive for influenza A virus by real time RT-PCR
analytical phase were submitted for H5N1 gene sequencing . All other samples were
excluded. All pertinent data were recorded in the laboratory notebook. The results of the
avian influenza A (H5N1) gene sequencing were compared to the avian influenza A
(H5N1) database repository at GenBank.
Data Analysis Plan
In this dissertation study, I upheld society’s trust that scientific research results
are an honest and accurate reflection of a researcher’s work (National Academy of
Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine of the National
Academies, 2010). This manuscript includes an outline for a data analysis plan examining
the burden of influenza A virus in recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban
geographical locations. The primary data analysis were a cross-sectional approach
comparing proportions, bivariate and multivariate logistic regression analysis of
recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical locations. The independent
variables included: geographic community location (rural or urban), GPS location
(latitude and longitude), altitude, approximate water pond surface area. The dependent
variables included: influenza A virus detection, influenza A virus infectivity endpoint
titer, influenza A virus (H5N1) characterization. Variables evaluated as possible
mediators and moderators included: water pH at collection, water salinity at collection,
water temperature at collection, and presence or absence of waterfowl (Anseriformes) and
shorebirds (Charadriiformes).

169
The statistical analysis software was IBM SPSS Statistics 21 and Microsoft Office
Excel 2007. Geographical graphing and mapping software were Google Earth. Data
integrity was maintained by recording data and observations with ink into field notebook
and laboratory notebook. Hand written entries were transferred or transcribed to
Microsoft Office Excel 2007 Spreadsheets. All electronic data had digital backup and
was password protected. Since I collected primary data, data cleaning and screening
procedures were not necessary.
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Table 1
Analysis Matrix for Influenza A Virus in Ponds Study
Study objective

Concept

1.1

1.2

2.1

Proportion and
probability of
influenza A virus
in geographical
locations
Infectivity
influenza A virus
in geographical
locations
Regression
analysis of factors
contributing to
influenza A virus
presence

3

Geospatial
trending of
influenza A virus
Regression
analysis of factors
contributing to
influenza A virus
infectivity

4

H5N1 gene
sequencing and
identification

2.2

Data source

Pond water
analysis by real
time RT-PCR

Level of
measurement

Analysis procedure
Proportions,
relative risk,
probabilities, odds,
and odds ratio

Pond water
analysis by
infectivity assay

Categorical Quantitative
Categorical,
Interval scale
(titer) Quantitative

Pond water
analysis by real
time RT-PCR,
field research data

Categorical,
interval Quantitative

Field research data
(GPS), Google
Earth mapping

Nominal Quantitative

Multiple logistic
regression
Mapping,
frequencies,
means, percent
description

Interval scale Quantitative

Multiple linear
regression

Categorical Quantitative

Frequencies,
means, percent
description

Pond water
analysis by
infectivity assay,
field research data
Pond water
analysis by real
time RT-PCR,
gene sequencing
by commercial
laboratory

Frequencies,
means, percent
description
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Research Question Analysis
In this study the proportion and probability of the presence of influenza A virus
were investigated in recirculating artificial water ponds in rural and urban geographical
locations. Rural ponds were viewed as one population and urban ponds as another
population. To approach (R1), the underlying test statistics were binomial distribution.
The binomial distribution refers to random variables with two outcomes (Forthofer et al.,
2007). For the research question (R1), the outcome variables were influenza A virus
detection, influenza A virus infectivity endpoint titer, and influenza A virus (H5N1)
characterization. The independent variables were the geographical location of the
recirculating artificial water pond sampling: rural or urban community. Independent
variables were coded [0 = rural community, 1 = urban community].
The statistical analysis examined the difference between the two proportions
(rural and urban communities), the relative risk, probabilities, odds, and odds ratio of
influenza A virus detection in rural and urban community recirculating artificial water
ponds. Interpretation of the findings included 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for
difference between the two proportions, relative risk, and odds ratio. Influenza A virus
detection were coded [0 = negative, 1 = positive]. The statistical analyses also included
the binomial distribution of the dependent ordinal variables: influenza A virus infectivity
endpoint titer, and influenza A virus (H5N1) characterization. For the statistical analysis,
the results of the hemagglutination titration levels-for all samples (+) positive for the
influenza A virus M gene sequence-were transformed to integer values using the binary
logarithm [log2 (n)] (i.e. titration level 1:16 = log2 (16) = 4). To account for negative

172
hemagglutination (integer transformation = 0), the value of 1 is added to each integer
value. Thus, the mathematical transformation is of the form: log2 (n) + 1 (i.e. titration
level 1:16 = log2 (16) + 1 = 5).
To approach (R2), the underlying test statistic was logistic regression. Logistic
regression is a method for examining the relationship between a dependent variable with
two levels and one or more independent variables. Forward method stepwise logistic
regression was used to test (R2). Field (2009) asserted that stepwise logistic regression to
be more appropriate for research situations where no previous research exists. Presently,
no known research is underway to investigate and compare the proportion of influenza A
virus in artificial rural and urban ponds. Additionally, Field asserted that forward
stepwise method is more likely to exclude predictors involved in suppressor effects.
However, the forward stepwise method runs a higher risk of making a Type II error. For
this research question, Type II error is favorable over a Type I error. A Type I error may
significantly mislead future research, whereas a Type II error may have less influence. To
evaluate how the model overall fits the data, the likelihood ratio test (Sig. p< 0.05) , the
Wald statistic, and the odds ratio [Exp(B)] were included in the analysis.
For research question (R2), the dependent variable was influenza A virus
detection. Influenza A virus detection were coded [0 = negative, 1 = positive]. The
independent variables were the geographical location of the recirculating artificial water
pond sampling (rural or urban community), latitude and longitudinal coordinates,
altitude, and estimate surface area, and presence or absence of waterfowl (Anseriformes)
or shorebirds (Charadriiformes) at the time of sample collection. Independent variable
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geographical location were coded [0 = rural community, 1 = urban community]. The
independent variables latitudinal coordinates, longitudinal coordinates, and estimate
surface area were separate continuous variables. The independent variable altitude were
transformed into 500 ft. elevation increments. The independent variable presence or
absence of waterfowl or shorebirds were coded [0 = not present, 1 = present].
Google Earth mapping software were utilized in attempt to identify geospatial
trending of positive and negative influenza A virus samples. Global positioning system
(GPS) location of samples were uploaded to Google Earth as waypoints. The waypoints
were identified by sample number. A multicolor-code system were used to indicate
influenza A virus presence for each sample number. A map of sample collection across
California were produced using this data. Mapping of the influenza A virus status of each
sample number is a method of geospatial trending of influenza A virus distribution across
California.
To approach (R3), multiple linear regression analysis was used. Multiple linear
regression is a method for examining the relation between one normally distributed
dependent variable and more than one continuous independent variable (Forthofer et al.,
2007). Interpretation of the findings included the t-statistics test. If the significance of the
t-statistic is less than 0.05, then it were assumed that b is significantly different from 0,
therefore the predictor makes a significant contribution to predicting the outcome (Field,
2009). For research question (R3), the dependent ordinal variable was influenza A virus
infectivity endpoint titer. For the statistical analysis, the results of the hemagglutination
titration levels-for all samples (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence-
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were transformed to integer values using the binary logarithm [log2 (n)] (i.e. titration level
1:16 = log2 (16) = 4). To account for negative hemagglutination (integer transformation =
0), the value of 1 is added to each integer value. Thus, the mathematical transformation is
of the form: log2 (n) + 1 (i.e. titration level 1:16 = log2 (16) + 1 = 5). The independent
continuous variables were water temperature, water pH, and water salinity. The data
were stratified by geographical location. Geographical location were coded [0 = rural
community, 1 = urban community].
To approach (R4), samples positive for influenza A virus (H5N1) by real-time
RT-PCR were submitted for gene sequencing analysis to Laragen Sequencing and
Genotyping Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California). The influenza A virus
(H5N1) gene sequencing results were compared to the influenza A viral gene sequence
database GenBank (National Institute of Health genetic sequence database).
Threats to Validity
There are two threats to the external validity of this study. The first threat to
external validity is centered to the theoretical framework of this dissertation. The
theoretical framework for this study were based on the hypotheses proposed by Webster
et al. (1992) and others that (a) migratory waterfowl are the natural reserve of influenza
viruses, and (b) water-borne transmission of influenza virus occurs between migratory
waterfowl and domestic waterfowl. The inclusion criteria of the study population were
artificial recirculating water ponds in the geographic locations of rural and urban
Californian communities. The geographical area was the state boundaries of California.
Thus, the findings of this dissertation are limited to geographical locations along the
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migratory flyways of the waterfowl within the boundaries of California. To address this
threat to the external validity of this dissertation study, the sampling and data analysis
plan were presented in a fashion so the study may be reproduced accurately by others
using the same or different geographical locations.
The second threat to external validity is a result of the inclusion criteria.
Recirculating artificial water ponds require mechanical equipment for recirculation. This
study does not include the type or design of the mechanical equipment used for
recirculation as an independent variable. Thus, the mechanical equipment used for
recirculation cannot be evaluated as a mediator or moderator of the outcome variables of
this dissertation study. However, estimated surface area of the recirculating artificial
water ponds as an independent variable may be of significant interest to future studies
seeking to investigate factors that associate to the burden of influenza A virus at the
human-animal interface in communities.
The primary data collection of dissertation study is heavily weighted by
laboratory instrumentation and molecular analysis. There are two threats to the internal
validity of this dissertation study: instrumentation and laboratory assays. Firstly,
inaccuracy of the instrument used for this study may systematically alter the data.
Secondly, inaccuracy of the laboratory assays may fail to accurately detect influenza A
virus. To address the possible inaccuracy of the instrumentation, all samples will use the
same instrumentation. Thus, errors, if identified, may be corrected across all samples
equally. To address the possible inaccuracy of the laboratory assays, positive and
negative control samples were processed simultaneously as study samples. The positive
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and negative control influenza A virus samples have not been determined. Threats to
statistical conclusion validity have not been identified.
Ethical Procedures
This dissertation study was conducted in an ethical manner. I submitted an
application to the Walden University IRB for approval to conduct research and I did not
collect any data until Walden University IRB approval was received. The IRB approval
number for this dissertation research study is: 04-16-14-0293110. The populations were
artificial recirculating water ponds in the geographic locations of rural and urban
communities in California. Since some of the samples were under public or private
ownership, a signed Collection Site Contact Letter was offered and Letter of Cooperation
was received before any field analysis or water collection were conducted (see
Appendices A and B for templates of letters). Environmental water sampling underscored
the research design of this study. Therefore, the research adhered to the Code of Ethics
and Standards of Practice for Environmental Professionals. The objectives of
Environmental Professionals are to conduct their personal and professional lives and
activities in an ethical manner (National Association of Environmental Professionals,
n.d). The Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice for Environmental Professionals are:
Creed
The objectives of an Environmental Professional are:
1. To recognize and attempt to reconcile societal and individual human needs
with responsibility for physical, natural, and cultural systems.
2. To promote and develop policies, plans, activities and projects that achieve
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complementary and mutual support between natural and man-made, and
present and future components of the physical, natural and cultural
environment.
Ethics
As an Environmental Professional I will:
1. Be personally responsible for the validity of all data collected, analyses
performed, or plans developed by me or under my direction. I was responsible
and ethical in my professional activities.
2. Encourage research, planning, design, management and review of activities in
a scientifically and technically objective manner. I will incorporate the best
principles of the environmental sciences for the mitigation of environmental
harm and enhancement of environmental quality.
3. Not condone misrepresentation of work I have performed or that was
performed under my direction.
4. Examine all of my relationships or actions, which could be legitimately
interpreted as a conflict of interest by clients, officials, the public or peers. In
any instance where I have financial or personal interest in the activities with
which they are directly or indirectly involved, I will make a full disclosure of
that interest to my employer, client, or other affected parties.
5. Not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation or discrimination.
6. Not accept fees wholly or partially contingent on the client’s desired result
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where that desired result conflicts with my professional judgment.
Guidance for Practice as an Environmental Professional
As an Environmental Professional I will:
1. Encourage environmental planning to begin in the earliest stages of project
conceptualization.
2. Recognize that total environmental management involves the consideration of
all environmental factors including: technical, economical, ecological, and
sociopolitical and their relationships.
3. Incorporate the best principle of design and environmental planning when
recommending measures to reduce environmental harm and enhance
environmental quality.
4. Conduct my analysis, planning, design and review my activities primarily in
subject areas for which I am qualified, and shall encourage and recognize that
participation of other professionals in subject areas where I am less
experienced. I shall utilize and participate in interdisciplinary teams wherever
practical to determine impacts, define and evaluate all reasonable alternatives
to proposed actions, and assess short-term versus long-term productivity with
and without the project or action.
5. Seek common, adequate, and sound technical grounds for communication
with and respect for the contributions of other professionals in developing and
reviewing policies, plans, activities and projects.
6. Determine the policies, plans, activities or projects in which I am involved are
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consistent with all governing laws, ordinances, guidelines, plans and policies
to the best of my knowledge and ability.
7. Encourage public participation at the earliest feasible time in an open and
productive atmosphere.
8. Conduct my professional activities in a manner that ensures consideration of
technically and economically feasible alternatives.
Encourage Development of the Profession
As an Environmental Professional I will:
1. Assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of my profession.
2. Encourage education and research and the development of useful technical
information relating to the environmental field.
3. Be prohibited from lobbying in the name of the National Association of
Environmental Professionals.
Advertise and present my services in a manner that avoids the use of material and
methods that may bring discredit to the profession.
The data collected were confidential. The statistical analysis software was IBM
SPSS Statistics 21 and Microsoft Office Excel 2007. Geographical graphing and mapping
software were Google Earth. Data integrity was maintained by recording data and
observations with ink into field notebook and laboratory notebook. Hand written entries
were transferred or transcribed to Microsoft Office Excel 2007 Spreadsheets. All
electronic data had digital backup and was password protected. Since I collected primary
data, data cleaning and screening procedures were not necessary. The raw data will be
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retained for no less than 60 months and no longer than 120 months from completion of
this dissertation study. At the end of the retention period, the field notebooks, laboratory
notebooks, digital data, and digital backup data will be destroyed or deleted.
I claim no conflict of interest. The Biological Safety Level 2 laboratory where
sample preparation, hemagglutination, and real-time RT-PCR assays were performed is
located at the California State University Channel Islands, Camarillo CA campus. I am
employed as a paid part-time lecturer at this University.
Summary
This baseline study of the proportion of influenza A virus in urban and rural
community settings resulted in knowledge and biological data that may be of significant
interest at the human-animal interface. Artificial water ponds in rural and urban
communities are sites of the human-animal interface. Several studies investigated the
presence or persistence of influenza viruses to natural waterfowl wetlands (Austin &
Hinshaw,1984; Ferro, et al.,2010; Lang et al., 2008). The purpose of this quantitative
study was to extend the previous environmental virology research of influenza in natural
waterfowl wetlands to rural and urban communities. The dissertation study method was
quantitative using a cross-sectional design. In this quantitative dissertation study, I
collected and analyzed primary data. A convenience sampling approach was used. The
geographical area was the state boundaries of California. Equal sample sizes from rural
and urban Californian communities were attempted.
The methodology for characterization of influenza viruses has shown similarity
across the literature. The methodologies applied in this dissertation are aligned to the
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published literature. These methodologies include: virus detection by RT-PCR (Poddar et
al., 2002), infectivity studies using MDCK cell line (Brown et al., 2009), nucleotide
sequencing of the RNA genome (Yamamoto, et al., 2011), and phylogenic analysis using
BLAST available from GenBank (Fouchier, et al., 2005).
The primary data analysis was a cross-sectional approach to compare proportions,
and bivariate and multivariate regression analysis of samples from recirculating artificial
ponds in rural and urban geographical locations. The independent variables included:
geographic community location (rural or urban), GPS location (latitude and longitude),
altitude, approximate water pond surface area. The dependent variables included:
influenza A virus detection, influenza A virus infectivity endpoint titer, influenza A virus
(H5N1) characterization. Variables evaluated as possible mediators and moderators
included: water pH at collection, water salinity at collection, water temperature at
collection, and presence or absence of waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds
(Charadriiformes).
The results of the data analysis were presented in table format, APA format
interpretation, graphs, and maps. The organization of the results of data analysis is
aligned to the research questions. The results of the data analysis may be of significant
interest to the scientific community.
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Chapter 4: Results
The “Spanish” influenza H1N1 pandemic of 1918–1919, which caused
approximately 50 million deaths worldwide, remains an ominous warning to public
health (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006). Since then, new subtypes of human influenza A
viruses have been detected at various times: in 1957, the H2N2 subtype (Asian influenza)
replaced the H1N1 subtype; in 1968, the H3N2 subtype (Hong Kong virus) appeared; and
in 1977, the H1N1 virus reappeared (Webster et al., 1992). Influenza disease emergence
data are collected year-round, but economic strain on global public health to prevent and
treat human influenza outbreaks is enormous. Therefore, it is imperative to identify
potential sources of the virus to help minimize outbreak occurrence.
There are gaps in knowledge about the association between molecular structure,
epidemiologic and clinical characteristics, and the impact of ecological and other
contextual aspects of influenza viruses. Gaps in understanding the role of the physical
and biogeochemical environment as an integral part of the influenza A viral transmission
also exist (Lang et al., 2008). More importantly, gaps in knowledge about the burden of
influenza A virus in rural and urban community settings remain present. IRAT is
expected to prompt additional studies to address these key gaps in the knowledge (Trock
et al., 2012).
The problem in this study was that public health scientists have been battling
emerging human influenza diseases with tactile and reactionary methods because there
was a lack of knowledge and data at the human-animal interface. This baseline study of
the proportion of influenza A virus in urban and rural community settings may provide
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knowledge and biological data of significant interest at the human-animal interface. This
biological data may be of significant interest for the development of IRAT.
Research Design and Rationale
Presently, no known research is underway to investigate and compare the
proportion of influenza A virus in recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban
geographical locations. A review of current literature did not identify any other studies
that attempted to collect influenza A virus data from artificial water ponds in rural or
urban communities. Several studies investigated the presence or persistence of influenza
viruses to natural waterfowl wetlands (Austin & Hinshaw,1984; Ferro, et al.,2010; Lang
et al., 2008). The purpose of this quantitative study is to extend the previous
environmental virology research of influenza in natural waterfowl wetlands to rural and
urban communities.
For this quantitative dissertation study, I collected and analyzed primary data. The
epidemiological triangle provided the framework for the primary data collected. The
epidemiological triangle has three vertices: host, agent, and environment. The host is the
organism harboring the disease. For influenza disease, the reservoir hosts are migratory
waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes; Franklin et al., 2011). The
agents were the influenza A viruses. The environments were the natural and artificial
habitats where the hosts are found.
The independent environmental variables of this study were the geographical
locations of the artificial water ponds and geochemical properties of the artificial water
pond samples. The geographical location data included rural or urban community, latitude
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and longitudinal coordinates, altitude, and approximate water pond surface area. The
geochemical properties of the artificial water pond sample measure included pH, salinity,
and temperature. Additionally, the presence or absence of waterfowl at the time of sample
collection was included as an independent host variable. The dependent agent variables
were influenza A viruses. Influenza A virus data included detection for M gene by real
time RT-PCR using World Health Organization recommended primer sequences,
infectivity by hemagglutination assay using MDCK cell line, and nucleotide sequencing
for H5N1 influenza A virus using World Health Organization recommended primer
sequences at Laragen Sequencing and Genotyping Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver
City, California).
The human-animal interface is recognized as a complex but critical juncture to
which new paradigms are emerging (World Health Organization, 2011). The aquatic
virus reservoir is a human-animal interface. Franklin et al. (2011) suggested aquatic virus
reservoirs give rise to indirect transmission, which would alter the transmission
dynamics, beyond just direct interactions between infectious and susceptible individuals.
The quantitative research design of this dissertation was intended to investigate aquatic
virus reservoirs as a human-animal interface. Further, the quantitative design of this
dissertation addressed the following research questions.
Research Questions
R1: Is there a difference in the burden of influenza A virus in rural ponds
compared to urban ponds?
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H01: The burden of influenza A virus in community ponds has no association to
geographical location.
Ha1: The burden of influenza A virus in community ponds is associated to
geographical location.
In this study the proportion and probability of the presence of influenza A virus
was investigated in recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical
locations. Rural ponds were viewed as one population and urban ponds as another
population. The dependent agent variables were influenza A viruses.
R2: Is there an association between geographic location, altitude, estimated
surface area and observed presence of waterfowl, and the proportion of influenza A virus
in rural ponds compared to urban ponds?
H02: There is no association between geographic location, altitude, estimated
surface area and observed presence of waterfowl, and the proportion of influenza A virus
in rural ponds compared to urban ponds.
Ha2: There is an association between geographic location, altitude, estimated
surface area and observed presence of waterfowl, and the proportion of influenza A virus
in rural ponds compared to urban ponds.
In this study, rural community ponds were viewed as one population and urban
community ponds as another population. The comparison of these two populations
included proportion of influenza A virus(s), latitude and longitudinal coordinates,
altitude, and approximate water pond surface area, and the presence or absence of
waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes) at the time of sample
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collection. These factors were included as an independent environment and host
variables. The dependent agent variables are influenza A viruses.
R3: Is there an association between water pH, salinity, or water temperature and
influenza A virus infectivity in rural and urban water ponds?
H03: There is no association between water pH, salinity, or water temperature and
influenza A virus infectivity in rural and urban water ponds.
Ha3: There is an association between water pH, salinity, or water temperature and
influenza A virus infectivity in rural and urban water ponds.
In this dissertation study, I investigated if the findings of the Brown et al. (2009)
study were consistent in rural and urban community pond samples. The geochemical
properties of the artificial water pond sample measure included pH, salinity, and
temperature. The dependent agent variable was infectivity of influenza A viruses.
R4: Are H5N1 influenza A viral subtypes detected in the sample of rural and
urban ponds novel nucleotide sequences or have the nucleotide sequences been
previously identified elsewhere?
H04: The H5N1 influenza A viral subtypes detected in the sample of rural and
urban ponds are not novel nucleotide sequences and the nucleotide sequences have been
previously identified elsewhere.
Ha4: The H5N1 influenza A viral subtypes detected in the sample of rural and
urban ponds are novel nucleotide sequences and the nucleotide sequences have not been
previously identified elsewhere.
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In this study, water samples were collected directly from rural and urban ponds.
World Health Organization recommended real time RT-PCR primers were used for
influenza A virus H5N1 nucleotide sequencing. The laboratory analysis for the presence
of influenza A virus and influenza A virus infectivity were conducted in a biosafety level
2 laboratory at the California State University Channel Islands campus. The analysis for
the presence of influenza A virus used commercially available influenza A/B viral real
time RT-PCR detection kits suitable for water analysis. Water samples positive for H5N1
influenza A viral strains were submitted for nucleotide sequencing analysis to Laragen
Sequencing and Genotyping Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California). The
H5N1 influenza A virus nucleotide sequencing results were compared to the influenza A
viral gene sequence database GenBank (National Institute of Health genetic sequence
database) using the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) BLAST.
Organization of the Chapter
This chapter is organized in a manner to present the data and research findings in
a clear and understandable format. Tables and figures are included in this manuscript to
provide the reader with a visual understanding of the data and data analysis. Following
the above introductory sections, the constraints and discrepancies of the research are
presented. This section is followed by the descriptive statistics of the data and then the
analysis of the data pertaining to each research question. For the descriptive statistics
section; the field research and laboratory research data analysis is presented in three
subsections. The subsections begin with the overall statewide sample data, followed by
the urban counties’ sample data, and then the rural counties’ sample data. Following the
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descriptive statistics are the analyses of the field research and laboratory research data, as
it pertains to each research question. These sections are followed by a chapter summary
of the findings of this dissertation research study.
Data Collection
Time and Resource Constraints
Applied environmental studies can be classified as baseline, monitoring, or impact
studies (Green, 1979). This dissertation is a baseline environmental study. Green (1979)
asserted a baseline study is one in which data are collected and analyzed for the purpose
of defining the present state of the biological community, the environment, or both (p.
68). In this dissertation study, I attempted to define the present state of the biological
community of recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical locations in
California. The temperate climate of California did not pose seasonal constraints.
However, to define the present state of the biological community, a cross-sectional
sampling approach was used. To limit threats to the internal validity of the study, pond
water samples were collected over the shortest time period, as possible. Field research
and water sample collection for this study were conducted from June 15, 2014 through
August 18, 2014. The laboratory water sample processing and analysis for this study
were conducted from June 17, 2014 through September 4, 2014. There were no resource
contraints apparent.
Discrepancies in Data Collection from the Planned
Unexpectedly, the weather and natural disasters in California had a negative effect
on field research and water sample collection. As previously noted, field research and
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water sample collection for this study were conducted from June 15, 2014 through
August 18, 2014. I attempted to collect an equal sample size from rural and urban
communities; a representative sampling from each of the 21 counties considered rural
areas, and 37 counties considered metropolitan and not rural in California by California
Business and Professions Code Section 19986(l). However, the severe drought conditions
in California resulted in a limited the number of available artificial recirculating water
ponds for sampling. Furthermore, the wildfires in Northern California during the time
frame of the field research and data collection made several of the planned pond water
locations unsafe for travel and field research. As shown in Table 1 only a representative
sampling from 14 counties considered rural areas (NRural = 82), and 25 counties
considered metropolitan and not rural (NUrban = 100) in California by California Business
and Professions Code Section 19986(l) was achieved. Discrepancies in data collection for
this study were not only limited to field research and water sample collection.
Discrepancies also occurred during the laboratory data collection process.
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Table 2
Water Sample Collection by County

County
name
Alameda
Alpine
Amador
Butte
Calaveras
Colusa
Contra
Costa
Del Norte
El Dorado
Fresno
Glenn
Humboldt
Imperial
Inyo
Kern
Kings
Lake
Lassen
Los Angeles
Madera
Marin
Mariposa
Mendocino
Merced
Modoc
Mono
Monterey
Napa
Nevada

Code
Section
19986(l)
designation
URBAN
RURAL
RURAL
URBAN
RURAL
RURAL

Number
of water
samples
collected
0
0
2
1
1
4

URBAN
RURAL
URBAN
URBAN

0
0
0
4

RURAL
RURAL
URBAN
RURAL
URBAN
URBAN
RURAL
RURAL
URBAN
URBAN
URBAN
RURAL
RURAL
URBAN
RURAL
RURAL
URBAN
URBAN
RURAL

2
0
5
7
3
2
0
2
5
3
0
1
0
0
13
4
6
0
15

County name
Orange
Placer
Plumas
Riverside
Sacramento
San Benito
San
Bernardino
San Diego
San Francisco
San Joaquin
San Luis
Obispo
San Mateo
Santa Barbara
Santa Clara
Santa Cruz
Shasta
Sierra
Siskiyou
Solano
Sonoma
Stanislaus
Sutter
Tehama
Trinity
Tulare
Tuolumne
Ventura
Yolo
Yuba

Code
Section
19986(l)
designation
URBAN
URBAN
RURAL
URBAN
URBAN
URBAN

Number
of water
samples
collected
3
7
5
4
4
3

URBAN
URBAN
URBAN
URBAN

4
2
0
8

URBAN
URBAN
URBAN
URBAN
URBAN
URBAN
RURAL
RURAL
URBAN
URBAN
URBAN
URBAN
RURAL
RURAL
URBAN
RURAL
URBAN
URBAN
URBAN

3
0
3
6
3
0
0
8
4
0
0
0
14
0
2
4
4
9
1
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Regulatory issues hampered the data collection processes in the laboratory. The
laboratory water sample processing and analysis for this study were conducted from June
17, 2014 through September 4, 2014. Positive and negative influenza A virus controls
were planned to be used during the real time RT-PCR assay targeting the M gene
sequence of influenza A viral genome and also during the hemagglutination MDCK
plaque assay to investigate influenza A virus infectivity. Regulatory policies prevented
the acquisition of a positive influenza A virus control. A readily available sterile normal
saline solution was used for a negative influenza A virus control. Since a positive
influenza A virus control was not available for the real time RT-PCR M gene assay, a
fluorophore endpoint evaluation was computed. The endpoint evaluation was computed
using the Bio-Rad CFX96 Touch Real time PCR Detection System (Bio-Rad, Hercules,
California) instrument software. Since a positive influenza A virus control was not
available for the hemagglutination MDCK plaque assays, the interpretation of the
hemagglutination was based on the negative control hemagglutination and therefore, the
results are highly subjective. There were also unexpected delays performing the
laboratory analysis of collected water samples.
It was planned that pond water samples be prepared and tested for the
hemagglutination MDCK plaque assay within 72 hrs of sample collection. Due to delays
in MDCK cell culture growth and other outside factors; the goal of testing all water
samples (N = 182) within 72 hrs of collection was not achieved. The extended delays of
testing the water samples may have an adverse effect on influenza A virus viability and
infectivity. The processing delays of the water samples range from same day (< 24 hrs) to
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16 days (384 hrs) [M = 7.08 days (170 hrs), SD = 4.957 days, and Mdn = 7.00 days (168
hrs)]. Due to the unexpected delays in preparation and testing for hemagglutination using
MDCK cells the results may not be truly representative of influenza A virus viability and
infectivity. A positive influenza A virus control provides the desired experimental
outcome for comparison against the samples. Without a positive influenza A virus control
this comparison is not possible. Therefore, the results of the hemagglutination MDCK
plaque assay should be interpreted with caution. It had also been planned to use 96 well
U-bottom titration plates for the hemagglutination MDCK plaque assay. The 96 well Ubottom titration plates were not available. Thus, 96 well Flat-bottom titration plates were
utilized in place for the hemagglutination MDCK plaque assay.
Results
Descriptive Statistics of Pond Water Samples
In this study the proportion and probability of the presence of influenza A virus
was investigated in recirculating artificial ponds in urban and rural locations. As shown in
Figure 1 and listed in Table 1 artificial pond water samples were collected from 14 of the
21 counties considered rural areas, and from 25 of the 37 counties considered
metropolitan and not rural in California by California Business and Professions Code
Section 19986(l). Urban counties’ pond water samples [NUrban = 100] were collected from
25 of the 37 counties considered metropolitan and not rural in California by California
Business and Professions Code Section 19986(l). Rural counties’ pond water samples
[NRural = 82] were collected from 14 of the 21 counties considered rural and not
metropolitan in California by California Business and Professions Code Section 19986(l).
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As previously noted, in this study the proportion and probability of the presence
of influenza A virus was investigated in recirculating artificial ponds in urban and rural
locations The artificial pond water sample data for statistical analysis was selected from
the overall statewide sampling data recorded during the field research and laboratory
assays of this dissertation study. Also as previously noted, all water samples were
verified for their content of influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the
M gene sequence.

Figure 1. Data collection site map. Google Earth map of California showing collection
site locations and sample numeration of pond water samples (N = 182).
Samples assayed by real time RT-PCR
Pond water samples were verified for their content of influenza A virus genome
by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene sequence. The real time RT-PCR M gene
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assay was conducted using a Bio-Rad CFX96 Touch Real time PCR Detection System
(Bio-Rad, Hercules, California) instrument and utilized two fluorescent dyes: FAM and
HEX. The analysis software used was Bio-Rad CFX Manager 3.1. The software setting
was: End cycles to average [5] and Percent of Range [10.0]. The results for the FAM
fluorophore were: [Lowest RFU value = -3.71], [Highest RFU value = 3.41], [Negative
Control Average = -0.453], and [Cut Off Value = -0.0668]. The number of statewide
samples [N = 182] called (+) positive using FAM [NFAM = 45, 45/182 = 24.7%]. The
results for the HEX fluorophore were: [Lowest RFU value = -1.93], [Highest RFU value
= 1.46], [Negative Control Average = 1.42], and [Cut Off Value = 1.42]. The number of
statewide samples [N = 182] called (+) positive using HEX [NHEX = 1, 1/182 = 0.5%].
The number of statewide samples [N = 182] verified for their content of influenza A virus
genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene sequence is [n = 45] (see Figure 2.).
The confidence interval formula for a proportion is commonly known as: CI = p ± Z α/2 ×
√[ (p × q) / n] , (x, n – x ≥ 5), where p = x / n, q = 1 - p, α = 1 - (Confidence Level/100) x
= Frequency, n = Sample Size, and Z α/2 = Z-table value. Applying the data values of this
study into the confidence interval formula the proportion of the overall statewide samples
[N = 182] called (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence [n = 45] is P =
0.247, 95% CI [0.185, 0.310]. The effect size index Cohen’s g is the departure from P =
0.50 (Cohen, 1988). Thus, the nondirectional calculation for Cohen’s g is [g = |P – 0.50|].
For the overall statewide samples, the calculation of Cohen’s g is [g = |0.247 – 0.50| =
0.253]; a large effect size (Cohen, 1988). Using G*Power 3.1.5, the post hoc computed
Power = 0.999 (two tailed).
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Figure 2. Statewide samples verified for their content of influenza A virus genome.
Google Earth map of California showing statewide pond water samples verified for their
content of influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene
sequence. [RED icon = (+) Positive for M gene sequence and GREEN icon = (-)
Negative for M gene sequence].
Urban samples assayed by real time RT-PCR. The number of urban county
samples [NUrban = 100] called (+) positive using FAM [NFAM = 36, 36/100 = 36.0%]. The
number of samples [NUrban = 100] called (+) positive using HEX [NHEX = 1, 1/100 =
1.0%]. The number of urban county samples [NUrban = 100] verified for their content of
influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene sequence is [n = 36]
(see Figure 3). Applying the confidence interval formula for a proportion: CI = p ± Z α/2 ×
√[ (p × q) / n] , (x, n – x ≥ 5), where p = x / n, q = 1 - p, α = 1 - (Confidence Level/100) x
= Frequency, n = Sample Size, and Z α/2 = Z-table value, the proportion of the urban
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counties’ samples [NUrban = 100] called (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene
sequence [n = 36] is P = 0.36, 95% CI [0.266, 0.454]. The effect size index Cohen’s g is
the departure from P = 0.50 (Cohen, 1988). Thus, the nondirectional calculation for
Cohen’s g is [g = |P – 0.50|]. For the urban counties’ samples, the calculation of Cohen’s
g is [g = |0.36 – 0.50| = 0.14]; a medium effect size (Cohen, 1988). Using G*Power 3.1.5,
the post hoc computed Power = 0.768 (two tailed).

Figure 3. Urban county samples verified for their content of influenza A virus genome.
Google Earth map of California showing urban counties’ pond water samples verified for
their content of influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene
sequence. [RED icon = (+) Positive for M gene sequence and GREEN icon = (-)
Negative for M gene sequence].
Rural samples assayed by real time RT-PCR. The number of rural counties’
samples [NRural = 82] called (+) positive using FAM [NFAM = 7, 7/82 = 8.5%]. The
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number of samples [NRural = 82] called (+) positive using HEX [NHEX = 2, 2/82 = 2.4%].
The number of rural counties’ samples [NRural = 82] verified for their content of influenza
A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene sequence is [n = 9] (see
Figure 4). Applying the confidence interval formula for a proportions: CI = p ± Z α/2 × √[
(p × q) / n] , (x, n – x ≥ 5), where p = x / n, q = 1 - p, α = 1 - (Confidence Level/100) x =
Frequency, n = Sample Size, and Z α/2 = Z-table value, the proportion of the rural
counties’ samples [NRural = 82] called (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene
sequence [n = 9] is P = 0.11, 95% CI [0.042, 0.177]. The effect size index Cohen’s g is
the departure from P = 0.50 (Cohen, 1988). Thus, the nondirectional calculation for
Cohen’s g is [g = |P – 0.50|]. For the rural counties’ samples, the calculation of Cohen’s g
is [g = |0.11 – 0.50| = 0.39]; a large effect size (Cohen, 1988). Using G*Power 3.1.5, the
post hoc computed Power = 1.000 (two tailed).
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Figure 4. Rural county samples verified for their content of influenza A virus genome.
Google Earth map of California showing rural counties’ pond water samples verified for
their content of influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene
sequence. [RED icon = (+) Positive for M gene sequence and GREEN icon = (-)
Negative for M gene sequence].
Samples Assayed for Infectivity
Influenza A virus infectivity was tested using the hemagglutination MDCK
plaque assay. Titrations were completed using a 96-well Flat-bottom plate. Serial
dilutions across the 96-well Flat- bottom plate ranged from 1:1 to 1:2048. All statewide
samples were assayed for influenza A virus infectivity. As shown in Table 2, the results
of the overall statewide samples are [Neg = 79/182 (43.4%), 1:1 = 17/182 (9.3%), 1:2 =
16/182 (8.8%), 1:4 = 12/182 (6.6%), 1:8 = 15/182 (8.2%), 1:16 = 16/182 (8.8%), 1:32 =
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9/182 (4.9%), 1:64 = 3/182 (1.6%), 1:128 = 7/182 (3.8%), 1:256 = 7/182 (3.8%), 1:512 =
0/182 (0.0%), 1:1024 = 0/182 (0.0%), 1:2048 = 1/182 (0.5%)].
Table 3
Results of Statewide Water Samples Assayed for Influenza A Virus Infectivity (N = 182)
Hemagglutination
titer
Negative
1:1
1:2
1:4
1:8
1:16
1:32
1:64
1:128
1:256
1:512
1:1024
1:2048

Number of water
samples
79
17
16
12
15
16
9
3
7
7
1
0
1

Percentage
43.41%
9.34%
8.79%
6.59%
8.24%
8.79%
4.95%
1.65%
3.85%
3.85%
0.55%
0.00%
0.55%

For the statistical analysis, only the data from those samples verified for their
content of influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene sequence
were selected [n = 45]. All other statewide samples assessed as “positive for
hemagglutination” are considered “false-positives” for influenza A virus infectivity using
the hemagglutination MDCK plaque assay and are not included in the statistical analysis.
The results of the overall statewide samples verified for their content of influenza A virus
genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene sequence are [Neg = 17/45 (37.8%),
1:1 = 6/45 (13.3%), 1:2 = 2/45 (4.4%), 1:4 = 5/45 (11.1%), 1:8 = 1/45 (2.2%), 1:16 =
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4/45 (8.9%), 1:32 = 4/45 (8.9%), 1:64 = 1/45 (2.2%), 1:128 = 2/45 (4.4%), 1:256 = 3/45
(6.7%), 1:512 = 0/45 (0.0%), 1:1024 = 0/45 (0.0%), 1:2048 = 0/45 (0.0
Urban samples assayed for infectivity. All urban counties’ samples were
assayed for influenza A virus infectivity. As shown in Table 3, the results of the urban
counties’ samples are [Neg = 32/100 (32.0%), 1:1 = 8/100 (8.0%), 1:2 = 11/100 (11.0%),
1:4 = 4/100 (4.0%), 1:8 = 10/100 (10.0%), 1:16 = 10/100 (10.0%), 1:32 = 7/100 (7.0%),
1:64 = 3/100 (3.0%), 1:128 = 7/100 (7.0%), 1:256 = 7/100 (7.0%), 1:512 = 0/100 (0.0%),
1:1024 = 0/100 (0.0%), 1:2048 = 1/100 (1.0%)].
Table 4
Results of Urban Counties Water Samples Assayed for Influenza A Virus Infectivity (N =
100)
Hemagglutination
titer
Negative
1:1
1:2
1:4
1:8
1:16
1:32
1:64
1:128
1:256
1:512
1:1024
1:2048

Number of water
samples
32
8
11
4
10
10
7
3
7
7
0
0
1

Percentage
32.00%
8.00%
11.00%
4.00%
10.00%
10.00%
7.00%
3.00%
7.00%
7.00%
0.00%
0.00%
1.00%

For statistical analysis, only the data from those urban county samples verified for
their content of influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene
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sequence are utilized [n = 36]. All other urban counties samples assessed as “positive for
hemagglutination” are considered “false-positives” for influenza A virus infectivity using
the hemagglutination MDCK plaque assay and are not included in the statistical analysis.
The results of the urban counties’ samples verified for their content of influenza A virus
genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene sequence are [Neg = 13/36 (36.1%),
1:1 = 4/36 (11.1%), 1:2 = 2/36 (5.6%), 1:4 = 3/36 (8.3%), 1:8 = 0/36 (0.0%), 1:16 = 4/36
(11.1%), 1:32 = 4/36 (11.1%), 1:64 = 1/36 (2.8%), 1:128 = 2/36 (5.6%), 1:256 = 3/36
(8.3%), 1:512 = 0/36 (0.0%), 1:1024 = 0/36 (0.0%), 1:2048 = 0/36 (0.0%)].
Rural samples assayed for infectivity. All rural counties’ samples were assayed
for influenza A virus infectivity. As shown in Table 4, the results of the rural counties’
samples are [Neg = 47/82 (57.3%), 1:1 = 9/82 (11.0%), 1:2 = 5/82 (6.1%), 1:4 = 8/82
(9.8%), 1:8 = 5/82 (6.1%), 1:16 = 6/82 (7.3%), 1:32 = 2/82 (2.4%), 1:64 = 0/82 (0.0%),
1:128 = 0/82 (0.0%), 1:256 = 0/82 (0.0%), 1:512 = 0/82 (0.0%), 1:1024 = 0/82 (0.0%),
1:2048 = 0/82 (0.0%)].

202
Table 5
Results of Rural Counties' Water Samples Assayed for Influenza A Virus Infectivity (N =
82)
Hemagglutination
titer
Negative
1:1
1:2
1:4
1:8
1:16
1:32
1:64
1:128
1:256
1:512
1:1024
1:2048

Number of water
samples
47
9
5
8
5
6
2
0
0
0
0
0
0

Percentage
57.30%
11.00%
6.10%
9.80%
6.10%
7.30%
2.40%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

For statistical analysis, only the data from those rural counties’ samples verified
for their content of influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene
sequence are utilized [n = 9]. All other rural counties samples assessed as “positive for
hemagglutination” are considered “false-positives” for influenza A virus infectivity using
the hemagglutination MDCK plaque assay and are not included in the statistical analysis.
The results of the rural counties’ samples verified for their content of influenza A virus
genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene sequence are [Neg = 4/9 (44.4%), 1:1
= 0/9 (0.0%), 1:2 = 2/9 (22.2%), 1:4 = 2/9 (22.2%), 1:8 = 1/9 (11.1%), 1:16 = 0/9 (0.0%),
1:32 = 0/9 (0.0%), 1:64 = 0/9 (0.0%), 1:128 = 0/9 (0.0%), 1:256 = 0/9 (0.0%), 1:512 =
0/9 (0.0%), 1:1024 = 0/9 (0.0%), 1:2048 = 0/9 (0.0%)].%)]. The geographical location
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data of the overall statewide samples was collected during the field research phase of the
data collection.
Geographical Locations of Ponds Sampled
As previously noted, pond water samples were collected from 39 of the 58
counties in California. Latitude and longitudinal coordinate data were collected using a
GARMIN® eTrex model 20 (Garmin, Ltd.) handheld GPS device. The coordinate data
were converted to decimal values using the Federal Communication Commission
Degrees, Minutes, Seconds and Decimal Degrees Latitude/Longitude Conversions online
calculator (Federal Communications Commission, n.d.). The overall statewide samples
were collected within the latitude range of [32° 39' 42.2202" N (32.661728)] to [41° 45'
56.7102" N (41.765753)] and within the longitudinal range of [115° 32' 41.9886" W
(115.544997)] to [122° 39' 14.7708" W (122.654103)]. The urban counties’ samples were
collected within the latitude range of [32° 39' 42.2202" N (32.661728)] to [39° 45'
27.5286" N (39.757647)] and within the longitudinal range of [115° 32' 41.9886" W
(115.544997)] to [122° 8' 32.7084" W (122.142419)]. The rural counties’ samples were
collected within the latitude range of [36° 34' 41.8686" N (36.578297)] to [41° 45'
56.7102" N (41.765753)] and within the longitudinal range of [118° 3' 54.3204" W
(118.065089)] to [122° 39' 14.7708" W (122.654103)].
Altitude of Ponds Sampled
Altitude sample data were also collected using the same GARMIN® eTrex model
20 (Garmin, Ltd.) handheld GPS device. The overall statewide samples were collected
within the altitudinal range from -209 ft. to 7903 ft. [ M = 1622 ft., SD = 2140; Skewness
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= 1.23, SE = 0.180; Kurtosis = 0.322, SE = 0.358]. For the statistical analysis, the raw
statewide sample altitude data were transformed into 500 ft. elevation increments. As
shown in Figure 5 the frequency of the transformed statewide altitude data is [Below Sea
Level = 9, < 500 ft. = 96, < 1000 ft. = 8, < 1500 ft. = 7, < 2000 ft. = 5, < 2500 ft. = 1, <
3000 ft. = 12, < 3500 ft. = 1, < 4000 ft. = 1, < 4500 ft. = 21, < 5000 ft. = 6, < 5500 ft. = 0,
< 6000 ft. = 6, < 6500 ft. = 5, < 7000 ft. = 0, < 7500 ft. = 0, > 7500 ft. = 4].

Figure 5. Frequency of statewide pond altitude data (elevation increment: 500 ft.).
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Altitude of urban ponds sampled. The urban counties’ samples were collected
within the altitudinal range of -209 ft. to 2351 ft. [M = 280 ft., SD = 446; Skewness =
2.73, SE = 0.241; Kurtosis = 8.254, SE = 0.478]. For the statistical analysis, the raw
urban counties’ samples altitude data was transformed into 500 ft. elevation increments.
As shown in Figure 6 the frequency of the transformed urban counties’ samples altitude
data is [Below Sea Level = 9, < 500 ft. = 76, < 1000 ft. = 5, < 1500 ft. = 4, < 2000 ft. = 2,
< 2500 ft. = 1]. The approximate pond water surface area for urban counties’ samples
was selected from the overall statewide estimated pond water surface area data.
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Figure 6. Frequency of urban counties’ pond altitude data (elevation increment: 500 ft.).
Altitude of rural ponds sampled. The rural counties’ samples were collected
within the altitudinal range of 69 ft. to 7834 ft. [M = 3259, SD = 2249; Skewness = 0.093,
SE = .266; Kurtosis = -0.921, SE = .526]. For the statistical analysis, the raw rural
counties’ samples altitude data was transformed into 500 ft. elevation increments. As
shown in Figure 7 the frequency of the transformed rural counties’ altitude data is [< 500
ft. = 17, < 1000 ft. = 3, < 1500 ft. = 3, < 2000 ft. = 3, < 2, < 3000 ft. = 12, < 3500 ft. = 1,
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< 4000 ft. = 1, < 4500 ft. = 21, < 5000 ft. = 6, < 6000 ft. = 6, < 6500 ft. = 5, > 7500 ft. =
4].

Figure 7. Frequency of rural counties’ pond altitude data (elevation increment: 500 ft.).
Estimated Surface Area of Ponds Sampled
The approximate pond water surface area was estimated using either a Carl Zeiss
Victory 8 x 26 T* PFR (Carl Zeiss, Sports Optics Gmbh, Germany) laser rangefinder for
X-axis and Y-axis measurements, or the same GARMIN® eTrex model 20 (Garmin,
Ltd.) handheld GPS device using the “Calculate Area” function, or Google Earth
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estimated measurement function. The overall statewide samples were collected from
artificial ponds with approximate surface areas ranging from 202 m2 to 702408 m2 [M =
22834 m2, SD = 64023; Mdn = 5095 m2; Skewness = 7.60, SE = 0.180; Kurtosis = 72.81,
SE = 0.358]. For the statistical analysis, the raw overall statewide sample surface area
data was transformed into 200 m2 increments. The transformed statewide sample surface
areas ranged from 1 to 3512 [M = 114, SD = 23.7; Mdn = 25; Skewness = 7.60, SE =
0.180; Kurtosis = 72.80, SE = 0.358] and is shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Frequency of statewide pond surface area data (surface area increment: 200
m2.).
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Estimated surface area of urban ponds sampled. The urban counties’ samples
were collected from artificial ponds with estimated surface areas ranging from 327 m2 to
702408 m2 [M = 21617, SD = 72464; Mdn = 5733; Skewness = 8.611, SE = .241;
Kurtosis = 80.611, SE = .478]. For the statistical analysis, the raw urban counties’ sample
surface area data was transformed into 200 m2 increments. The transformed urban
counties’ samples surface areas range from 2 to 3512 [M = 108, SD = 362; Mdn = 29;
Skewness = 8.612, SE = .241; Kurtosis = 80.624, SE = .478] and is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Frequency of urban counties’ pond surface area data (surface area increment:
200 m2.).
Estimated surface area of rural ponds sampled. The rural counties’ samples
were collected from artificial ponds with estimated surface areas ranging from 202 m2 to
293751 m2 [M = 24319, SD = 52319, Mdn = 5733; Skewness = 3.525, SE = .266; Kurtosis
= 13.576, SE = .526]. For the statistical analysis, the raw rural counties’ sample surface
area data was transformed into 200 m2 increments. The transformed urban counties’
sample surface areas range from 1 to 1469, [M = 122, SD = 262; Mdn = 20; Skewness =
3.525, SE = .266; Kurtosis = 13.572, SE = .526] and is shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Frequency of rural counties’ pond surface area data (surface area increment:
200 m2.).
Geochemical Properties of Ponds Sampled
The geochemical properties of the overall statewide samples were measured using
an Oakton Multi-Parameter Tester 35 Series Model 35425-10 (Eutech Instruments,
Thermo Fisher Scientific, Huntington Beach, California) for pH, salinity, and
temperature. The overall statewide samples were collected from artificial ponds with pH
measurements ranging from 7.28 to 11.19 [M = 9.31, SD = 0.744; Mdn = 9.29; Mode =
9.45; Skewness = -0.199, SE = 0.180; Kurtosis = -0.136, SE = 0.358]. The salinity
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measurements of the overall statewide samples range from 23 ppm to 3270 ppm [M =
316, SD = 406; Skewness = 4.396, SE = 0.180; Kurtosis = 25.798, SE = 0.358]. The
temperature measurements of the artificial ponds from which the overall statewide
samples were collected ranged from 18.6 °C to 34.1 °C [M = 26.4, SD = 2.97; Skewness =
4.396, SE = 0.180; Kurtosis = -0.384, SE = 0.358]. Observational data was recorded
during the field research phase of the data collection.
Geochemical properties of urban ponds sampled. The urban counties’ samples
were collected from artificial ponds with pH measurements ranging from 7.75 to 10.89
[M = 9.20, SD = 0.641; Mdn = 9.16; Mode = 8.98; Skewness = .086, SE = .241; Kurtosis
= -.096, SE = .478]. The salinity measurements of the urban counties’ samples range
from 40 ppm to 3270 ppm [M = 440, SD = 499; Skewness = 3.631, SE = .241; Kurtosis =
16.570, SE = .478]. The temperature measurements of the artificial ponds from which the
urban counties’ samples were collected ranged from 20.0 °C to 34.1 °C [M = 26.7, SD =
2.61; Skewness = -.033, SE = .241; Kurtosis = .017, SE = .478].
Geochemical properties of rural ponds sampled. The rural counties’ samples
were collected from artificial ponds with pH measurements ranging from 7.28 to 11.19
[M = 9.43, SD = 0.840; Mdn = 9.60; Mode = 9.67; Skewness = -0.554, SE = .266;
Kurtosis = -0.040, SE = .526]. The salinity measurements of the rural counties’ samples
range from 23 ppm to 857 ppm [M = 164, SD = 150; Skewness = 3.151, SE = .266;
Kurtosis = 11.518, SE = .526]. The temperature measurements of the artificial ponds
from which the rural counties’ samples were collected ranged from 18.6 °C to 33.2 °C [M
= 26.0, SD = 3.33; Skewness = 0.155, SE = .266; Kurtosis = -0.699, SE = .526].
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Observational Data of Ponds Sampled
The observational data recorded at time of data collection included the presence
or absence of waterfowl at time of sample collection and the artificial water pond setting.
The frequency of the presence waterfowl at the time of pond water collection for the
overall statewide samples was [NPresent = 135/182 (74.2%)]. Frequency of the absence
waterfowl at the time of pond water collection for the overall statewide samples was
[Nabsence = 47/182 (25.8%)]. Artificial pond water settings were grouped into five separate
categories: Business, Farm, Golf, Park, and University. As shown in Table 5 the
frequencies of the pond setting for statewide samples collected were [Business = 17/182
(9.3%), Farm = 25/182 (13.7%), Golf = 71/182 (39.0%), Park = 67/182 (36.8%), and
University = 2/182 (1.1%)]. The data for the descriptive statistical analyses of the pond
water samples collected in urban and rural communities was selected from the
dissertation study dataset specific to those counties.
Table 6
Frequency of Statewide Sample Pond Setting
Pond setting

Frequency

Business
Farm
Golf
Park
University

17
25
71
67
2

Total

182

Percent

Valid Percent

9.3
13.7
39.0
36.8
1.1
100.
0

9.3
13.7
39.0
36.8
1.1
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
9.3
23.1
62.1
98.9
100.0
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Observational data of urban ponds sampled. The frequency of the presence
waterfowl at the time of pond water collection for the urban counties’ samples was
[NPresent = 85/100 (85.0%)]. The frequency of the absence waterfowl at the time of pond
water collection for the urban counties’ samples was [Nabsence = 15/100 (15.0%)]. The
artificial pond water settings were grouped into five separate categories: Business, Farm,
Golf, Park, and University. The frequencies of the pond setting for urban counties’
samples collected were [Business = 8/100 (8.0%), Farm = 7/100 (7.0%), Golf = 35/100
(35.0%), Park = 48/100 (48.0%), and University = 2/100 (2.0%)].
Observational data of rural ponds sampled. The frequency of the presence
waterfowl at the time of pond water collection for the rural counties’ samples was
[NPresent = 50/82 (61.0%)]. The frequency of the absence waterfowl at the time of pond
water collection for the rural counties’ samples was [Nabsence = 32/82 (39.0%)]. The
artificial pond water settings were grouped into five separate categories: Business, Farm,
Golf, Park, and University. The frequencies of the pond setting for the rural counties’
samples collected were [Business = 9/82 (11.0%), Farm = 18/82 (22.0%), Golf = 36/82
(43.9%), Park = 19/82 (23.2%), and University = 0/82 (0.0%)].
Research Question (R1) Analysis
In this study the proportion and probability of the presence of influenza A virus
was investigated in recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical
locations. Rural ponds were viewed as one population and urban ponds as another
population. The dependent agent variables are influenza A viruses. Influenza A virus data
included: detection for M gene by real time RT-PCR using World Health Organization
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recommended primer sequences, infectivity by hemagglutination assay using MDCK cell
line, and nucleotide sequencing for H5N1 influenza A virus using World Health
Organization recommended primer sequences at Laragen Sequencing and Genotyping
Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California).
Proportion of (+) positivity for IAV M gene sequence. The proportion of the
urban counties’ samples [NUrban = 100] called (+) positive for the influenza A virus (IAV)
M gene sequence [nu = 36] is Pu = 0.36, 95% CI [0.266, 0.454]. This value is numerically
larger than the proportion of the rural counties’ samples [NRural = 82] called (+) positive
for the influenza A virus M gene sequence [nr = 9] is Pr = 0.11, 95% CI [0.042, 0.177]. It
is commonly accepted the two-sided 100 (1 - α) % CI for the difference between two
proportions of unequal sample size is of the form: (^p1 – ^p2 ) ± z1 – α/2 √ [ (^p1 (1 – ^p1) /
n1 ) + (^p2 ( 1 – ^p2) / n2 ) ]. For this analysis; [^p1 = nu / NUrban], [^p2 = nr / NRural], and [z1
– α/2

= 1.96]. The calculated difference in the proportion of urban counties’ samples called

(+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence to rural counties’ samples called
(+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence is directionally towards urban
counties’ samples [(^p1 – ^p2 = 0.2502, 95% CI (0.1278, 0.3604), RD = 0.2502, 95% CI
(0.1337, 0.3668), RR = 3.28, 95% CI (1.83, 7.79), OR = 4.563, 95% CI (2.042, 10.193)].
The effect size index of the difference between two proportions is Cohen’s h.
Cohen’s h is the calculated difference between the arcsine transformations of the
proportions (P) of the populations (Cohen, 1988). Thus, Cohen’s h = |φ1 – φ2| where φ =
2 arcsine √(P). The calculated effect size index for the difference in the proportion of
urban counties’ samples to rural counties’ samples called (+) positive for the influenza A
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virus M gene sequence is Cohen’s h = | (2 arcsine √(Pu)) – (2 arcsine √(Pr)) | = | (2
arcsine √(0.36)) – (2 arcsine √(0.11)) | = | 1.287 – 0.676 | = 0.611; a large effect size
(Cohen, 1988). Using G*Power 3.1.5, the post hoc computed Power = 0.979 (two tailed)
and actual α = 0.038.
Proportion of IAV infectivity by MDCK. As aforementioned, influenza A virus
(IAV) water sample infectivity was measured by hemagglutination assay using MDCK
cell line. For the statistical analysis, the results of the hemagglutination titration levels-for
all samples (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence-were transformed to
integer values using the binary logarithm [log2 (n)] (i.e. titration level 1:16 = log2 (16) =
4). To account for negative hemagglutination (integer transformation = 0), the value of 1
is added to each integer value. Thus, the mathematical transformation is of the form: log2
(n) + 1 (i.e. titration level 1:16 = log2 (16) + 1 = 5).
An independent-samples t test was conducted to evaluate the burden of influenza
A virus in rural ponds compared to urban ponds. The test was significant, t (26.545) =
2.330, p = .028, and favors a greater burden of influenza A virus in urban ponds over
rural ponds. As shown in Figure 11, the hemagglutination titration levels transformed to
integer values for urban counties’ pond water samples (M = 3.08, SD = 3.210) on average
were higher than for rural counties’ pond water samples (M = 1.33, SD = 1.581). The
95% confidence interval for the difference in means was moderately wide, ranging from
0.208 to 3.292, which approximately represents 25% of the total range of values from 0
to 12. The effect size index for the independent samples t test is Cohen’s d (Cohen,
1988). Cohen’s d = (Mean Difference) / (SDpooled), where SDpooled = √ [((N1 – 1) SD12 +
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(N2 – 1) SD22) / (N1 + N2 – 2). For this analysis, [N1 = nu = 36, N2 = nr = 9, SD1 = 3.210,
SD2 = 1.581], thus, Cohen’s d = 0.59; a medium effect size (Cohen, 1988). The eta square
index (η2) for an independent sample t test is commonly known in the form: η2 = (t2) / (t2
+ (N1 + N2 – 2)). For this analysis [N1 = nu = 36, N2 = nr = 9, t = 2.330], thus, the eta
square index (η2) = 0.112. The eta square index indicates that 11.2% of the variance of
the hemagglutination titration levels transformed to integer values was accounted for by
whether the pond water sample was collected in an urban county or a rural county. Using
G*Power 3.1.5, the post hoc computed Power = 0.340 (two tailed) and Critical t = 2.017.
Proportion of nucleotide similarity. All of the resulting nucleotide sequences
from Laragen Sequencing and Genotyping Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City,
California) were analyzed for genetic similarity to known influenza A viruses using the
NCBI BLAST. None of the samples (N = 45) showed significant similarity to any
influenza A virus strains within the databases. As shown in Table 8, all samples (N = 45)
resulted “No significant similarity found”. Therefore no statistical analysis comparison of
the findings was conducted. Nucleotide sequencing of the samples is further detailed in
section Research question 2 analysis of this chapter.
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Figure 11. Transformed Hemagglutination titration values. Error bars (two standard
deviations above and below the mean) for the transformed HA titration values (log2 (n)
+1).
Research Question (R2) Analysis
In this study, rural community ponds were viewed as one population and urban
community ponds as another population. The comparison of these two populations
included proportion of influenza A virus(s), latitude and longitudinal coordinates,
altitude, and approximate water pond surface area, and the presence of absence of
waterfowl (Anseriformes) and shorebirds (Charadriiformes) at the time of sample
collection were included as an independent environment and host variables. The
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dependent agent variables were influenza A viruses. Influenza A virus data included:
detection for M gene by real time RT-PCR using World Health Organization
recommended primer sequences, infectivity by hemagglutination assay using MDCK cell
line, and nucleotide sequencing for H5N1 influenza A virus using World Health
Organization recommended primer sequences at Laragen Sequencing and Genotyping
Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California).
Association of IAV to geographic locations. A two-way contingency table
analysis was conducted to evaluate whether urban counties’ water samples were more
likely to be called (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence compared to
rural counties’ water samples. The two variables were urban counties’ water samples and
rural counties’ water samples with two levels [(+) positive for the influenza A virus M
gene sequence, and (-) negative for the influenza A virus M gene sequence]. Community
location and influenza A virus M gene sequence positivity were found to be significantly
related, Pearson χ2 (1, N = 182) = 15.159, p <.001, Phi = .289, p < .001. The calculated
odds ratio favored urban counties’ water samples [OR = 9.889, 95% CI (4.426, 22.093)].
Urban counties’ water samples were nearly ten-fold more likely to be called (+) positive
for the influenza A virus M gene sequence to rural counties’ water samples. A similar
analysis was conducted for pond water samples collected from park locations.
Association of IAV to park locations. A two-way contingency table analysis
was conducted to evaluate whether urban counties’ water samples collected in park
locations were more likely to be called (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene
sequence compared to rural counties’ water samples collected in park locations. The two
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variables were urban counties’ water samples collected in park locations and rural
counties’ water samples collected in park locations with two levels [(+) positive for the
influenza A virus M gene sequence, and (-) negative for the influenza A virus M gene
sequence]. Park location and influenza A virus M gene sequence positivity were found
not to be significantly related, Pearson χ2 (1, N = 67) = 0.980, p = .322, Phi = .121, p =
.322. The calculated odds ratio favored urban counties’ water samples collected in park
locations [OR = 5.750, 95% CI (1.638, 20.183)]. Urban counties’ water samples collected
in park locations were nearly six-fold more likely to be called (+) positive for the
influenza A virus M gene sequence compared to rural counties’ water samples collected
in park locations. A similar analysis was conducted for pond water samples collected
from business locations.
Association of IAV to business locations. A two-way contingency table analysis
was conducted to evaluate whether urban counties’ water samples collected in business
locations were more likely to be called (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene
sequence compared to rural counties’ water samples collected in business locations. The
two variables were urban counties’ water samples collected in business locations and
rural counties’ water samples collected in business locations with two levels [(+) positive
for the influenza A virus M gene sequence, and (-) negative for the influenza A virus M
gene sequence]. Business location and influenza A virus M gene sequence positivity were
found not to be significantly related, Pearson χ2 (1, N = 17) = 0.476, p = .490, Phi = .167,
p = .490. The calculated 95% CI of the odds ratio implied there is no difference in water
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samples collected in business locations [OR = 5.176, 95% CI (0.617, 43.289)]. A similar
analysis was conducted for pond water samples collected from golf courses.
Association of IAV to golf course locations. A two-way contingency table
analysis was conducted to evaluate whether urban counties’ water samples collected from
golf courses were more likely to be called (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene
sequence compared to rural counties’ water samples collected from golf courses. The two
variables were urban counties’ water samples collected from golf courses and rural
counties’ water samples collected from golf courses with two levels [(+) positive for the
influenza A virus M gene sequence, and (-) negative for the influenza A virus M gene
sequence]. Golf courses and influenza A virus M gene sequence positivity were found to
be significantly related, Pearson χ2 (1, N = 71) = 7.173, p = .007, Phi = .318, p = .007.
The calculated odds ratio favored urban counties’ water samples collected from golf
courses [OR = 12.917, 95% CI (3.274, 50.965)]. Urban counties’ water samples collected
from golf courses were nearly thirteen-fold more likely to be called (+) positive for the
influenza A virus M gene sequence compared to rural counties’ water samples collected
from golf courses. A similar analysis was conducted for pond water samples collected
from farms.
A two-way contingency table analysis was conducted to evaluate whether urban
counties’ water samples collected in farms were more likely to be called (+) positive for
the influenza A virus M gene sequence compared to rural counties’ water samples
collected in farms. The two variables were urban counties’ water samples collected in
farms locations and rural counties’ water samples collected in farms with two levels [(+)
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positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence, and (-) negative for the influenza A
virus M gene sequence]. Farms and influenza A virus M gene sequence positivity were
found to be significantly related, Pearson χ2 (1, N = 25) = 12.245, p < .001, Phi = .700, p
< .001. The calculated odds ratio could not be achieved due to zero samples called (+)
positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence in rural counties’ water samples
collected in farms. A two-way contingency table analysis was not conducted for pond
water samples collected from Universities since only two samples were collected from a
University setting. Both samples were collected from a University located within a
county deemed urban.
Association of IAV to presence of waterfowl
A two-way contingency table analysis was conducted to evaluate whether the
presence of waterfowl at the time of overall statewide water sample collections were
more likely to be called (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence to
absence of waterfowl at the time of overall statewide water sample collections. The two
variables were the presence or absence of waterfowl at the time of overall statewide water
samples collections with two levels [(+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene
sequence, and (-) negative for the influenza A virus M gene sequence]. The presence of
waterfowl and influenza A virus M gene sequence positivity were found not to be
significantly related, Pearson χ2 (1, N = 182) = 2.021, p = .155, Phi = .105, p = .155. The
calculated odds ratio favored statewide water samples collected in the presence of
waterfowl [OR = 7.524, 95% CI (3.217, 17.595)]. Statewide water samples collected in
the presence of waterfowl were more than seven-fold more likely to be called (+) positive
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for the influenza A virus M gene sequence compared to statewide water samples
collected in the absence of waterfowl. A similar analysis was conducted for pond water
samples collected in urban county settings.
Waterfowl in urban locations. A two-way contingency table analysis was
conducted to evaluate whether the presence of waterfowl at the time of urban counties’
water sample collections were more likely to be called (+) positive for the influenza A
virus M gene sequence compared to absence of waterfowl at the time of urban counties’
water sample collections. The two variables were the presence or absence of waterfowl at
the time of urban counties’ water samples collections with two levels [(+) positive for the
influenza A virus M gene sequence, and (-) negative for the influenza A virus M gene
sequence]. The presence of waterfowl and influenza A virus M gene sequence positivity
were found not to be significantly related, Pearson χ2 (1, N = 100) = 0.054, p = .815, Phi
= .023, p = .815. The calculated odds ratio favored urban counties’ water samples
collected in the presence of waterfowl [OR = 3.742, 95% CI (1.172, 11.947)]. Urban
counties’ water samples collected in the presence of waterfowl were nearly four-fold
more likely to be called (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence compared
to urban counties’ water samples collected in the absence of waterfowl. A similar
analysis was conducted for pond water samples collected in rural counties.
Waterfowl in rural locations. A two-way contingency table analysis was
conducted to evaluate whether the presence of waterfowl at the time of rural counties’
water sample collections were more likely to be called (+) positive for the influenza A
virus M gene sequence compared to absence of waterfowl at the time of rural counties’
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water sample collections. The two variables were the presence or absence of waterfowl at
the time of rural counties’ water samples collections with two levels [(+) positive for the
influenza A virus M gene sequence, and (-) negative for the influenza A virus M gene
sequence]. The presence of waterfowl and influenza A virus M gene sequence positivity
were found not to be significantly related, Pearson χ2 (1, N = 82) = 0.138, p = .711, Phi =
.041, p = .711. The calculated odds ratio favored rural counties’ water samples collected
in the presence of waterfowl [OR = 17.000, 95% CI (3.936, 73.426)]. Rural counties’
water samples collected in the presence of waterfowl were nearly four-fold more likely to
be called (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence compared to rural
counties’ water samples collected in the absence of waterfowl.
Association of IAV to latitude and longitude
A logistic regression analysis to investigate geographic location (latitude &
longitude), altitude, and estimate surface area for statewide water sample collections was
conducted. The four predictor variables were tested a priori to verify there was no
violation of the assumption of the linearity of the logit. Only one of the four predictor
variables, latitude, in the logistic regression analysis was found to contribute to the model
B0 = -1.113, SE0 = .172, Wald0 = 41.986, p < .001. After four iterations, the predictor
variable, latitude, was included in the equation: B1 = -.339, SE1 = .080, Wald1 = 18.142, p
< .001. The estimated odds ratio favored an inverse relationship of nearly one and onehalf fold [Exp (B) = 0.713, 95% CI (0.610, 0.833)] for every unit increase of latitude
(decimal transformation). In this model, 10% to 16% [Cox & Snell R2 = .105, Nagelkerke
R2 = .156] of the variability in (+) positive finding for the influenza A virus M gene
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sequence is explained by the latitude of the water pond. The model also shows to fit the
data well [Hosmer and Lemeshow’s χ2 (8, N = 182) = 3.518, p = .898]. A similar analysis
was conducted for pond water samples collected in urban county settings.
Latitude and longitude of urban ponds. A logistic regression analysis to
investigate geographic location (latitude & longitude), altitude, and estimate surface area
for urban counties’ water sample collections was conducted. The four predictor variables
were tested a priori to verify there was no violation of the assumption of the linearity of
the logit. Only one of the four predictor variables, latitude, in the logistic regression
analysis was found to contribute to the model B0 = -.575, SE0 = .208, Wald0 = 7.627, p =
.006. After three iterations, the predictor variable, latitude, was included in the equation:
B1 = -.295, SE1 = .113, Wald1 = 6.767, p = .009. The estimated odds ratio favored an
inverse relationship of nearly one and one-half fold [Exp (B) = 0.745, 95% CI (0.597,
0.930)] for every unit increase of latitude (decimal transformation). In this model, 7% to
10% [Cox & Snell R2 = .069, Nagelkerke R2 = .094] of the variability in (+) positive
finding for the influenza A virus M gene sequence is explained by the latitude of the
water pond. The model also shows to fit the data well [Hosmer and Lemeshow’s χ2 (8, N
= 100) = 5.831, p = .666]. A similar analysis was conducted for pond water samples
collected in rural county settings.
Latitude and longitude of rural ponds. A logistic regression analysis to
investigate geographic location (latitude & longitude), altitude, and estimated surface
area for rural counties’ water sample collections was conducted. The four predictor
variables were tested a priori to verify there was no violation of the assumption of the
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linearity of the logit. After five iterations, none of the four predictor variables; latitude,
longitude, altitude, and estimated surface area, in the logistic regression analysis was
found to contribute to the model B0 = -2.093, SE0 = .353, Wald0 = 35.106, p < .001 and
thus, no equation was calculated.
Research question (R3) analysis
(R3)- Is there an association between water pH, salinity, or water temperature
and influenza A virus infectivity in rural and urban water ponds?
A multivariate linear regression analysis was conducted to investigate the
hypothesis of an association between pond water sample pH, salinity, and water
temperature at time of collection and influenza A virus infectivity. Samples for this
analysis-selected from the overall statewide sample data set-were verified for their
content of influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene
sequence. The number of statewide samples [N = 182] verified for their content of
influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene sequence is [n =
45]. The predictors of this analysis are: pond water pH, pond water salinity, and pond
water temperature at time of collection. The pH of the pond water samples-at time of
collection-range from 7.89 to 10.52 with [M = 9.24, SD = 0.66]. The salinity of the pond
water samples-at time of collection-range from 23 ppm to 3270 ppm with [M = 465, SD =
646]. The water temperature of the pond water samples-at time of collection-range from
18.6°C to 31.0°C [M = 26.3, SD = 2.68]. The dependent variable of this analysis is
influenza A virus infectivity. As noted above, the results of the overall statewide samples
verified for their content of influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR targeting the
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M gene sequence are [Neg = 17/45 (37.8%), 1:1 = 6/45 (13.3%), 1:2 = 2/45 (4.4%), 1:4 =
5/45 (11.1%), 1:8 = 1/45 (2.2%), 1:16 = 4/45 (8.9%), 1:32 = 4/45 (8.9%), 1:64 = 1/45
(2.2%), 1:128 = 2/45 (4.4%), 1:256 = 3/45 (6.7%), 1:512 = 0/45 (0.0%), 1:1024 = 0/45
(0.0%), 1:2048 = 0/45 (0.0%)].
As previously aforementioned in Chapter 3, influenza A virus water sample
infectivity was measured by hemagglutination assay using MDCK cell line. Serial
dilutions of the samples were assayed for hemagglutination of MDCK ranged from 1:1 to
1:2048. The highest hemagglutination titration was recorded per sample. If no
hemagglutination of MDCK was microscopically identified, the sample was deemed
“Negative”. For the statistical analysis, the results of the hemagglutination titration
levels-for all samples verified (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequencewere transformed to integer values using the binary logarithm [log2 (n)] (i.e. titration level
1:16 = log2 (16) = 4). To account for negative titration levels (integer transformation = 0),
the value of 1 is added to each integer value. Thus, the mathematical transformation is of
the form: log2 (n) + 1 (i.e. titration level 1:16 = log2 (16) + 1 = 5).
Statistical assumptions
The predictors for this multivariate linear analysis were tested for the assumption
of linearity. As shown in Figure 12, there appears to be a linear increase in
hemagglutination titer with increase in pond water sample pH. As shown in Figure 13
and 14 the hemagglutination titer did not increase or decrease with increase pond water
salinity or pond water temperature, respectively. The horizontal lines produced are linear,
but horizontal to the X-axis. The cross-sectional random sampling strategy of the
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statewide pond water samples satisfies the assumption of sampling independence. As
shown in Figure 15, the dependent variable hemagglutination titer appears not to be
normally distributed.
Figure 12. Scatterplot diagram of Pond Water pH to Hemagglutination titer

Figure 12. There appears to be a linear increase in hemagglutination titer with increase in
pond water sample pH.
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Figure 13. Scatterplot diagram of Pond Water Salinity to Hemagglutination titer. The
hemagglutination titer does not increase or decrease with increase pond water salinity
(ppm).
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Figure 14. Scatterplot diagram of Pond Water Temperature to Hemagglutination titer.
The hemagglutination titer does not increase or decrease with increase pond water
temperature
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Figure 15. Histogram of Hemagglutination Titer Madin Darby Canine Kidney cell line.
The dependent variable hemagglutination titer (MDCK) appears not to be normally
distributed.
Statistical analysis. In the model summary for this analysis, the R is slightly
positive (R = 0.112), so there is a slight positive correlation between pond water sample
pH, salinity, or water temperature, and influenza A virus infectivity. Since the value of R
is close to zero, the correlation between all the variables and influenza A virus infectivity
is not strong. The coefficient of determination is [R2 = .013]. Based on this, only 1% of
the variability in hemagglutination titer is explained by pond water sample pH, salinity,
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or water temperature at time of collection. Hence, 99% of the variability maybe explained
other variables not investigated in this study.
In the coefficients table, none of the three independent variables was found to be
significant predictors of change. Controlling for pond water pH and salinity, for each
1.0°C increase in temperature, the binary logarithm [log2(n)] value for hemagglutination
titer decreased by -.064. Controlling for pond water pH and temperature, for each unit
(ppm) increase in salinity, the binary logarithm [log2 (n)] value for hemagglutination titer
remained unchanged. Controlling for pond water salinity and temperature, for each 1.0
increase in pH, the binary logarithm [log2 (n)] value for hemagglutination titer increased
by 0.019. None of the three predictor effects were statistically significant and all had
confidence intervals that included 0: pH [ß = 0.019, 95% CI (-0.440, 0.312), p = .980],
salinity [ß = 0.000, 95% CI (-0.001, 0.002), p = .570], temperature [ß = -0.064, 95% CI (0.440, 0.312), p = .733]. As previously noted, due to the unexpected delays in preparation
and testing for hemagglutination using MDCK cells in combination with a lack of a
positive influenza A virus control the results of the hemagglutination MDCK plaque
assay should be interpreted with caution.
Research Question (R4) Analysis
The samples [N = 45] verified for their content of influenza A virus genome by
real time RT-PCR targeting the M gene sequence were submitted to Laragen Sequencing
and Genotyping Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California). All [N = 45]
samples verified for their content of influenza A virus genome by real time RT-PCR
targeting the M gene sequence were also (+) positive for H5 or N1 or both. To submit
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samples, 15 μml of the amplification product of the real time RT-PCR targeting the H5
gene sequence was extracted and transferred to a clean, labeled 1.5 ml sample centrifuge
tube.
As previously noted, all of the resulting nucleotide sequences from Laragen
Sequencing and Genotyping Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California) were
analyzed for genetic similarity to known influenza A viruses [GenBank (National
Institute of Health genetic sequence database)] using the NCBI BLAST. A universal
forward primer set for sequencing HA0 developed by Gall, Hoffmann, Harder, Grund,
and Beer (2008) and a forward primer sequence for N1 identified by Huang, Khan, &
Măndoiu (2013) were utilized to sequence the influenza A virus samples[N = 45] for this
dissertation study. The primer sequences were manufactured by Invitogen (Carlsbad,
California) and are shown in Table 6 and Table 7. All samples (N = 45) were searched
using the limited records matching entrez query: txid197911 [ORGN] OR txid11320
[ORGN] OR txid11320 [ORGN] OR txid102797 [ORGN] OR txid102797 [ORGN].
None of the samples (N = 45) showed significant similarity to any influenza A virus
strains within the databases. As shown in Table 8, all samples (N = 45) resulted “No
significant similarity found”.
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Table 7
Universal Forward Primer Set for Sequencing HA0
Oligonucleotide
HA-1057.1-F
HA-1057.2-F
HA-1057.3-F

Sequence (5′-3′)a
GGR GAA TGC CCC AAA TAY GT
GGR ARA TGC CCC AGR TAT GT
GGR GAA TGC CCC AAR TAY AT

Position (nt)
967-986
967-986
967-986

Table 8
Forward Primer for Sequencing N1
NA Subtype
N1 - Forward

Sequence (5′-3′)a
5'-TAGACTGCATGAGGCCTTGCTTCTG-3'

Product length
(bp)
137
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Table 9
HA and NA Gene Sequencing Results with BLAST Analysis Results
Sample
ID.
C-1001

C-1003

C-1006

C-1007

C-1009

C-1010

C-1011

HA gene sequencing
NA gene sequencing
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNGNTNNGNGNGNNN
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNNNNNGNN
NNGGGNNNNNNNNNNANNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNGGNNGNNNNNNNNN
NNNNGGGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNCCNNCCNGNNNNC
NNCNCNNNNNNNCNNNCNCNNNNNNCNNCCNC
CCNCCCNCCCCCCNATGNNNNNCCCNCCNNNC
CCTCNCCNNNCNATCCCCCCCCNNAANN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNGNNTNNN
NNCNNNATACNCNNNNCNGNNNNGN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGGGGGNN
GGNNNNNNNNNNNCNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNGNNNTNNNNACNCTNTCANNAGTTGGNG
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNGNGGGGNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTNNNGNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNGNGNTGNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNTNTTTTNTTNNNNNNANTNNTCTNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNGNANNGN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNAANAGGNN
ANNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNCNNTCNNA
GTNGNAGNTATANATA
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNANNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTNNGNAGNNNNNNNNN
TTNNATNNNNNNNNNNNNG

No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found

No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
(table continues)
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Sample
ID.

C-1012

C-1013

C-1015

C-1017

C-1020

C-1021

C-1024

HA gene sequencing
NA gene sequencing
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGGGGGGNNNN
GNNNNNNNNNNNNNNCTCCNNNNTNNNNNGNN
NNNNCCNNNCCCNCNNNNAATTNTTNTTTTTNN No significant
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNCNNNNN
similarity found
No significant
NNNNN
similarity found
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNNGN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNCCTA
GNCNNNTNTTTTNTNNNATGNNNTNCNCCNNNN No significant
NNNNNNNANN
similarity found
No significant
NNNNN
similarity found
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNGNNNNGGGGNN No significant
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
similarity found
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNNGNNNNNNNNNNN
NGGGNNNNNNNGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNT No significant
NNNNANTNNNNNNNNTNTCAGATTGGA
similarity found
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGGGGGNNNGGNN No significant
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNG
similarity found
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGNNGNNGNNNNNNNN
GGGGGNGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNANNNTCAGNTTGGAGGATNNNNN No significant
NN
similarity found
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNG No significant
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
similarity found
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNACNCNNCAGANTTGNNGNNT No significant
NNCNTA
similarity found
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN No significant
NTNNNTNNNNNNNNNTNNNNNNNNN
similarity found
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTGNGNNNN No significant
NNNNNNAANATANATANNNNN
similarity found
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNGGGGNNNGN No significant
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
similarity found
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTNN No significant
NNNNNNNNNAGNNTNNNNN
similarity found
(table continues)
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Sample
ID.

C-1026

C-1028

C-1030

C-1033

C-1034

C-1039

C-1041

HA gene sequencing
NA gene sequencing
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNN
NNNNNNNTTNNGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNANNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNATNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGNNNGNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNN
NGGGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
N
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGANNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNANNNNNN
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTTNN
NNTTTNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNCNNNNNNNTNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTNN
NNANNNNCNTGACNCNNNCNNNGGTNGNNGNN
TNNCNTANN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNNNNNNNGNG
NNNNNNNNNNNGGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
GNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNNNTNNNNNN
NNAANANNNNNNANGN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNG
NNNNGGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNATANNNNNNTTANNNN

No significant
similarity found

No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
(table continues)
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Sample
ID.

C-1043

C-1045

C-1048

C-1052

C-1054

C-1057

C-1061

C-1067

HA gene sequencing
NA gene sequencing
NNNNTNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGAN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNCNAN
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNGNTAN
NNNNNNNNNTNNCNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGNGNGNNGNNGNNNN
GNGNNNNNGNNNGNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNNNN
NNTNNNNNNNNNNNNNNCNNGN
NNNNNNNNNNNANNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGN
NNNNCNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNCNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NTNNNNNNNNNNATNNNNNNCNNNNNTNGAGN
NTNNCNTA
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNNGNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNCNNNCNNNNNNNNN
N
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGT
TNTNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNG
NNNGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTNNN
NNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNTNNN
NNNNNNNNNNGNNNNNNCNNNNNNNNN
NNNNN

No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
(table continues)
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Sample
ID.

C-1069

C-1078

C-1081

C-1085

C-1088

C-1092

C-1095

C-1101

HA gene sequencing
NA gene sequencing
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGG
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNA
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNGN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGN
GGNNNNNCNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNA
NTN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGGGNN
NGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNAN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNTCTGT
NGNGTGTTNTANNNTNCATA
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
TNNNNTNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGNNNNNGNNNNNNNN
GGGGGGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNGNNNNNTNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NTNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNCNNGNNNNNNNNAG
NNNNNTANNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNGN
NNNNNNNNNTNNNNNNCA
NNNNN

No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
(table continues)
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Sample
ID.

C-1104

C-1111

C-1129

C-1136

C-1149

C-1168

HA gene sequencing
NA gene sequencing
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNGNNNNNANNNCNNNNNNNNNNNANNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNGNNN
NGGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNTANGTNTC
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGGGGGGNNTNTG
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNANGATCNGAN
NNTNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTN
NNTNTNTNATTNNNTANATNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTNNNGNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNTNNANNNGNNNNNNNNNNNTT
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTNNNNNNN
N
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNGNNTTGGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNCNTN
NNTTNGGT
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNGGGGNNN
NGNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNTGNTACACNNTCNTGNTTGNNGNNNN
NTANNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNANNNNN
NNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNGNNGNNTNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNCNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNTTGNGTTNTNNNNTA
TAACTCCTCCNGCG

No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found

No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found
(table continues)
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Sample
ID.

C-1169

HA gene sequencing
NA gene sequencing
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGGNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNGNN
NNNNNTANNNTATACNCTNTCANNNTNGNGGN
TNCNTAN

No significant
similarity found
No significant
similarity found

Note. Nucleotide sequencing results from Laragen Sequencing and Genotyping
Laboratory (Laragen, Inc., Culver City, California) and NCBI Blast analysis results for
similarities to known influenza A virus strains. Sequence base pair codes (nitrogenous
bases): A = Adenine, T = Thymine, C = Cytosine, G = Guanine, and N = Non-identified
nitrogenous base.
Summary
This dissertation study has been an investigation into the persistence of influenza
viruses in artificial suburban neighborhood water ponds. No known research has analyzed
the proportion and persistence of influenza viruses in these aquatic habitats. The aim of
this dissertation study was to investigate the proportion of influenza A viruses in
recirculating artificial ponds in rural and urban geographical locations. To investigate the
proportion of influenza A viruses in recirculating artificial ponds, 182 pond water
samples were collected from a representative sampling from 14 counties considered rural
areas (NRural = 82), and 25 counties considered metropolitan and not rural (NUrban = 100)
in California by California Business and Professions Code Section 19986(l) was
achieved. Field research data and laboratory data were transcribed to an Microsoft Office
Excel 2007 spreadsheet and statistically analyzed to answer the four research questions of
this study.
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The analysis of the proportion of influenza A virus in rural and urban water ponds
favored the greater burden of influenza A virus in urban community ponds over rural
community ponds [(^p1 – ^p2 = 0.2502, 95% CI (0.1278, 0.3604), Cohen’s h = 0.611,
Power = 0.979, actual α = 0.038]. An independent-samples t test was conducted to
evaluate influenza A virus water sample infectivity in samples from rural and urban water
ponds. The test was significant, t (26.545) = 2.330, p = .028, Cohen’s d = 0.59, eta square
index (η2) = 0.112, and also favored a greater burden of influenza A virus in urban ponds
over rural ponds. Factors of pond water location and setting were also analyzed as
predictors.
A two-way contingency table analysis was conducted to evaluate whether urban
counties’ water samples were more likely to be called (+) positive for the influenza A
virus M gene sequence compared to rural counties’ water samples in five different
settings: businesses, farms, golf courses, parks, and Universities. Overall, urban counties’
water samples were nearly ten-fold more likely to be called (+) positive for the influenza
A virus M gene sequence to rural counties’ water samples [OR = 9.889, 95% CI (4.426,
22.093)]. The calculated 95% CI of the odds ratio implied there is no difference in water
samples collected in business locations [OR = 5.176, 95% CI (0.617, 43.289)]. The
calculated odds ratio for pond water samples collected in farms could not be achieved due
to zero samples called (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence in rural
counties’ water samples collected in farms. However, farms and influenza A virus M
gene sequence positivity were found to be significantly related, Pearson χ2 (1, N = 25) =
12.245, p < .001, Phi = .700, p < .001. Urban counties’ water samples collected from golf
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courses were nearly thirteen-fold more likely to be called (+) positive for the influenza A
virus M gene sequence compared to rural counties’ water samples collected from golf
courses [OR = 12.917, 95% CI (3.274, 50.965)]. Urban counties’ water samples collected
in park locations were nearly six-fold more likely to be called (+) positive for the
influenza A virus M gene sequence compared to rural counties’ water samples collected
in park locations [OR = 5.750, 95% CI (1.638, 20.183)]. A two-way contingency table
analysis was not conducted for pond water samples collected from Universities since only
two samples were collected from a university setting within an urban county. The
presence of waterfowl and three geochemical measures of the pond water samples were
analyzed as predictors.
The presence of waterfowl and influenza A virus M gene sequence positivity were
found not to be significantly related in the overall statewide samples, urban counties’
samples, and the rural counties’ samples. However, the calculated odds ratio favored
rural water samples collected in the presence of waterfowl for all three groups: the overall
statewide samples, urban counties’ samples, and the rural counties’ samples. Latitude was
shown to be a predictor of (+) positivity for the influenza A virus M gene sequence for
statewide and urban counties’ pond water samples, but not for rural counties’ pond water
samples. Longitude, altitude, and estimated surface area were not found to contribute to
any of the models. The analysis of the geochemical properties; pH, salinity, and water
temperature at time of collection of the pond samples did not identify any predictors of
influenza A virus infectivity. None of the samples (N = 45) submitted for nucleotide
sequencing and subsequent strain identification showed significant similarity to any
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influenza A virus strains within GenBank (National Institute of Health genetic sequence
database). Therefore no statistical analysis comparison of the findings of the NCBI
BLAST was conducted.
Chapter 5 includes a discussion of the interpretations of the research data. The
discussion begins with an interpretation of the findings as related to the literature, as well
as, related to ecological and molecular structure topics. This section is followed by a
presentation of the limitations of this research study, and then a discussion of
recommendations for further research. These sections are followed by a discussion of the
potential social change impact of this dissertation study at the international level, the
national and state level, the population level, and at the individual level.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The “Spanish” influenza H1N1 pandemic of 1918–1919, which caused
approximately 50 million deaths worldwide, remains an ominous warning to public
health (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006). Since then, new subtypes of human influenza A
viruses have been detected at various times: in 1957, the H2N2 subtype (Asian influenza)
replaced the H1N1 subtype; in 1968, the H3N2 subtype (Hong Kong virus) appeared; and
in 1977, the H1N1 virus reappeared (Webster et al., 1992). Influenza disease emergence
data are collected year-round, but economic strain on global public health to prevent and
treat human influenza outbreaks is enormous. Therefore, it is imperative to identify
potential sources of the virus to help minimize outbreak occurrence.
There are gaps in knowledge about the association between molecular structure,
epidemiologic and clinical characteristics, and the impact of ecological and other
contextual aspects of influenza viruses. Gaps in understanding the role of the physical
and biogeochemical environment as an integral part of the influenza A viral transmission
also exist (Lang, Kelly, & Runstadler, 2008). More importantly, gaps in knowledge about
the burden of influenza A virus in rural and urban community settings remain present.
IRAT is expected to prompt additional studies to address these key gaps in the knowledge
(Trock, Burke, & Cox, 2012).
The problem in this study was that public health scientists have been battling
emerging human influenza diseases with tactile and reactionary methods because there
was a lack of knowledge and data at the human-animal interface. This baseline study of
the proportion of influenza A virus in urban and rural community settings may provide
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knowledge and biological data of significant interest at the human-animal interface. This
biological data may be of significant interest for the development of IRAT.
Interpretation of the Findings
The results of this dissertation study showed an association in the burden of
influenza A virus to geographical location. The analysis of the data favored a greater
burden of influenza A virus in urban ponds compared to rural ponds. Additionally, this
dissertation study’s findings aligned with the research of others who investigated the
persistence of influenza A virus in aquatic habitats. The interpretation of the data
analysis—MDCK plaque assays, real time RT-PCR, and nucleotide sequencing—
supported the proposal by Franklin et al. (2011) that aquatic systems may serve as
reservoirs and sources of infection for both wild birds and mammals. That being said, the
aquatic habitats sampled for this study were potential sites of the human-animal interface
of influenza A viruses. Interestingly, the analysis of the dissertation data did not fully
support the well-accepted theory of the influenza virus human-animal interface by
Webster et al. (1992).
As aforementioned, Webster et al. (1992) described the aquatic habitat as an
influenza virus human-animal interface with the example of domestic ducks in
community ponds attracting migratory waterfowl. The migratory waterfowl introduce the
influenza virus to that community’s water pond from fecal contamination. The
contaminated community water pond now becomes a potential source of influenza virus
to both humans and animals. In this dissertation study, the presence or absence of
waterfowl did not show to be a statistically significant factor for the detection of
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influenza A virus. However, the calculated odds ratio favored pond water samples
collected in the presence of waterfowl to be called (+) positive for the influenza A virus
M gene sequence compared to absence of waterfowl at the time of pond water sample
collection. This discrepancy maybe explained by the work by Ito et al. (1995). The results
of the Ito et al. investigation showed the influenza A viruses remained viable in the lake
water after most ducks left for migration south. In this study, there was no credible
evidence that the presence of waterfowl at time of collection contributed to the sample
being verified as (+) positive for the influenza A virus M gene sequence. Therefore, the
presence or absence of waterfowl-as tested in this dissertation study may not be a
contributing factor for the detection of influenza A virus. Geospatial analysis also did not
show to be a strong contributing factor for the detection of influenza A virus.
The latitude of the sampled water pond was shown to be a predictor of (+)
positivity for the influenza A virus M gene sequence. In contrast, longitude, altitude, and
estimated surface area were not found to contribute to any of the statistical models.
Additionally, the laboratory investigation by Brown et al. (2009) indicated the pH,
temperature, and salinity at levels normally encountered in nature can impact the ability
of avian influenza A viruses to remain infective in water, but this could not be replicated
in the field. The analysis of the geochemical properties—pH, salinity, and water
temperature at time of collection of the pond water samples—did not identify any
predictors of influenza A virus infectivity. This dissertation study did support some of the
material and methods identified in the literature.
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Evers et al. (2007) investigated the commercial preservative RNAlater (Qiagen®)
against the current method of cryo-freezing, and ethanol preservatives for influenza A
virus samples. The purpose of Evers et al.’s investigation was to determine if using the
commercial preservative RNAlater would result in improved RT-PCR amplification over
the current sample preservation methods of cryo-freezing or ethanol fixation. In this
dissertation study, the commercial preservative RNAlater was successfully used as a
stabilizer to protect RNA for subsequent analysis. However, sample preservation methods
of cryo-freezing or ethanol fixation was not compared. Zhang et al. (2011) collected 200ml water samples from areas near the habitat of migratory birds and stored the samples at
-80°C until assayed. In this dissertation study, a 200-ml to 250-ml pond water sample
was successfully collected and analyzed from each site. Tønnessen et al. (2013) collected
samples along migratory flyways for influenza viruses, genome sequencing, and
similarity analysis.
In this dissertation study, I successfully collected pond water samples along the
eastern Pacific flyway and analyzed the samples for influenza A viruses, genome
sequencing, and similarity analysis. The positive results of the HA0 and N1 nucleotide
sequencing are viewed as validation for the real time RT-PCR analysis and also as
validation for the presence of influenza A virus in the pond water samples. The HA0 and
N1 nucleotide sequencing was performed on the real time RT-PCR amplification
products of the samples (N = 45) that verified (+) positive for H5 or N1 by real time RTPCR. A positive HA0 and N1 nucleotide sequencing result should only occur if amplified
hemagglutination or neuraminidase protein strains are present in the sample. The
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amplified hemagglutination or neuraminidase protein strains should only be present in the
nucleotide sequencing samples if the proteins were amplified during the real time RTPCR assays. For the parameters of this study, the real time RT-PCR assay should only be
able to amplify the (H5) hemagglutination or (N1) neuraminidase protein strains if either
influenza A virus H5 RNA strains or influenza A virus N1 RNA strains were present in
the collected pond water samples. Therefore, the positive results of the HA0 and N1
nucleotide sequencing are validation for the presence of influenza A virus in the pond
water samples along the eastern Pacific flyway in California. Further, these (+) positive
influenza A virus pond water samples originated from a human-animal interface.
Ecological Interpretations
The study and detection of influenza A virus along the eastern Pacific flyway
were in alignment with the World Health Organization (2011) description of the humananimal interface as a complex juncture at which new paradigms are emerging. Austin and
Hinshaw (1984) suggested that surveillance of healthy ducks and the aquatic environment
they frequent may be of significant interest to monitoring and controlling influenza A
viruses. This dissertation study is a model that can be modified to monitor influenza A
virus in the aquatic environment. Ferro et al. (2010) focused on the presence of influenza
A viruses among the migratory ducks and the winter breeding grounds along the Texas
coast. As previously mentioned, in this dissertation study pond water samples were
collected along the eastern Pacific flyway and analyzed for influenza A viruses. Lang et
al. (2008) collected and studied sediment samples for influenza A virus from three ponds
in Alaska using a time-series approach. Hinshaw et al. (1980) completed a similar
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longitudinal study to isolate influenza viruses and to determine whether influenza viruses
continually circulate or whether the same or different strains are present from year to
year. A time series approach would be an appropriate modification to the cross-sectional
baseline approach of this dissertation study.
Many have studied the theory of water-borne transmission of influenza A viruses
among waterfowl (Brown et al., 2009; Halvorson et al., 1985). The findings of this
dissertation study cannot adequately address the theory of water-borne transmission of
influenza A viruses among waterfowl. However, replication of this research model may
provide data on the size of the gene pool of influenza A viruses in artificial aquatic
habitats in California and the number of viruses antigenically related to human strains
present in avian species that use these habitats. The findings of this dissertation study
showed there was a greater burden of influenza A virus in aquatic habitats of urban
communities. Future research of this human-animal interface could use these
geographical findings to locate and limit the areas of interest.
Molecular Structure Interpretations
The results of this dissertation study add to the body of knowledge of the
laboratory analysis of influenza viruses. As previously discussed, the commercial
preservative RNAlater was successfully used as a stabilizer to protect influenza A viral
RNA for subsequent analysis. This may be of significant interest to future influenza viral
research. As detailed in Chapter 2, a constellation of studies have applied real tme RTPCR assays to verify the (+) positivity of influenza A viruses from various types of
samples. The results of this dissertation study were further support of the use of RNAlater
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and the application of real time RT-PCR methodologies utilizing the commonly
recognized “TaqMan® principle” for water samples. As aforementioned, the nucleotide
sequencing results of the real time RT-PCR amplification products validate the real time
RT-PCR methodologies for pond water samples. However, the results of this dissertation
study cannot fully support the use of MDCK cell line for avian influenza field research
infectivity studies.
Brown et al. (2009) and others have conducted infectivity studies using MDCK
cell line. This laboratory approach is also recommended by the World Health
Organization (2007). However, due to the unexpected delays in preparation of MDCK
cell culture and testing for hemagglutination using MDCK cells in combination with a
lack of a positive influenza A virus control; the results of the hemagglutination plaque
assay of this dissertation study should be interpreted with caution. Due to the unexpected
delays in preparation and testing for hemagglutination using MDCK cells the results may
not be truly representative of influenza A virus viability and infectivity. A positive
influenza A virus control provides the desired experimental outcome for comparison
against the samples. Without a positive influenza A virus control this comparison is not
possible. Therefore, the results of the hemagglutination plaque assay should be
interpreted with caution. The MDCK infectivity assay outcomes experienced in this
dissertation are possibly of significant interest to future research of aquatic habitats and
the avian influenza viruses within them.
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Limitations of the Study
As aforementioned in Chapter 1, there are two threats to the external validity of
this study. The first threat to external validity is centered to the theoretical framework of
this dissertation. The theoretical framework for this study was based on the hypotheses
proposed by Webster et al. (1992) and others that (a) migratory waterfowl are the natural
reserve of influenza viruses, and (b) water-borne transmission of influenza virus occurs
between migratory waterfowl and domestic waterfowl. The inclusion criteria of the study
population were artificial recirculating water ponds in the geographic locations of rural
and urban Californian communities. The geographical area was the state boundaries of
California. Thus, the findings of this dissertation are limited to geographical locations
along the migratory flyways of the waterfowl within the boundaries of California.
As aforementioned in Chapter 4, the severe drought conditions in California
resulted in a limited the number of available artificial recirculating water ponds for
sampling. Furthermore, the wildfires in Northern California during the time frame of the
field research and data collection made several of the planned pond water locations
unsafe for travel and field research. It is reasonable the severe drought conditions limited
the number of available water ponds for migratory waterfowl migration stopovers. A
similar effect may be attributed to the 2014 summer wildfires in Northern California. The
unsafe smoke and fire across several geographical regions are likely to have diverted
migratory waterfowl migration towards safer flight paths and stopovers. These
environmental conditions may have contributed to the outcomes of this study.
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This study is limited to the geographical areas of California which were available
for pond water sampling. These areas were defined by both state boundaries and
environmental conditions, namely drought and wildfire. As is shown in the analysis of
the data, the greater proportion of samples verified for influenza A virus were collected
within urban counties. This increased proportion maybe due to migratory waterfowl
migration seeking safer flight paths and stopovers. As observed during the field research
phase of this study, the urban counties had fewer wildfires and more available pond
water.
Recommendations
The purpose of this dissertation study was to investigate the aquatic virus
reservoir in rural and urban communities. As such, this was a baseline water analysis
study of the proportion of influenza A virus in urban and rural community settings in
California. Future research should continue to investigate the aquatic virus reservoir in
rural and urban communities. Alterations should be made to the ecological and
geographical approach and also to the laboratory model of this dissertation to improve the
focus and yielding data.
The ecological and geographical approach could be improved by narrowing the
geographical area of interest and using a multicenter strategy. This dissertation research
was a single-center statewide cross sectional study. Limited resources and distances of
travel reduced the allocation of funds per sample in this study. A multicenter approach
over a limited geographical may have a higher allocation of funds per sample. Greater
funding per sample may further result in identifying influenza A viruses. Identifying
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influenza A viruses by geography may improve vaccine development and biosecurity
measures.
The results of this study favor water ponds in urban communities to have a higher
burden of influenza A viruses than rural communities. Future research could limit
sampling schemes to specific urban communities. This dissertation study was limited to
collecting a single 200-ml water sample per site. It would be prudent for future studies to
collect multiple water samples from a single site. Additionally, in place of targeting only
for H5N1 influenza A viruses by real time RT-PCR, future studies could use universal
primer sets (PanHA) for amplification and sequencing for all 16 HA subtypes as asserted
by Gall, Hoffmann, Harder, Grund, and Beer (2008). A similar modification could also
be used for neuraminidase (NA) subtyping. Huang, Khan, and Măndoiu (2013) asserted
that quadruplicate primer pools [(N2, N6, N7); (N4, N5, N7, N8); (N3, N5, N9); and (N1,
N4, N6, N9)] of specific primer sequences can effectively be used to identify and
sequence all 9 NA subtypes. Influenza A viral sequencing may also be improved by
modification to the laboratory model.
The additional step of agarose gel electrophoresis following conventional RTPCR is a recommended protocol by the World Health Organization (2007) (this study
used real time RT-PCR assays). Agarose gel electrophoresis is a process to identify and
isolated DNA groups from a sample for the purpose of nucleotide sequencing. In the Gall
et al. (2008) study, the researchers purified the PanHA RT-PCR products using agarose
gels and by use of the QIAquick gel extraction kit (Qiagen®, USA) as recommended by
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the manufacturer. The purified influenza viral samples were then genetically sequenced
(Gall et al., 2008).
According to Gall, et al. (2008), the PanHA RT-PCR primers were designed and
combined in a one-step RT-PCR to amplify a fragment of 164 to 176 bp spanning the
HA0 cleavage site of influenza A viruses of all 16 HA subtypes. A similar process was
also used by the researchers of the Huang, Khan, & Măndoiu (2013) study in evaluating
the sensitivity and specificity of the quadruplicate primer pools to identify and sequence
all 9 NA subtypes. The agarose gel electrophoresis technique was not used in this
dissertation study. Agarose gel electrophoresis technique may have improved the
nucleotide sequencing results. Adapting these recommendations to a multicenter
approach would improve the research model and deepen the geographical areas of
interest.
Institutions of higher education with capabilities to conduct the laboratory
research could form a multicenter influenza A virus surveillance consortium. The
University of California system consists of 10 campuses and the California State
University system consists of 23 campuses. These institutions of higher learning are
located throughout the state. This dissertation research study could readily be adapted to
the classroom setting. The adaptation and implimentation of this dissertation research
study to the curriculum at institutions of higher learning has the potential to increase
influenza A virus surveillance and monitoring at the human-animal interface, improve
upon the laboratory model, increase and improve upon the influenza A virus strain library
for vaccine development, and may bring greater awareness to the individual, and thus,
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greater perceived susceptibility to influenza A virus infection. Greater perceived
susceptibility to influenza A virus infection may lead to increased influenza vaccination
rates.
As previously noted, indigenous populations in the United States have shown a
disproportionately higher rate of hospitalization and death from pandemic 2009 influenza
A (H1N1) virus infection. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2009)
reported American Indian/Alaskan Natives had H1N1 mortality rates four times higher
than persons in all other racial/ethnic populations combined. The findings of this
dissertation study show a greater burden of influenza A viruses in urban counties’
community water ponds, therefore, further investigation into rural communities’ humananimal interface is warranted to rule-out potential sources of influenza A viruses that may
not have been sampled. As shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17, there are identifiable
clusters of Native American Reservation in the Continental United States and California
(see Table 1). There are geographical similarities to water ponds verified (+) positive for
influenza A viruses (see Figure 18) and the locations of Native American Reservations in
California (see Figure 17). Further investigation of water ponds proximal to Native
American Reservations in California may be of significant interest to understanding the
disparate outcomes H1N1 mortality rates among American Indian/Alaskan Natives.
Another area of future research needs to focus on eliminating influenza A viruses or
reducing influenza A virus infectivity.
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Figure 16. Native American reservations in the continental United States site map.
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Table 10
Native Americans Reservations in the Continental United States Map Index

Native American Tribe and Index Number
0 No Data

51. COOS,
LOWER
UMPQUA &
SIUSLAW

102. HUALAPAI

153. MORONGO

204. RED
CLIFF

255.
STEWARTS
POINT

1. ABSENTEE
SHAWNEE *

52. COQUILLE *

103. INAJA

154.
MUCKLESHOOT

205. RED
LAKE

256.
STOCKBRIDGE
MUNSEE

2. ACOMA

53. CORTINA

104. IOWA *

155. NAMBE

206. RENOSPARKS

257. SUMMIT
LAKE

3. AGUA
CALIENTE

54. COUSHATTA

105. ISABELLA

156.
NARRAGANSETT

207. RINCON

258.
SUSANVILLE

4. ALABAMACOUSHATTA

55. COW CREEK

106. ISLETA

157. NAVAJO

208. ROARING
CREEK

259.
SWINOMISH

5. ALABAMAQUASSARTE
CREEKS *

56. CREEK *

107. JACKSON

158. NETT LAKE

209. ROCKY
BOYS

260. TAOS

6. ALLEGANY

57. CROW

108. JEMEZ

159. NEZ PERCE

210. ROSEBUD

261. TE-MOAK

7. APACHE *

58. CROW
CREEK

109. JICARILLA

160. NIPMOCHASSANAMISCO +

211. ROUND
VALLEY

262. TESUQUE

8. BAD RIVER

59. CUYAPAIPE

110. KAIBAB

161. NISQUALLY

212. RUMSEY

263. TEXAS
KICKAPOO

9. BARONA
RANCH

60. DEER CREEK

111. KALISPEL

162. NOOKSACK

213. SAC AND
FOX #

264. TOHONO
O'ODHAM

10. BATTLE
MOUNTAIN

61. DELAWARE *

112. KAW *

163. NORTHERN
CHEYENNE

214. SALT
RIVER

265.
TONAWANDA

11. BAY MILLS

62. DEVILS
LAKE

113. KIALEGEE
CREEK *

164.
NORTHWESTERN
SHOSHONE

215. SANDIA

266.
TONIKAWA *

12. BENTON
PAIUTE

63.
DRESSLERVILLE
COLONY

114. KICKAPOO *

165. OIL SPRINGS

216. SANDY
LAKE

267. TORRES
MARTINEZ

13. BERRY
CREEK

64. DRY CREEK

115. KIOWA *

166. OMAHA

217. SANTA
ANA

268.
TOULUMNE

14. BIG BEND

65. DUCKWATER

116. KLAMATH *

167. ONEIDA #

218. SANTA
CLARA

269. TRINDAD

15. BIG
CYPRESS

66. DUCK
VALLEY

117. KOOTENAI

168. ONONDAGA

219. SANTA
DOMINGO

270. TULALIP

16. BIG
LAGOON

67. EASTERN
SHAWNEE *

118. L'ANSE

169. ONTONAGON

220. SANTA
ROSA

271. TULE
RIVER

17. BIG PINE

68. EAST
COCOPAH

119. LAC COURTE
OREILLES

170. OSAGE

221. SANTA
ROSA
(NORTH)

272. TUNICABILOXI

(table continues)
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18. BIG
VALLEY

69. ELY COLONY

120. LAC DU
FLAMBEAU

171. OTOEMISSOURI *

222. SANTA
YNEZ

273. TURTLE
MOUNTAINS

19. BISHOP

70. ENTERPRISE

121. LAC VIEUX
DESERT

172. OTTAWA *

223. SANTA
YSABEL

274.
TUSCARORA

20. BLACKFEET

71. FALLON

122. LAGUNA

173. OUT

224. SANTEE

275.
TWENTYNINE
PALMS

21.
BRIDGEPORT

72. FLANDREAU
INDIAN SCHOOL

123. LAS VEGAS

174. OZETTE

225. SAN
CARLOS

276.
UMATILLA

22. BRIGHTON

73. FLATHEAD

124.
LAYTONVILLE

175. PAIUTE

226. SAN
FELIPE

277. UINTAH
AND OURAY

23. BURNS
PAIUTE
COLONY

74. FOND DU
LAC

125. LA JOLLA

176. PALA

227. SAN
ILDEFONSO

278. UNITED
KEETOOWAH
BAND OF
CHEROKEE *

24. CABEZON

75. FORT
APACHE

126. LA POSTA

177. PAMUNKEY +

228. SAN JUAN

279. UPPER
SIOUX

25. CADDO *

76. FORT
BELKNAP

127. LIKELY

178. PASCUA
YAQUI

229. SAN
MANUAL

280. UPPER
SKAGIT

26. CAHUILLA

77. FORT
BERTHOLD

128. LONE PINE

179.
PASSAMAQUODDY

230. SAN
PASQUAL

281. UTE
MOUNTAIN

27. CAMPO

78. FORT
BIDWELL

129. LOOKOUT

180. PAUCATAUK
PEQUOT +

231. SAN
XAVIER

282.
VERMILION
LAKE

28. CAMP
VERDE

79. FORT HALL

130. LOS
COYOTES

181. PAUGUSETT +

232. SAUK
SUIATTLE

283. VIEJAS

29. CANONCITO

80. FORT
INDEPENDENCE

131. LOVELOCK
COLONY

182. PAWNEE *

233.
SEMINOLE *

284. WALKER
RIVER

30. CAPITAN
GRANDE

81. FORT
MCDERMITT

132. LOWER
BRULE

183. PECHANGA

234. SENECACAYUGA *

285. WARM
SPRINGS

31. CARSON

82. FORT
MCDOWELL

133. LOWER
ELWAH

184. PENOBSCOT

235. SEQUAN

286. WASHOE

32. CATAWBA

83. FORT
MOHAVE

134. LOWER
SIOUX

185. PEORIA *

236.
SHAGTICOKE
+

287. WEST
COCOPAH

33.
CATTARAUGUS

84. FORT PECK

135. LUMMI

186. PICURIS

237.
SHAKOPEE

288. WHITE
EARTH

34. CAYUGA *

85. FORT YUMA

136. MAKAH

187. PINE RIDGE

238. SHEEP
RANCH

289. WICHITA
*

35.
CEDARVILLE

86. FT. SILL
APACHE *

137.
MANCHESTER

188. POARCH
CREEK

239.
SHERWOOD
VALLEY

290. WIND
RIVER

36. CHEHALIS

87. GILA BEND

138. MANZANITA

189. POJOAQUE

240. SHINGLE
SPRING

291.
WINNEBAGO #

(table continues)
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37.
CHEMEHUEVI

88. GILA RIVER

139. MARICOPA

190. PONCA *

241.
SHINNECOCK
+

38. CHEROKEE
*#

89. GOSHUTE

140.
MASHANTUCKET
PEQUOT

191.
POOSEPATUCK +

242.
SHOALWATER

39. CHEYENNEARAPAHOE*

90. GRANDE
RONDE

141. MATTAPONI
+

192. PORT GAMBLE

243.
SHOSHONE

40. CHEYENNE
RIVER

91. GRAND
PORTAGE

142. MENOMINEE

193. PORT
MADISON

244. SILETZ

295. XL
RANCH

41.
CHICKASAW *

92. GRAND
TRAVERSE

143. MESCALERO

194. POTAWATOMI
#

245. SISSETON

296. YAKAMA

42.
CHITIMACHA

93. GREATER
LEECH LAKE

144. MIAMI *

195. PRAIRIE ISLE

246.
SKOKOMISH

297. YANKTON

43. CHOCTAW *
#

94. GRINDSTONE

145.
MICCOSUKEE

196. PUERTOCITO

247. SKULL
VALLEY

298. YAVAPAI

44. CITIZEN
BAND OF
POTAWATOMI
*

95.
HANNAHVILLE

146.
MIDDLETOWN

197. PUYALLUP

248. SOBOBA

299.
YERINGTON

45. COCHITI

96. HAVASUPAI

147. MILLE LACS

198. PYRAMID
LAKE

249.
SOUTHERN
UTE

300. YOMBA

46. COEUR
D'ALENE

97. HOH

148. MISSION

199. QUAPAW *

250. SPOKANE

301. YSLETA
DEL SUR

47. COLD
SPRINGS

98.
HOLLYWOOD

149. MOAPA

200. QUILLAYUTE

251. SQUAXON
ISLAND

302. YUROK

48. COLORADO
RIVER

99. HOOPA
VALLEY

150. MODOC *

201. QUINAULT

252. ST. CROIX

303. ZIA

49. COLVILLE

100. HOPI

151. MOLE LAKE

202. RAMAH

253. ST. REGIS

304. ZUNI

50. COMANCHE
*

101. HOULTON
MALISEETS

152.
MONTGOMERY
CREEK

203. RAMONA

254.
STANDING
ROCK

292.
WINNEMUCCA
293.
WOODFORD
INDIAN
COMMUNITY
294.
WYANDOTTE
*
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Figure 17. Native American reservations in California site map.
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Figure 18. Statewide samples verified (+) positive for their content of influenza A virus
genome.
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The target population for this dissertation was artificial recirculating water ponds
in the geographic locations of rural and urban Californian communities. Future studies
may consider investigating methods of eliminating influenza A viruses or reducing
influenza A virus infectivity in these aquatic habitats. As aforementioned, Faust et al.
(2009) focused on the ability of filter-feeeding bivalves to remove influenza virus from
contaminated water. The researchers were able to demonstrate that filter-feeding bivalves
can remove influenza virus from contaminated water, however, the findings of the
research suggest avian influenza virus is inactivated or sequestered in clam tissue after
filtration (Faust et al., 2009). The introduction of bivalves to communty water ponds for
the purpose of removing influenza A viruses may be ecologically unfavorable. Another
method of removing influenza A viruses could be water exposure to ultraviolet
electromagnetic radiation (UV light). The method of UV light to sterilize saltwater
aquariums is a well known and common practice. An in-vitro investigation to the
susceptibility of influenza A viruses to UV light may warrant further field research in
artificial recirculating water pond settings. If successful, UV light exposure may be
viewed as a biosecurity measure. These recommendations for expansion and further
research are centered around positive social change.
Implications
The potential impact of this dissertation study can be recognized at the
international level, the national and state level, the population level, and at the individual
level. The results of this dissertation study show that artificial water ponds in
communities can be sources of influenza A viruses. As sources of influenza A viruses,
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the artificial water ponds in communities can be used to increase influenza A virus
surveillance and monitoring at the human-animal interface, expand and improve upon the
influenza A virus strain library for vaccine development, and may bring greater
awareness to the individual, and thus, greater perceived susceptibility to influenza A virus
infection leading to improved vaccination rates. International surveillance and monitoring
of influenza viruses is a current global challenge.
At the end of 2013, seven novel variants of clade 2.3.4 HPAI H5N1 isolated from
poultry in China were reported (Gu, et al., 2013). The authors of the Gu, et al. (2013)
study also reported that various NA subtypes of the H5 viruses bearing the same genetic
backbone of clade 2.3.4 A(H5N1) viruses had been detected in ducks, geese, quail, and
chickens. Following this event, there have been two epidemic clusters of H7N9 human
infections in China (World Health Organization, 2014). The World Health Organization
(2014) reported there have been more than 400 cases with a case fatality rate greater than
20%. Additionally, the World Health Organization reported the source of infection is
assumed to be infected poultry or contaminated environments. These two recent events
alone stress the importance of international surveillance and monitoring of influenza A
viruses. As aforementioned, artificial water ponds in communities can be used to increase
influenza A virus surveillance and monitoring at the human-animal interface. Increased
surveillance and monitoring of influenza viruses may lead to mitigating risk. Mitigating
influenza risk is a challenge at the national and state levels.
Moriguchi, Onuma, and Goka (2013) asserted that species distribution models can
be useful tools for predicting the distribution of pathogens. The authors of the Moriguchi,
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et al. study further asserted the creation of a potential risk map for avian influenza,
including the localities of infected birds, would provide a potentially useful warning of
infection and also be used to suggest priority areas for surveillance. This dissertation
research study model could supplement the potential risk map for avian influenza as
suggested by Moriguchi, et al. by providing molecular verification of the presence of
influenza A viruses. The national and state level impact of potential risk mapping and
aquatic habitat surveillance for influenza A viruses would be an initiation of biosecurity
measures to protect poultry industries. Surveillance for influenza A viruses in aquatic
habitats in communities may also lead to positive impact at the population level.
Improving vaccine development is a positive impact at the population level. This
dissertation research study as a model, may further expand the influenza A virus strain
library for vaccine development. Schrauwen et al. (2014) asserted surveillance of bird
and swine influenza viruses should specifically target particular mutations that render
viruses more virulent or airborne-transmissible in humans. The virulence of influenza A
viruses is being studied by others (Rumschlag-Booms & Rong, 2013; Schrauwen et al.,
2014; Taggi, Colaiori, Loreto, and Tria, 2013). Rumschlag-Booms and Rong (2013)
stated the HA protein of the influenza A viron is recognized as an important determinant
for influenza virus virulence and pathogenesis (p. 2). The researchers of the Schrauwen et
al. (2014) study presented a similar conclusion and also noted the polymerase proteins
(PB2), PB1-F2, PA-X, NS1, and NA each are contributing virulence factors. Taggi,
Colaiori, Loreto, and Tria (2013) asserted the evolutionary dynamics of human influenza
A viruses have a high mutation rate that allows the viruses to escape the host’s adaptive
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immunity. The theorectical model proposed by Taggi, et al. highlights the challenges of
developing a universal vaccine that would induce protection against all influenza
subtypes (Schrauwen et al., 2014). As aforementioned, this dissertation research study as
a model, may further expand the influenza A virus strain library for vaccine and
theapeutics development. Therapeutic development is a positive impact at the individual
level. Further, at the individual level the results of this dissertation may bring about
greater awareness of influenza A virus infection.
As previously noted, Shive and Kanekar (2011) suggested the principles of the
Health Belief Model can provide explanation why many people, including high risk
individuals, do not receive influenza vaccination. The results of this dissertation study
may bring greater awareness to the individual, and thus, greater perceived susceptibility
to influenza A virus infection. The analysis of samples from artificial recirculating water
ponds identified influenza A viruses. Many of the samples were collected from artificial
recirculating water pond features in parks and golf courses. The decorative feature is
often constructed to attract people. These decorative features may also attract both
domestic and migratory waterfowl (Webster et al., 1992). As asserted by Webster et al.
(1992), migratory waterfowl likely will introduce influenza A viruses to the artificial
recirculating water pond enivronment from viral shedding in feces. Several of the
artificial recirculating water ponds sampled were constructed with an aeration fountain
producing mist and droplet formation. As is well established, influenza viruses are
transmitted between individuals through droplets (e.g., coughing, sneezing). The
individual who comes in contact with the droplets from the contaminated artificial
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recirculating water pond may be inoculated with influenza A virus. Therefore, the (+)
positive influenza A virus findings of this dissertation study may bring greater awareness
at the individual level, and thus, increase the perceived susceptibility to influenza A virus
infection. As implied by Shive and Kanekar, perceived susceptibility to influenza A virus
infection will have a direct correlation to influenza vaccination.
Conclusion
The results of this dissertation research study show community water ponds are
viable sites of influenza A viruses. Additionally, the data analysis suggests these aquatic
systems may serve as reservoirs and sources of infection for both wild birds and
mammals. The infectivity studies show these community water ponds to have the
potential to be sites of the human-animal interface for influenza A virus infection.
Additionally, this environmental baseline research study validated these community
water ponds as resource sites for influenza A virus surveillance and monitoring. The
materials and methods of this environmental baseline research study were built on the
research of others.
This investigation successfully used the commercial preservative RNAlater
(Qiagen®) as a stabilizing media for influenza A virus research. Real time RT-PCR
utilizing the TaqMan® methodology also showed to be successful. Testing field research
water samples with the hemagglutination MDCK plaque assay showed promise and is
warranted for further investigation. The geochemical properties of pond water (pH,
salinity, and temperature) could not be concluded as contributing factors to influenza A
virus infectivity in water ponds. However, due to the association of the MDCK plaque
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assay in this study, the geochemical properties of pond water as contributing factors to
influenza A virus infectivity also warrants further investigation. Alterations should be
made to the ecological and geographical approach of this research study to improve the
focus and resulting data.
This research study was a single-center statewide cross sectional study. The
ecological and geographical approach could be improved by narrowing the geographical
area of interest and using a multicenter strategy. Institutions of higher education with
capabilities to conduct the biosafety level 2 laboratory research could collaborate to form
a multicenter influenza A virus surveillance consortium. This research study could
readily be adapted to the classroom setting. The adaptation and implimentation of this
dissertation research study to the curriculum at partnership institutions has the potential to
increase statewide influenza A virus surveillance and monitoring, increase and improve
upon the influenza A virus strain library at the national and international levels for
vaccine development, and may bring greater awareness to the individual and society
about susceptibility to influenza A virus infection.
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Appendix A: Collection Site Contact Letter
Collection Site Contact Letter
[Date]
Zin Htway
Contact Information
Dear [Data Collection Site Contact],
I am a PhD student at Walden University and I am conducting a research study entitled
___________. This research involves the collection of water samples from artificial
recirculating water ponds in rural and urban communities throughout California. By this
letter, I am requesting your (and/or your organization’s) participation in this research. Of
course, your participation in the research is completely voluntary. The data collection
process at your site will present no risk of harm or damage to your facility or any
individuals who may be present. The potential benefits from this research include
___________________. Your participation in the research as well as the data derived
from the samples collected from your site were kept confidential. While the description
of the research in this letter has been summary in nature, I will provide the full research
proposal for your information should you desire (either now or at any point in the future).
If you have any questions about the proposed research please feel free to contact me (now
or in the future) at ____________. If you want to talk privately about your rights regarding
this research, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden University representative who
can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-312-1210. Walden University’s approval
number for this study is IRB will enter approval number here and it expires on IRB will enter
expiration date.
If you (and/or your organization) agree to participate in the research, please sign the attached
letter of cooperation and return to me. Also, you should keep a copy of the signed letter of
cooperation for your files. Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions or concerns.
Sincerely yours,
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Appendix B: Letter of Cooperation
Letter of Cooperation
[Date]
Data Collection Site
Contact Information

Dear Zin Htway,
Based on my review of your research proposal, I give permission for you to conduct the
study entitled __________ at our site located at _______. As part of this study, I
authorize you to collect water samples as described in your contact letter dated ____ and
more specifically detailed in your research proposal.
We understand that our organization’s responsibilities include: ________________. We
reserve the right to withdraw from the study at any time if our circumstances change.
I confirm that I am authorized to approve research in this setting.
I understand the data collected will remain entirely confidential and may not be provided
to anyone outside of the research team without permission from the Walden University
IRB.
Sincerely,
Authorization Official
Contact Information

296
Appendix C: Curriculum Vitae
Zin M. Htway
zin.htway@waldenu.edu / zin.htway@csuci.edu
Education:
PhD in Public Health, Epidemiology, Walden University, February 2015
MBA, Healthcare Management, Western Governor’s University, 2011
Bachelor of Science in Clinical Sciences, Cytotechnology, California State University
Dominguez Hills,
1992
Certificate of Completion, Los Angeles Consortium of Cytotechnology, University of
California Los Angeles and California State University Dominguez Hills, 1992
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Los Robles Hospital and Medical Center, Thousand Oaks, California 2005-Present
Supervisor Anatomic Pathology Department
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Responsibilities include – Operations Manager of the Anatomic Pathology Section of the
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